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Introductory Section 
Introduction 
  
Man is still utterly dependant on the natural world but now has for the first 
time the ability to alter it, rapidly and on a global scale. Because of that 
difference, Einstein’s verdict that “we shall require a substantially new 
manner of thinking if mankind is to survive” still seems apt. 
Jessica Tuchman Matthews: Redefining Security.1 
The Environment and Security or Environmental Security? 
One of the most important ideas to emerge from security studies in the past forty 
years is the field of research commonly known as environmental security. The scale 
and pace of both environmental changes and global population growth in the 20th 
and 21st century have given rise to concerns about how these may lead to serious 
negative security outcomes. These concerns revolve around issues such as: conflict 
between nations over scarce resources; state instability due to dwindling supplies of 
food and water; negative outcomes for individuals and communities due to both 
increasingly severe climatic events and renewable resource scarcity; and the 
vulnerability created by the impacts of a changing climate and ecosystem loss. 
These concerns about the interaction between security and the environment have 
led to a range of security analyses that approach them from a variety of 
perspectives.      
Although there is a huge interest in the linkages between the environment and 
security from both academic and policy perspectives, there is no agreement as to 
how to understand or interpret these linkages. This provides a certain richness to the 
theoretical approaches to environmental security, however it does not provide 
policymakers with any clear or readily understandable way of applying theory in 
practice. Unlike traditional theories of international security such as realism and 
liberalism, environmental security has not had a growing impact on national security 
that it might have expected to – given the environmental issues raised above. On the 
                                                          
1
 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989). 
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other hand, environmental security has been more accepted by the field of human 
security. The problem with this is that there is no analytical bridge between the 
environment (environmental science), the state (traditional security and international 
relations) and the individual (human security). This is a problem because national 
and international policymakers generally continue to look through the lenses of the 
traditional theories of realism and liberalism in order to understand the complex and 
evolving political/environmental/social challenges that are arising as a result of a 
rapidly changing environment and a biosphere under immense pressure. Whereas 
human security analyses more readily engage with the social issues that are linked 
to a changing environment, it generally rejects the statist premise that underlines 
realism and liberalism.  
This thesis engages with the problems that arise due to the disparate nature of 
Environmental Security Studies (ESS) and seeks to understand why environmental 
security is such a splintered notion. It also investigates whether there are similar 
ideas or themes running throughout the varied and fragmented literature on 
environmental security. Finally, based on these investigations, this thesis forwards 
an original and unique way of understanding the relationship between the 
environment and security, linking the state, the environment and the individual: 
Systemic Environmental Security.  
Statement of the Thesis - Hypothesis 
The central premise or distinctive hypothesis driving this thesis is that although there 
is no central theoretical core to Environmental Security Studies, there is a discernible 
recurring theme within the environmental security discourse. If operationalised to 
form a synthetic analytical framework – known as Systemic Environmental Security – 
this more integrative analysis provides unique security insights that would not 
otherwise be achieved. Furthermore, it is assumed that this systemic approach to 
environmental security provides a valuable way of analysing environmental problems 
from a security perspective and that this will contribute to the discipline of security 
studies more generally. The sections below will outline the research questions and 
the specific contribution of the thesis. 
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Outline of Research Questions. 
In order to address the above hypothesis, three research questions are below 
advanced and will be pursued throughout this thesis: 
 
1. Does environmental security have a central theoretical core that enables it to 
coherently analyse the linkages between security and the environment?   
2. Is there a common theme that can be discerned within the literature on 
environmental security? 
3. Does Systemic Environmental Security provide any unique insights into the 
relationship between security and the environment? 
Contribution of the thesis: Research Question 1. 
The first research question therefore revolves around whether there is a theoretical 
core within the environmental security discourse. The findings indicate that security 
analyses of environmental issues tend to focus on either the level of the state or the 
level of the individual. The environmental analyses that focus on state security 
emanate from ‘traditional’ security approaches such as realism and liberalism. 
Realism’s main concerns revolve around aspects such as power balances and 
interstate conflict in an anarchic international environment where each actor seeks to 
maximise its own gains in what is believed to be a zero sum game.2 On the other 
hand, liberalism offers more cooperative ways of dealing with environmental 
problems, focusing on relative rather than absolute gains, trade, economic 
competition, the liberalisation of markets, liberal institutions, and globalisation.3 Both 
realism and liberal theory – specifically liberal institutionalism – favour the state as 
the referent of security.  
At the other end of the spectrum, human security focuses on the ways in which 
environmental insecurity is driven by globalisation and the consumption habits of 
                                                          
2
 Some central texts espousing these points are: John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
(New York: WW Norton & Co., 2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: 
Waveland Press Inc., 1979); Morgenthau J. Hans, Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace, 
5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978). 
3
 See for example: Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (London: 
HarperCollins, 2000). Much of liberal thought in this respect is based on the ideas of Smith. See: Adam Smith, 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. W. B. Todd, Glasgow Edition of the Works 
and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal 
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983). 
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those living in the global North.4 Concerns revolve around the basic material needs 
of individuals and communities and the ways in which poverty and inequity drive 
vulnerability.5 Rather than thinking in terms of an external environment which is to be 
secured and captured, human security analyses of the environment align with 
ecological principles that focus on complex and interconnected eco and social 
systems which, when healthy, help to build resilience – the antithesis of 
vulnerability.6 In the case of human security, the referent of security is obviously 
individuals and communities.  
The specific contribution of this thesis that emanates from answering the first 
research question is the finding that there is no body of literature that might be 
considered, in and of itself, to contain the core tenet of environmental security. Nor is 
there an analytical coherence to environmental security that enables a clear 
understanding of the interactions between security and the environment. This is a 
complex claim that will be established by the following literature review chapter and 
reinforced in Chapter Three. Instead of containing a central theoretical core, 
environmental security is an amorphous idea that arose over the past few decades 
from the post-Cold War security discourse interested in the environmental concerns 
identified above.7 This means that environmental security is a conglomeration of 
ideas from scholars, often from competing disciplines, discussing the ways that 
environmental processes impact on security. Although there is recognition within the 
ESS discourse that environmental security does not have a central tenet, nor a 
united epistemological or methodological approach, there does not appear to be any 
great consternation about this.8  
This is potentially a problem, however, in that environmental security generally defies 
definition and is, therefore, a considerably loose term. Answering the first research 
                                                          
4
 Jon Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era 
(London: Zed Books Ltd., 2001); Simon Dalby, Environmental Security (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002). 
5
 Karen O'Brien and Jon Barnett, "Global Environmental Change and Human Security," Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 38(2013). 
6
 Simon Dalby, "Ecological Politics, Violence, and the Theme of Empire," Global Environmental Politics 4, no. 2 
(May 2004); Simon Dalby, "Ecology, Security, and Change in the Anthropocene," The Brown Journal of World 
Affairs 13, no. 2 (Spring 2007); Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security. 
7
 Michael Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers Inc., 2005). 
8
 Rita Floyd, "Whither Environmental Security Studies? An Afterword," in Environmental Security: Approaches 
and Issues, ed. Rita Floyd and Richard A. Matthew (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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question raises the awkward question as to what environmental security actually is. 
Is it a theory, a field of research, a concept, a discipline, or an analytical framework?9 
The ambiguous and highly unsatisfactory answer that results from answering 
research question one, is that environmental security is all of these and none. The 
challenge of such a disparate approach is that if there is nothing unified about 
environmental security, and if it is simply a “car crash”10 of competing ideas and 
methodologies, then the term environmental security could arguably be abandoned 
given that it fails to provide analytical coherence.  
Contribution of the thesis: Research Question 2. 
The second research question posed in this thesis therefore asks us to look more 
deeply and take a more nuanced approach. The assumption driving this approach is 
that it does not follow, given there is no theoretical core to environmental security, 
that environmental security is a useless term that should be abandoned. Question 
two therefore asks if it is possible to conceive of environmental security in a more 
unified way. In the absence of a theoretical core, is there a common theme that runs 
through the environmental security literature? This is an exploratory research 
question that highlights the importance of knowing more about this amorphous idea 
of environmental security. Are scholars on the subject even talking about the same 
thing given that they are not taking similar methodological or epistemological 
approaches? If there are similarities, then what are they, and what does this mean?  
The research indicates that although the literature on environmental security is 
disparate in many ways, there is a previously unrecognised and undescribed way of 
understanding environmental security in a more coherent fashion. Understanding 
this unifying theme within ESS requires us to ask the important question: What is the 
referent object of environmental security? Is it the state, individuals or the 
environment itself?11 What has been found is that although environmental security 
scholars proceed from a range of theoretical perspectives, each perspective 
attempts to understand the ways in which security interacts with the environment at 
                                                          
9
 I owe the excellent framing of this question to Jon Barnett.   
10
 I have Dr Matthew Sussex to thank for the ‘car crash’ reference.  
11
 Simon Dalby, "Environmental Security: Ecology or International Relations?," in Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association (New Orleans, March, 2002). See also: Karen T. Liftin, "Constructing 
Environmental Security and Ecological Interdependence," in Critical Security Studies: Critical Concepts in 
Military, Strategic and Security Studies, ed. Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 
2013), 317. 
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various social and political levels of analysis. Instead of simply trying to understand 
the way that the environment interacts with security at only the level of the state, or 
only the level of the individual, the majority of environmental security scholars 
endeavour to comprehend the systemic impact of environmental processes.  
In answering this question, this thesis provides another important contribution,  not 
by acknowledging the splintered theoretical nature of environmental security, but 
instead, by uncovering the common theme running throughout the literature.  
Contribution of the thesis: Research Question 3. 
Building on this theme, this thesis forwards a unique approach to environmental 
security that provides a way of understanding it in a more unified way. This 
conceptualisation of environmental security is based around its systemic nature – in 
that it attempts to understand the relationship between states; individuals and 
communities; and environmental processes and systems. The main argument or 
thesis presented here is that rather than the current approaches that suggest that 
environmental security take either a state-centric or a human security approach, 
environmental security must be understood as a combination of both. This approach 
has been termed “Systemic Environmental Security” (SES). SES is an analytical 
framework that takes into account the way that environmental processes give rise to 
both state security and human security concerns. From an empirical perspective, 
SES aligns with ecological notions of the environment due to the emphasis that 
these give to ecological systems at the local and biospherical levels. Thinking in 
these terms gives SES a unique advantage in understanding a range of security 
considerations. 
The final research question seeks to understand what, if any, unique insights are 
provided by SES into the relationship between security and the environment. The 
final unique contribution of this thesis, therefore, is to empirically explore the 
potential value of the analytical framework of Systemic Environmental Security. This 
exploration demonstrates four key insights regarding: the relationships between 
states and the environment; the relationships between states and other states; the 
relationship between human security and the environment and; the relationship 
between the state and human security. Firstly, the attitude of a state to its 
environmental or renewable resources can have a negative impact on its security 
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when its resources are viewed in purely economic terms, as sovereign and 
exploitable. This is related to the second insight that suggests that viewing resources 
in this way – even when they are shared – can have a negative impact on the 
relationship between states. SES indicates that the relationships between states 
which are connected via complex ecological systems, and not simply connected by 
borders, have unique physical connections that require greater understanding and 
exploration. Thirdly, the relationship between human security and the environment is 
particularly strong when individuals and communities are heavily reliant on natural 
resources for their subsistence and livelihoods. Finally, SES demonstrates that the 
relationship between the state and human security is not simply based on economic 
transactions that rely on increasing the revenue for the central government in order 
to redistribute this to individuals and communities. When environmental resources 
are valued by states only as a source of economic revenue, without due 
consideration for their wider importance in the context of ecological and social 
systems, this can have significant negative impacts on human security.  
The Case of the Mekong River Basin 
In order to investigate Systemic Environmental Security and draw the conclusions 
described above, it is crucial to provide an empirical context. This is achieved 
through a relevant case study which provides both geographic and ecological 
specificity to the investigation. There are a large number of potentially worthwhile 
issues to investigate related to environmental security. Each potential research 
interest is arguably as important as the next, but for the sake of a manageable 
thesis, only one is focused on here: hydropower construction in the Mekong River 
Basin (MRB). Hydropower construction in the MRB is occurring in the context of the 
rapid expansion of hydropower projects throughout Asia and the seemingly 
unquenchable thirst for energy in the region has pitted energy security against food, 
water and human security. Large dams have significant impacts on those reliant on 
the river for their livelihoods and the stability of the wider economy.  
There are several good reasons for choosing hydropower as a case study for 
developing and challenging the idea of Systemic Environmental Security. Firstly, 
hydropower development works on the assumption that the consequences of 
fracturing complex riverine ecosystems, and the knock-on effects to environmental 
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resources, individuals and communities, is acceptable in terms of the economic and 
societal benefits that flow from the project. This warrants investigation. Secondly, 
hydropower projects are often highly contested by civil society, frequently pitting 
governments and private interests against communities and individuals. This 
provides an opportunity to investigate the interaction between the environment and 
both state and human security. Finally, given the relevance that hydropower prima 
facie has to the idea of environmental security generally, there is a dearth of case 
studies on the subject. This thesis will therefore go some way to addressing this lack 
of attention to hydropower in the environmental security discourse.  
Instead of a single nation state, the focus of attention for this thesis will be on a 
single river system, the MRB. The MRB is of particular interest in that it is currently 
undergoing a massive expansion in hydropower projects on both the mainstream of 
the river and its tributaries. Furthermore, the Mekong River is shared by six different 
nation-states, each treating their part of the river as a national resource to be 
exploited, with little consideration of the impacts on nations and communities in other 
parts of the system. This fragmentation of a natural system into artificial political units 
provides fertile ground for developing the idea of Systemic Environmental Security. 
Taking into account the impact of hydropower on both the Mekong mainstream and 
its tributaries, both a macro and a micro lens will be used to examine the case from 
an SES standpoint. From a macro perspective, the mainstream dams that have been 
built in the Chinese section of the river, known as the Lancang Cascade are 
examined. The Lancang Cascade is having significant environmental, social, 
economic and political impacts on the MRB, all the way from south-western China to 
the mouth of the river in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. This macro perspective gives 
insight into the relationship between the environmental impacts of hydropower and 
the state. From a micro perspective, a single dam, the Nam Theun 2 in central Laos, 
has been selected to provide a more detailed analysis of the impacts of hydropower 
projects, focussed at the level of the community and individual. By focusing on this 
single geographic area – the Mekong River Basin – and by narrowing the interest of 
the thesis to a single security interest – that is, the impact of hydropower 
development – it is possible to explore the idea of Systemic Environmental Security, 
asking if and how it is related to this real world problem. It also enables a comparison 
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of the current ad-hoc and disparate security approaches to hydropower issues in the 
Mekong River Basin, with an approach that incorporates the state, the individual and 
the environment.  
This narrowed focus highlights the fact that this thesis is not designed to engage, nor 
capable of adequately engaging with the larger arguments surrounding the 
biophysical processes of climate change. Neither does it enter into the broad and 
growing discourse surrounding food and water security. Although issues of food and 
water are obviously related to human security concerns regarding hydropower – and 
will be considered in due course – the focus will remain on the literature relevant to 
environmental security. This is despite both global climate change and food and 
water security arguably sitting under the general umbrella of environmental security. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the global reach of climate change and 
the broad applicability of food and water security issues to states and individuals 
highlight the need for a clear and coherent understanding of the interactions between 
these environmental challenges and security. The unprecedented global and local 
environmental changes that have occurred in the past century, and which continue at 
a rapid pace, in effect, demand a clearer conceptualisation of environmental security. 
This begins with developing knowledge at a much more specific level. It is intended, 
therefore, for this thesis to make a significant contribution to the environmental 
security literature by positing a promising new way of conceptualising the idea in a 
more coherent fashion, offering a single, complex case-study, which demonstrates 
its value. 
Structuring the Thesis – Linking Theory with Empirics  
When undertaking research such as this, it is important to outline and emphasise 
how the theory is linked with empirics.12 The structure of this thesis is designed to 
provide the strongest possible links between theory and the real world.  
The literature review chapter – Chapter One – provides an overview of the evolution 
of the environmental security discourse and outlines the four primary approaches to 
environmental security: National security; environmental scarcities and violent 
conflict (ESVC) – including a migration component; critical security; and human 
security.  
                                                          
12
 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003), 18, 145. 
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The methodology chapter, Chapter Two, follows the literature review and has five 
main goals. It provides: the research design for the thesis – including the research 
questions and primary assumptions; the thesis scope – explaining and justifying the 
focus on the Mekong River Basin; an epistemological overview that outlines why a 
mixed methods approach is used; the case study design; and finally the data 
collection methods used throughout the thesis. It is intended that a strong 
methodology will help to guide the research so as to keep the thesis clearly focused 
on the research questions. 
Chapter Three is an extension of the literature review in that it examines the way that 
the development of the environmental security discourse did not lead to a central 
tenet with similar methodological and theoretical underpinnings. It goes on to explain 
that although environmental security is a highly splintered notion, those involved in 
the discourse nevertheless have similar aspirations in attempting to understand the 
various security referents and how they interact. From this, the idea of Systemic 
Environmental Security is explored in more detail and suggested as a way of 
overcoming the current splintered nature of environmental security studies. 
 
The third section is comprised of the case study chapters which provide an important 
empirical context in the form of a case study on the Mekong River Basin. The case 
study chapters provide not only an empirical re-evaluation of the environmental 
security discourse, but they also afford the opportunity to consider how the empirics 
relate to the theoretical assumptions of the thesis – specifically Systemic 
Environmental Security. The first case study chapter, Chapter Four, examines the 
Lancang Cascade – a series of dams built on the Mekong mainstream in the 
Chinese section of the river known as the Lancang Jiang. This chapter provides a 
macro view of the Mekong River Basin and the way that hydropower is interacting 
with environmental security issues – from the upper section of the river all the way to 
the Delta. Chapter Five takes a micro view, focusing in on a single dam in Laos, the 
Nam Theun 2, investigating how it is having an impact on security in a more defined 
geographical area. Together, these two chapters provide important insights as to 
why a systemic approach is needed in ESS.  
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The aim of Section Four, therefore, is to consider the theory of Systemic 
Environmental Security in the context of the lessons learned from the case study 
chapters. Chapter Six explores the findings of the case study, concluding that SES 
provides valuable insight into the links between the state and the environment, states 
and other states, human security and the environment and, most importantly, states 
and human security. Finally, the conclusion assesses whether the thesis has been 
successful in answering the research question and evaluates the potential 
usefulness of SES to both theory and practice. It concludes by highlighting some of 
the challenges to SES and also forwards some suggestions for further research that 
may help to explore, strengthen and challenge the idea of Systemic Environmental 
Security.  
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 Literature Section 
Chapter One: Environmental Security 
– From National to Human Security 
 
Critics of the idea of environmental security have argued that it is too amorphous. 
Michael Sheehan: International Security.13 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out to explore the evolution of environmental security and the way 
that the discourse has evolved from initially being oriented towards national or state 
security, towards a more human centred focus. This literature review engages with 
the thesis’ first research question regarding the lack of a central premise to 
environmental security studies (ESS). The chapter will demonstrate that 
environmental security – as it currently stands – is often simply what occurs when 
theorists and practitioners, from a range of disciplines within science and social 
science, attempt to understand the interaction between environmental processes 
and security concerns.14 This means that the literature on environmental security is 
immensely broad, standing at the intersection of politics, geography, economics and 
a variety of different physical sciences. Obviously a manageable literature review will 
not be able to adequately review the full spectrum of literature associated with all of 
the above.  
Accordingly, this chapter will review the literature that is important to the evolution of 
ESS – focusing primarily on those scholars who engage more explicitly with the 
dominant themes of environmental security. In many ways the literature marries with 
the evolving nature of international security theory at the end of the cold war and the 
structure of this chapter will roughly align with this. The first section will review what 
                                                          
13
 Sheehan, International Security, 105. 
14
 For a snapshot of this situation see the Millennium Project’s overview of environmental security definitions: 
"Section 2 - Definitions of Environmental Security," The Millennium Project: Global Futures Studies and 
Research, 2014: http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/es-2def.html. 
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might be considered the “securitisation of the environment”. On one hand, 
environmentalists sought to push issues related to the environment up the policy 
chain by embedding environmental issues within the language of security. On the 
other hand, security scholars sought to broaden the nature of security, moving away 
from the militaristic mindset that dominated security studies throughout the Cold 
War. Changes in the environment were usually viewed as a threat to national 
security, economic prosperity, and the stability of the developing world.  
The second phase of environmental security – and the focus of the second section – 
occurred principally throughout the 1990s and centred mainly on the links between 
environmental scarcities and violent conflict. This second wave of environmental 
security studies15 was a period of empirical exploration investigating the assumptions 
underlying the statements made about the environment and security in the first 
wave. An important part of these investigations was the role of migration in creating 
or encouraging violent conflict. As the majority of the environmental security 
literature surrounds research into the links between environmental scarcities and 
violent conflict, a large part of this chapter will be dedicated to exploring this concept 
– particularly that of the key author of this literature, Thomas Homer-Dixon.16  
The third phase of environmental security was in many ways a response to the 
second in that much of the literature of this third phase directly challenged the 
environmental scarcity and violent conflict thesis. The main critiques revolved around 
the neo-Malthusian assumptions that scarcity is an inevitable result of population 
growth and that conflict is the most likely outcome of scarcity. The tendency for the 
environmental scarcity and violent conflict literature to lean towards the national 
security perspective, focusing on state level analyses rather than other security 
perspectives, was also criticised. The three most comprehensive critiques of the 
earlier literature emanate from the disciplines of political ecology, critical security, 
and human security studies.  
                                                          
15
 Marc A. Levy, "Time for a Third Wave of Environment and Security Scholarship?," in Environmental Change 
and Security Program Report (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995).  
16
 Richard A. Matthew et al., eds., Global Environmental Change and Human Security (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press,2010), 10. 
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Section One: Redefining Security – Making Way for the Environment 
The oil shocks of the late 1970s and a growing awareness of human impacts on the 
environment of disasters such as Chernobyl, Love Canal, and Bhopal created a 
ground swell of interest in how the environment interacts with security. Books such 
as Silent Spring, The Population Bomb, The Limits to Growth and Lester Brown’s 
concerns about the limits of the green revolution further encouraged policymakers to 
give greater consideration to environmental issues.17 Although a variety of 
international security scholars demonstrated a keen interest in the links between 
environmental change and security, for the most part, they lacked the analytical tools 
for the task.  
The realisation that traditional security analyses, focused mainly on military 
outcomes, were inadequate to deal with complex environmental problems led to calls 
within security community for a redefinition of security, incorporating issues not 
usually associated with the dominant realist paradigm.18 Brown challenged the 
dominant Cold War military focus of security discourse of the late 1970s, instead 
linking a nation’s security – or lack thereof – with population, hunger, poverty, 
economic instability and ecological stress: “In a world that is not only ecologically 
interdependent but economically and politically interdependent as well, the concept 
of ‘national’ security is no longer adequate”19. His belief was that continuing to focus 
solely on militarisation to the exclusion of development and environmental protection 
in the Third World would, in the long term, have negative consequences for global 
security and millions in the poorest countries. As Brown suggests, “neither bloated 
military budgets nor highly sophisticated weapons systems can halt deforestation or 
arrest the soil erosion now affecting so many Third World countries. Blocking 
                                                          
17
 Lester R. Brown, "The Next Crisis? Food," Foreign Policy 13(Winter 1973-1974); Rachel Carson, Silent Spring 
(London: Ebenezer Baylis and Son Ltd, 1962); Donella H. Matthews, Limits to Growth (London: Earth Island Ltd, 
1974); Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (London: Ballantine, 1971). 
18
 See for example: Lester R. Brown, "Redefining National Security (1977)," in Worldwatch Paper 14 
(Worldwatch Institute, 1977); Lester R. Brown, "Redefining National Security (1986)," Challenge (July/August 
1986); Mathews, "Redefining Security."; Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8, no. 
1 (Summer, 1983). Over time, these “new security threats” have come to be known as non-traditional security 
studies, incorporating not only environmental security, but also energy security, human security, issues 
surrounding migration and conflict, economic security, cyber security and others. 
19
 Lester R. Brown, "Redefining National Security (1978)," EPA Journal 4, no. 6 (June 1978): 39. 
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external aggression may be relatively simple compared with stopping the 
deterioration of life-support systems”20. 
A decade later Jessica Tuchman Mathews echoed Brown’s assessment, calling for a 
redefinition of security in the face of environmental changes.   21 Ozone depletion, 
climate change, population control and refugees figured prominently and the paper 
has, at its core, an economic argument, representing a liberal institutionalist 
approach to international security. She encouraged policymakers to factor in the 
economic benefits of the environment and the related costs of declining 
environmental services to the world economy. Mathews also suggested that global 
cooperation and new institutions are required in order to meet the challenges of a 
globe faced with increased competition for declining resources, but lacking the 
political nous to do so: “The traditional prerogatives of nation states are poorly 
matched with the needs for regional cooperation and global decision-making”22. 
Similarly, Ullman expressed concern about the “excessively narrow and excessively 
military” orientation of national security analyses.23 In his opinion, important potential 
non-military threats to national security are easily missed due to this blinkered focus 
on military threats. Ullman’s paper is ground-breaking in that he not only raises 
concerns about dwindling supplies of essential resources such as fuelwood, fish 
stocks and clean air and water in the face of increasing demand, but also 
differentiates between renewable and non-renewable resources.24 He discusses the 
potentially destabilising effect of large-scale migrations, highlighting the ethnic and 
religious tensions and social instability that can occur as a consequence.25 Ullman 
takes the analysis one step further than Brown and Mathews in that he not only asks 
for a redefinition of security but tentatively provides one: 
…a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens 
drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the 
inhabitants of the state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy 
                                                          
20
 Brown, "Redefining National Security (1986)," 32. 
21
 Mathews, "Redefining Security." 
22
 Mathews, "Redefining Security," 172-73. 
23
 Ullman, "Redefining Security," 129. 
24
 Ullman, "Redefining Security," 140-44. 
25
 Ullman, "Redefining Security," 142. 
 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
choices available to the government of the state or to private, non-governmental 
entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.26 
There are clear elements of the social contract within this definition and the state is 
expanded beyond government institutions and the military with the inclusion of 
political, economic, and social elements.  
Ullman’s assessment remains primarily focused on national security and in this way 
contrasts to the position assumed by Brown and Mathews who are more concerned 
with transboundary issues and cooperation between states. This is reflective of their 
different approaches, highlighting Brown’s and Mathews’ scientific backgrounds and 
Ullman’s international political grounding, reflecting the two sides of the coin that 
represented environmental security in its early phase. On one side of the coin, actors 
with environmental, scientific, or economic expertise sought to securitise the problem 
in order to lift environmental issues up the policy agenda.27 Environmental issues 
wrapped in the language of insecurity, conflict and negative impacts on national 
security was targeted at policymakers focused on national security.28 On the other 
side was the security community, steeped in Cold War realpolitik, attempting to come 
to terms with a world beyond the bipolarity of the decades preceding the 1990s. 
Environmental security issues gained increasing prominence in the mid to late 
1980s. In the mid-1980s, for example, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros 
Ghali is famously quoted as saying that: “The next war in the Middle East will be 
fought over water, not politics”29. Popular international relations magazines began to 
carry more articles that included an environmental element. In 1986, Norman Myers 
wrote a securitising piece in Foreign Policy linking population growth, resource 
depletion and social instability. He challenged US policymakers to attempt to come 
to terms with the complex issues and re-orientate foreign spending towards 
environmental preservation, asking “(c)ould the time be coming when as much 
                                                          
26
 Ullman, "Redefining Security," 133. 
27
 Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 
2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), 370; Ole Waever, "Security, the Speech Act: 
Analysing the Politics of a Word," (Copenhagen: Centre of Peace and Conflict Research, June 25-26, 1989). 
28
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 42. For an early example, see: Norman Myers, "The 
Environmental Dimension to Security Issues," The Environmentalist 6, no. 4 (1986). 
29
 "Former National Leaders: Water a Global Security Issue," United Nations University, 20 March, 2011: 
http://unu.edu/media-relations/releases/water-called-a-global-security-issue.html. 
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lasting security can be purchased through trees as through tanks?”30 The 1987 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) Report, Our 
Common Future, provided a form of justification for switching to a focus on 
environmental security. The report raised the spectre of conflict emanating from 
disputes over “raw materials, energy supplies, land, river basins, sea passages, and 
other key environmental resources”31 in the face of dwindling supplies and increasing 
competition. Environmental stress was singled out as an important part of the causal 
chain in many cases of conflict.  
As the Cold War ground to a halt, and the brief period of “the end of history”32 
arrived, many who had devoted their lives to Cold War studies and national security 
searched for new fields of enquiry in what Barnett describes as “the old guard 
looking for new targets”33. Former US Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger 
captured the mood of the time positioning environmental degradation amidst “a 
plethora of (potential) foreign policy objectives”34 – although from his perspective 
environmental issues did not rate a serious mention compared with more traditional 
concerns such as the rise of China and the spread of chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons. Despite this, the growing environmental awareness in the security 
community resulted in organisations such as the US Department of Defence (US 
DoD) taking note of the shifting security environment and the impacts of 
environmental changes on its structure and priorities. For example, a 1992 paper 
specifically mentions the WCED report above, citing concerns over environmental 
problems amidst a list of 41 “environmental trends” of concern to the US armed 
forces.35 Even the Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration, Warren 
Christopher, pointed to the importance of environmental issues to US national 
security: “The environment has a profound impact on our national interests in two 
                                                          
30
 Norman Myers, "Environment and Security," Foreign Policy 74(Spring, 1989): 41. 
31
 Harlem Brundtland, "Our Common Future,"  (New York: United Nations World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987).Chapter 11/2. 
32
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Avon Books Inc.: The Free Press, 1992). 
33
 Jon Barnett, "New Security Issues: The Old Guard Looks for New Targets," in The Meaning of Environmental 
Security (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2001). 
34
 James Schlesinger, "Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 (1992): 18. This state 
of affairs has also been referred to as ‘Mandelbaum’s doughnut’, after former Clinton adviser Michael 
Mandelbaum said, “We have a foreign policy today in the shape of a doughnut – lots of peripheral interests 
but nothing at the centre." See: Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic(February 1994), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/. 
35
 Robert Jarrett et al., "Environmental Trends: Policy Implications for the U.S. Army,"  (Champaign, Illinois: 
Army Environmental Policy Institute, March 1992), 9. 
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ways…First, environmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly 
the health, prosperity and jobs of American citizens. Second, addressing natural 
resource issues is frequently critical to achieving political and economic stability, and 
to pursuing our strategic goals around the world”36. This is a clear manifestation of 
the securitisation of the environment at the highest level of international politics. 
Kaplan’s alarmingly worded The Coming Anarchy, continued the trend of securitising 
the environment. The environment, according to Kaplan, is not only a national 
security concern, but also something to be feared: “The environment…is part of a 
terrifying array of problems that will define a new threat to our security”37. Kaplan 
paints a world of food and water shortages, violent upheaval, state failure, and – as 
the name of the article suggests – general anarchy in which “(e)nvironmental scarcity 
will inflame existing hatreds and affect power relationships”. In his estimation, 
environmental threats will be the foreign policy challenges of the future: 
It is time to understand The Environment for what it is: the national-security issue of 
the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging 
populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air 
pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile 
Delta and Bangladesh – developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, 
incite group conflicts – will be the core foreign policy challenge from which most 
others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left 
over from the Cold War.38 
Kaplan’s imagery indicates that the environment is clearly something to be feared 
due to the havoc that it will wreak and the danger it presents to national security. His 
concerns were echoed several years later by Klare who posits that the wars of the 
future will be fought primarily over dwindling natural resources including water and 
timber, although his main concerns centred on non-renewable resources such as oil 
and gas.39 Instead of a world divided along ethnic, ideological and nationalist lines, in 
Klare’s opinion, the world of the future will be split up into geopolitical zones of 
                                                          
36
 "Christopher Challenges Academia to Aid in Environmental Initiative,"(11 April, 1996), 
http://news.stanford.edu/pr/96/960412chrstopher.html. 
37
 Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy." 
38
 Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy." 
39
 See: Michael T. Klare, "The New Geography of Conflict," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (May, 2001); Michael T. 
Klare, Resource Wars (New York: Owl Books, 2001). 
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conflict over dwindling resources of oil and gas, water systems and aquifers, and 
gems, minerals and timber.40  
The assumptions within this discourse is that scarcities of resources lead to conflict, 
chaos and anarchy, and that the ensuing instability in the South threatens the 
stability and prosperity of the North. In both of these analyses there is a strong neo-
Malthusian element. Although the Reverend Thomas Malthus wrote his Essay on the 
Principle of Population in 1798,41 the concerns that he raised about the capacity of 
the earth to provide food and water to ever-growing populations witnessed a 
resurgence prior to and following the green revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.42 This 
was not only limited to foreign policy analysts and traditional security scholars, but 
also extended into the environmental and scientific community. In fact much of 
Brown’s work and his publications through the Worldwatch Institute have been, and 
remain unapologetically neo-Malthusian.43 Although neo-Malthusian analyses tend to 
be more nuanced, complex, and technical than Malthus’s original work, the central 
idea remains that, at some point, given continual population growth, a limit to the 
carrying capacity of the earth and its ecosystems must be reached.44 This theme 
underpins much of the environmental security literature because it is assumed that 
once carrying capacity is reached, people will fight for those ever dwindling 
resources. This in turn tends towards a more nationalistic security orientation. In 
some respects, this basic assumption also underpins a great deal of anxiety and 
foreboding that accompanies more modern discussions about food and water 
shortages. 
John Orme’s article is particularly telling in regards to the perceived links between 
neo-Malthusian views of resource scarcity and conflict. Orme’s strongly realist 
account links the peace and prosperity since the Second World War with man’s 
                                                          
40
 Klare, "The New Geography of Conflict," 55. See also: Klare, Resource Wars, 213-14. 
41
 Rev Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (New York: Augustus M. Kelly 
Publishing, 1971). 
42
 See for example: Fairfield Osborn, ed. Our Crowded Planet: Essays on the Pressures of Population (London: 
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“conquest of nature”45. Accordingly, “(t)here is only so much fresh water on the 
planet, and hence there must eventually be a limit to the amount food (sic) available 
to nourish the human species”46. He therefore postulates:  
When the empire of man over nature can no longer be easily extended, then the only 
way for one people to increase its standard of living is by redistributing the sources of 
fruits of industry from others to themselves. The surest way to do so is by extending 
man’s empire over man… As the value of land increases, so too does the value of 
the primary means of taking and holding it: diminishing returns in the economy 
implies increasing returns to the military.47 
This is a Hobbesian equation, according to Orme, who believes that conflict is 
inevitable when “two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot 
both enjoy”48. The potential for cooperation in the face of a world of increasing 
scarcity does not rate a mention in Orme’s article. States facing these conditions 
instead either “collapse into chaos” or “channel the discontent… (towards) foreign 
aggression”49. 
Orme argues from a strongly realist position based on neo-Malthusianism 
assumptions about resource scarcity. Although his views are more radical than other 
national security arguments in that he assumes that conflict necessarily follows from 
severe resource scarcity, his epistemological approach is nevertheless similar to 
much of the early literature on environmental security: Nature, or the environment, is 
a source of threat to the nation state which must protect itself through a range of 
policy measures taken at the national level. These include an increase in foreign aid, 
Third World interventions, vague suggestions about how to improve the global 
environment and a hedging against the violence and aggression which is likely to 
emanate from the economically and resource poor countries of the global South.  
The majority of the literature in this first wave of environmental security is built on the 
assumption that environmental scarcities will lead to violence and/or chaos – at both 
the international and sub-national levels. What is also present in the majority of the 
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literature is an attempt to understand the way that security and the environment 
interact in a more complex and inclusive way that pushes the boundaries of well-
established scientific and social scientific epistemological siloes. The second wave of 
environmental security literature, reviewed below, took these neo-Malthusian 
assumptions surrounding resource scarcity and violent conflict and tested them 
through detailed case-studies whilst developing complex causal models. 
Section Two: Violence, Conflict and the Environment 
Homer Dixon and the ECAC Project 
By the early 1990s it was clear that environmental issues were gradually forming an 
important part of the security landscape. As has been demonstrated above, much of 
this literature was still steeped in traditional analyses that attempted to come to 
terms with the complexities of environmental issues. At the same time, many 
analyses were vague and/or anecdotal. Several large projects were undertaken 
throughout the 1990s to empirically investigate the links between security and the 
environment. Baechler’s Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) brought 
together sixty experts from seventeen nations in order to study the relationship 
between environmental change and violent conflict.50 The findings of the project 
indicated that “apocalyptic scenarios” and “alarmist prognoses of world 
environmental wars” were untenable.51 As a result, Baechler suggested that a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between the environment and conflict was 
needed:  
Human-induced environmental change can be either a contributing or a necessary 
factor to both the emergence and/or the intensification of violent conflicts. On one 
hand, violent conflicts triggered by environmental disruption are due in part to 
socioeconomic and political developments. On the other hand, social and political 
maldevelopment, due in part to degradation of natural resources, has become an 
international peace and security challenge.52 
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These observations challenged the national security mindset that assumed that 
violent conflict would naturally stem from environmental scarcities and environmental 
change. They were also important in that they also highlighted that negative 
outcomes in relation to the environment do not only occur due to a changing 
environment, but can also be driven by the behaviour of states (political 
development). 
Of far greater influence than Baechler has been Thomas Homer-Dixon, who in 1991 
set out a new research agenda for environmental security. On the Threshold 
appeared in the security journal International Security and raised a number of 
challenges to the environmental security discourse of the time.53 The ideas outlined 
in On the Threshold established the theoretical foundation and epistemological 
assumptions that underpinned the series of case studies that lead to the 
development his theoretical framework as outlined in Environmental Scarcities and 
Violent Conflict.54 This second article was the summation of a three year project on 
Environmental Change and Acute Conflict (ECAC) under the auspice of the Peace 
and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Toronto, bringing together thirty 
researchers from ten countries.55  
The aim of the ECAC project was to empirically explore the three “ideal types” of 
conflict surrounding environmental scarcities, also outlined in the initial document. 
First – that environmental scarcities lead to interstate “simple-scarcity” conflicts or 
resource wars; second – that environmental scarcity can induce large population 
movements which then provoke “group-identity” conflicts such as ethnic clashes and 
thirdly; severe environmental scarcity simultaneously increases economic 
deprivation and disrupts key social institutions, which in turn lead to “deprivation” 
conflicts such as civil strife and insurgency (see figure 1).56 For each of these 
hypotheses, two case studies were completed and in each case the aim was to 
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falsify the null hypothesis that “environmental scarcity does not cause violent 
conflict”57.  
 
Figure 1: Homer-Dixon's 'Ideal Types' of Conflict 
 
For stronger internal validity, the causes of environmental scarcity were defined and 
limited to three sources: Environmental change; population growth; and the unequal 
distribution of resources. In regards to the first, environmental change, it was defined 
as “a human induced decline in the quantity or quality of a renewable resource that 
occurs faster than it is renewed by natural processes”58. This was further broken into 
six possibly relevant types of environmental change linked to renewable resources: 
degradation and loss of agricultural land; degradation and removal of forests; 
depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies; depletion of fisheries; greenhouse 
induced climate change and; stratospheric ozone depletion. Climate change and 
ozone depletion were omitted as types of environmental change to be investigated 
for the project. The logic behind this was simply that the developing world is already 
suffering from the large scale impacts of environmental change and, although 
climate change is likely to impact on developing countries increasingly over the 21st 
century, the priority for research on conflict and the environment should be focused 
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on what is currently occurring. He also points out that climate change (“atmospheric 
problems”) will interact with events that are already taking place.59  
The second cause of environmental change – population growth – is much more 
straightforward. The effect of population growth on resource scarcity is that it 
reduces a resource’s per-capita availability by dividing it between more and more 
people. It can often have a double impact in that population growth can also 
contribute to environmental change by decreasing the quantity or quality of 
renewable resources in areas surrounding the growing population.60 There is 
certainly a strong neo-Malthusian element here, indicating an assumption that 
population growth leads to resource scarcity once the carrying capacity is reached.  
The final cause of environmental change according to Homer-Dixon is the unequal 
distribution of resources: “(A)nalysts often study resource depletion and population 
growth in isolation from the political economy of resource distribution”61. The unequal 
distribution of resources concentrates a resource in the hands of a few people and 
therefore subjects the rest of a given population to greater scarcity. This point is of 
the most interest to this thesis focused on hydropower construction.  
These three sources of environmental scarcity each have a varying effect on the 
‘resource pie’. Environmental change reduces the quantity and quality of the pie, 
while population growth divides it into smaller pieces, and unequal resource 
distribution means that some get a much larger slice, leaving less for everyone else. 
When these sources of environmental scarcity interact with each other, two patterns 
are particularly common: “resource capture and “ecological marginalisation” (see 
Figure 1).62 Resource capture occurs when a fall in the quantity and quality of 
renewable resources combines with population growth and encourages powerful 
groups within society to shift resource distribution in their favour. Ecological 
marginalisation can occur when unequal resource access and population growth 
occur resulting in migration to regions that are ecologically fragile such as upland 
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slopes, areas at risk from desertification, and tropical rain forests. Large populations 
in these marginal areas can cause severe environmental damage and chronic 
poverty.   
The complexity of Homer-Dixon’s framework is evident. As will be demonstrated 
below, this provides opportunity for strong criticism. Whether the theoretical 
framework is overly complex or not, what is clear is that Homer-Dixon is attempting 
to come to terms with the complexity of the real world that researchers interested in 
the links between the environment and social outcomes encounter frequently. The 
complexity of the framework is understandably mirrored by the complexity of the 
results. The case studies undertaken by the ECAC project called into question the 
first hypothesis finding little empirical evidence to support the assumption that 
renewable resource scarcity creates “simple-scarcity” conflict between states. Water 
was found to be the one renewable resource with the capacity to create interstate 
conflict because it is crucial for both human and national security, as well as survival.  
With regards to the second hypothesis, the ECAC project found that “there is 
substantial evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental scarcity causes 
large population movements, which in turn causes group identity conflicts”63. The 
most well developed example given concerning conflict brought about by large 
population movements as a result of environmental scarcity is the tension between 
India and Bangladesh that has arisen due to the large migrations from Bangladesh to 
India. Environmental scarcity in Bangladesh caused by environmental change, 
population growth and the unequal distribution of resources created a situation that 
precipitated large scale migration: “The absence of any hope of survival in other 
parts of their own country has left no other option for them but to cross the porous 
border into India”64. Once in the receiving area, ethnic, religious and indigenous 
‘nativism’ combined to create tensions between migrants and the original inhabitants. 
As tensions grew, migrant groups and indigenous groups became more organised, 
and politically motivated individuals and groups realised that it may be in their 
interest to align themselves with either bloc. Other native groups such as the Hindu 
‘Army of Shivaji’ took it upon themselves to resort to violence and murder in an 
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attempt to expel the Muslim Bangladeshis.65 Obviously, the chain of events linking 
environmental scarcity with migration and violent conflict is a complex process. 
Given the importance of migration to the environmental scarcity and conflict thesis, 
and the complexity involved, the following section will discuss this issue in greater 
detail.  
The final hypothesis considered by the ECAC project was in regards to “deprivation 
conflicts”. The project found that empirical evidence partially supports the hypothesis 
that environmental scarcity simultaneously increases economic deprivation and 
disrupts key social institutions.66 Whether or not this occurs is due to a variety of 
contextual factors. The most important issue at play and the biggest risk factor was 
the failure or disruption of the social institution of the state. Environmental scarcity 
creating large population movements and economic decline appears likely to sharply 
weaken the capacity and legitimacy of the state in some poor countries.67 The effect 
of resource scarcity combined with decreased economic activity decreases the 
revenues available to local and national governments. In what could be described as 
a downward spiral, this decreases the ability of the state to in turn respond to the 
environmental scarcity and can have the impact of increasing environmental scarcity 
due to growing poverty and unemployment. Key contextual factors are obviously 
important in determining whether these will lead to deprivation conflicts. Civil strife is 
more likely when pressures interact to create an increase in grievance and 
opportunity.  
The ideas of grievance and opportunity reflect the notion that there is no clear 
correlation between poverty and social conflict. That is to say, it does not follow that 
the fact that a person lives in poverty will lead to them having a grievance against the 
system or state that either led to or fails to remedy the situation of poverty. Much 
depends on the subjective ‘blame system’ of the actors involved.68 Cultures that are 
fatalistic about their economic situation are less prone to violence. This gives rise to 
the idea of ‘relative deprivation’.69 Simply taking GDP per capita and education levels 
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as indicators of grievance – and therefore the potential for civil strife – is far too 
simplistic. Relative deprivation relates to the gap between a person’s level of 
satisfaction and their perceived notion of what they believe they actually deserve.70 
This is an important notion as it indicates that the likelihood of poverty related to civil 
strife in any given society is contingent on the systems of belief that are held by 
those in poverty. This means that someone living in much better circumstances – 
according to standard economic indicators – may well be more prone to violent 
conflict than someone who is living in abject poverty due to the fact that they 
subjectively perceive their circumstances as worse than what they actually deserve. 
This leads to a feeling of grievance which they are more likely to act upon than the 
person in a worse situation who sees no reason for grievance, and therefore action.  
Once again, contextual factors are important and the more an individual feels 
connected to a group with the same belief system, the more likely they are to 
express grievance. This point is explored in more detail by Kahl, below. If groups are 
organised around ethnic, religious or class values and belief systems, and are able 
to articulate and coordinate through well organised and financed opposition groups, 
they will have greater relative power. Homer-Dixon points out that “(t)hese groups 
can provide a clear sense of identity and act as nuclei around which highly mobilized 
and angry elements of the population, such as unemployed and urbanised young 
men, will coalesce. Conversely, if economic crisis weakens challenger groups more 
than the state, or affects mainly disorganised people, it will not lead to state 
violence”71.  
Opportunity can arise through a variety of sources. A weakened state obviously 
presents opportunities for challengers such as elite groups with a grievance to make 
a move against the state or state control. Remoteness also presents opportunity. 
The ECAC project examined the Sendero Luminoso rebellion in Peru which resulted 
from a series of land re-distributions, population growth, soil degradation and 
drought.72 The heart of the rebellion was in the physically remote city of Ayacucho 
which also has a major university that served as an organisational base for radicals. 
Graduates of the university were less likely to gain professional jobs on graduation 
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and therefore joined the ranks of mobile, angry disgruntled citizens. This led to both 
grievance and the opportunity to act on those grievances which played a part in the 
rebellion. 
Homer-Dixon summarises the 1994 article confidently: “Our research shows that 
environmental scarcity causes violent conflict”73, a position from which he 
subsequently backed away from, being more careful to demonstrate complex 
causality. For example, in Ecoviolence, which Homer-Dixon co-edits with Jessica 
Blitt, they conclude that “severe environmental scarcities often contribute to major 
civil violence”    74. Ecoviolence summarises the Project on Environment, Population, 
and Security (EPS) which examined a further five case studies on the links between 
environmental scarcities and violent conflict. Chapter six, “The Case of Rwanda”, is a 
particularly interesting examination of the links between environmental scarcities and 
violence in the Rwandan conflict of 1994.75 The complexity of the causal links 
between environmental scarcities and violence is highlighted in that both the 
independent and dependent variables were strong in this case, given that both 
environmental scarcity and violent conflict were present. What is significant, 
however, is that the conclusion is drawn that the connections between the two were 
not particularly strong. Scarcity and violent conflict coexisted but the causal links 
between the two were “difficult to determine”76. 
The other cases examined in the book – the Zapatistas rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico; 
water scarcity and population growth in Gaza; environmental scarcity in apartheid 
South Africa; and population growth and structural scarcity in Pakistan in the mid-90s 
– all paint a picture of the complex interaction between environmental scarcities and 
violent conflict, highlighting important causal links without drawing strong causal 
conclusions. In a book written after Ecoviolence but referring back to the ECAC 
project, Homer-Dixon demonstrates how far he has moved from his earlier confident 
position:  
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(P)reliminary research indicates that scarcity of renewable resources – or what I call 
environmental scarcity – can contribute to civil violence, including insurgencies and 
ethnic clashes… Scarcity’s role in such violence, however, is often obscure and 
indirect. It interacts with political, economic, and other factors to generate harsh 
social effects that in turn help reduce violence. Analyst often interpret the social 
effects as the conflict’s principal causes, thus overlooking scarcities influence as an 
underlying stress.77 
In the final section, critiques of Homer-Dixon’s position on the role of environmental 
scarcities in contributing to violent conflict are examined, and it is worth noting here, 
and important to keep in mind that it is a complex, rather than simple, relationship 
that Homer-Dixon posits.  
Homer-Dixon’s work, and that of the ECAC and EPS projects, appears in a variety of 
other settings,78 and spurred on a mixture of research and critiques. An important 
addition to the literature on environmental scarcities and conflict is that of Colin Kahl 
who first outlined his argument in 1998.79 Kahl set out to explore the linkages 
between what he refers to as “demographic and environmental stress (DES)…a 
composite variable encompassing: (1) population growth and (2) the degradation, 
depletion, and maldistribution of renewable resources” and civil strife.80 He furthers 
the work of previous scholars on the subject by adding state exploitation to the 
deprivation and state weakness arguments, as outlined above. In his opinion the 
causal role of the state in cases of DES and violence has been undertheorised.81  
Kahl refers to first order and second order effects of DES. First order affects are 
already familiar to those involved in the environmental scarcity and violent conflict 
debate: renewable resource scarcity; economic marginalisation (poverty or resource 
capture); and demographic shifts – including population growth, urbanisation and 
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“youth bulges”.82 Second order effects are related to the grievances which occur in 
society as a result of DES. As a result of relative deprivation these grievances may 
be directed at the state or other groups, such as elites, who are blamed for the DES 
or are a cause of resentment because of their inequitable gains. These grievances 
act as threats to the regime, and, Kahl believes, they may be co-opted by the state in 
order to divert attention from state or elite activity. “Most obviously, inciting intergroup 
violence can be a brutally effective way of crushing political opponents. Less 
obvious, but no less important, violence can divert attention away from a regime’s 
failings while making key social groups dependent upon the state for their physical 
well-being, thereby ensuring their allegiance”83.  
Two intervening variables between DES and state exploitation are also identified. 
The first is inclusive institutions which act to empower key social groups, enabling 
them to participate in and influence the decision making of state elites. Inclusive 
institutions hinder the ability of state elites to co-opt the grievances caused by DES. 
The corollary, exclusive states, enables elites to exploit these grievances and direct 
them towards other less favoured groups.  
The second intervening variable identified is what Kahl refers to as “groupness” – or 
the degree of societal segmentation in any given state. “Homogenous societies 
dominated by a single group identity, and heterogeneous societies with significant 
cross cutting group affiliations and interests are characterised by low segmentation 
and thus low groupness”84 – therefore decreasing the likelihood of state elites being 
able to direct grievances regarding DES at other groups. Higher groupness 
increases the risks of state exploitation by providing an atmosphere of inbuilt 
tensions and high societal segmentation, lowering the costs for elites of instigating 
violence between groups.  
Kahl demonstrates how state exploitation of DES occurred in Kenya in the early 90s 
where rapid population growth and increasing land scarcity combined with poverty 
and urbanisation to create the perfect environment for state exploitation. Long-
standing inter-ethnic grievances between Kalenjins – led by President Moi – and 
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other ethnic minorities in Kenya were inflamed deliberately by the president in order 
to divert attention from the state’s role in the land crisis. This led to the death of 
thousands and displacement of hundreds of thousands. Kahl warns that the case of 
Kenya demonstrates that DES poses a serious threat to political stability in the 
developing world:  “states need not totally collapse for population growth and 
environmental pressures to produce violent internal conflicts; violence can also result 
from the purposive actions of state elites”85. 
The work carried out by Kahl, Homer-Dixon, members of the Environmental Change 
and Conflict project and those involved with the Environment, Population and 
Security project moved the environmental security literature from the speculative 
towards a model of the environment and conflict based on empirical observation. 
This empirical rigour brought greater credibility to the idea of environmental security 
which, in turn, helped capture public and policy attention – ironically, often through 
the re-interpretation of the research and journalistic flair of writers such as Kaplan. 
The epistemology remained neo-Malthusian – given the focus on resource scarcities 
– but the security dimension shifted from one purely focused on national security, 
towards a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the state, 
communities, institutions, population, the environment and conflict.  
Rather than simply thinking of security in terms of a binary relationship between the 
state and the environment – based on realist assumptions – the work undertaken 
during this second phase of environmental security expanded the notion of security 
to impacts at the sub-state level. An element of violent conflict was required to 
register an issue as a security concern which discounted non-violent conflict and 
non-conflictual violence as issues for consideration. Nevertheless, the incorporation 
of individuals, communities and institutions and the ways in which they are impacted 
by environmental scarcities, contribution to our understanding of environmental 
security in important ways. Of particular relevance to this is thesis is the more 
systemic perspective that was brought to bear on the relationship between the 
environment and security.   
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Population Movement and Environmental Security 
Much of the literature on environment and security hinges on the linkages between 
environmental change and migration. Homer-Dixon’s framework indicates that when 
environmental scarcities occur, population movements often result which, in turn, 
can lead to civil strife and ethnic conflict. Homer-Dixon discusses the influence of 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in migration decisions. He suggests that what distinguishes a 
migrant from a refugee is the weight of the push or the pull factor, with refugees 
normally being pushed or forced to relocate. He finds that “(e)nvironmental scarcity 
is more likely to produce migrants than refugees, because it usually develops 
gradually...and...pull factors can therefore clearly enter into potential migrants 
calculations”86. These ‘environmental migrants’ are often poor and politically weak 
and may remain so in the receiving society. Homer-Dixon notes that without the 
backing of a state – receiving or sending – it is unlikely that migrants are able to 
organise, gain power and create conflict.87 In this case migration is “less likely to 
produce violence than silent misery and death”88. 
This indicates that understanding the interaction between environmental processes 
and migration is an important element in understanding environmental security. The 
ECAC project was not by any means the first to draw these links, and there is a 
strong body of literature both within and at the periphery of the environmental 
security discourse that debates the role of population movement as a result of 
environmental change and as a cause of violent conflict. This section will briefly 
overview this important element of the environmental security literature as it relates 
to population movement, focusing on three main themes: the legal status of those 
who are or will be affected by environmental changes; the types of environmental 
changes that are causing or encouraging people to move; and the impacts of these 
environmentally induced migrations on security. 
Migration has been a constant factor of human civilisation and the environment has 
frequently been part of this equation. A large variety of natural and climate disasters 
over the past few thousand years have forced countless people to move from their 
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places of residence to different, more hospitable areas.89 More recently, as the 
interest that developed over the last few decades grew in regards to the linkages 
between the environment and security, so has the interest in the links between 
security and migration. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the developing body of 
research focused on the same environmental factors that gave birth to the 
environmental security discourse – such as resource scarcity, population growth, 
food and water shortages and climate change. Academic and policy interests 
surrounding the links between the environment and migration initially centred on the 
concept of “environmental refugees”. This is a highly contested term that initially 
entered the public sphere in 1985 after El Hinnawi, a researcher at the United 
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), classified environmental refugees as 
“those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or 
permanently, because of marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered 
by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of 
their life”90.  
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
however a refugee is defined as a person who has a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion"91. This very specific definition prevents any 
recognition under international law of a person seeking refuge from environmental 
catastrophe or change without the accompanying fear of political persecution 
necessary to include them in UNHCR’s description. Furthermore, a refugee must be 
“outside the country of his nationality (and)… is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it”. Very often, a person who is popularly conceived of as an 
environmental refugee remains within the borders of their own country, further 
impeding them from any official international status.92 The International Organisation 
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for Migration (IOM) and others have classified such people as ‘Internally Displaced 
People’ or IDPs, but have placed very little emphasis on the environment in their 
definition.93 Vlachos suggests that a way of overcoming the IDP versus refugee 
problem is to use the dual terms ‘environmental refugees’ and ‘eco-migrants’.94  
The difficulty in establishing who exactly constitutes an environmental refugee has 
led to criticism of the term and those who use it. At the forefront of this criticism is 
Richard Black, who believes the term ‘environmental refugee’ is “unsound 
intellectually”95. He observes that the decision to migrate or flee from a particular 
area is usually the consequence of a variety of push and pull factors and cannot be 
readily attributed to one single environmental cause.96 Indeed, migration is a 
complex issue and the decision can be made at an individual, familial or community 
level for a variety of reasons. Even so, a recent report by the Environmental Change 
and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) Project indicated that the environment 
is increasingly playing an important role as a push factor or ‘signal’ in migration 
decisions, emphasising the role of the environment amongst the other factors that 
influence migration decisions.97  
Bates describes the decision-making process as a “continuum” from those that have 
total control over the decision, to those having no control. In her opinion, involuntarily 
migrants such as those effected by sea-level rise, are to be considered 
‘environmental refugees’; those who are compelled by “the transformation of the 
environment to one less suitable for human occupation”,98 receive the ‘environmental 
migrants’ categorisation; and those who leave of their own volition – migrants. Lee 
agrees, suggesting that there is a difference between environmental migrants and 
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refugees due to the lack of choice faced by those seeking refuge from environmental 
changes. “Given this logic, environmental refugees should be those who flee from 
life-threatening environmental change as urgently and desperately as political 
refugees flee from violence”99. Perhaps the most cogent conceptualisation of the 
differences between the various categories of persons affected by the environment is 
to be found in a study by the UN University Institute for Environment and Human 
Security (UNU-EHS) which echoes Bates’ findings above, indicating three categories 
of environmental displacement: Environmental Refugee; Environmental Migrant and; 
Environmentally Motivated Migrant.100  
Most of the literature distinguishes between slow-onset disasters – such as drought, 
desertification, deforestation and sea-level rise – and sudden-onset disasters – such 
as floods and storms.101 Unfortunately, much of this literature misses the importance 
of environmental changes as a result of human causes. To counter this, Westing 
proposed three categories: migrants who move due to an acute event; migrants who 
move due to gradually worsening situation; and those migrations in which there is a 
clash of pre-modern and modern cultures.102 The third category is somewhat 
definitionally confusing, but relates to what Homer-Dixon refers to as ‘resource 
capture’, recognising that much environmentally induced displacement occurs as a 
result of modernity and industrialisation. Westing describes it as, “(t)he pre-emption 
for modern uses (mechanized agriculture, urbanization, industrialization etc.) of large 
semi-natural areas inhabited by pre-modern indigenous peoples who are dependent 
upon their traditional means of support (subsistence farming, pastoralism, shifting 
slash-and-burn agriculture, hunting, and gathering of wild fruits etc.)…(causing) the 
indigenous people to become displaced”.103 Dams could easily be added to the list of 
causes of migration in these cases as many in this third category are clearly unable 
                                                          
99
 Shin-wha Lee, "In Limbo: Environmental Refugees in the Third World," in Conflict and the Environment, ed. 
Nils Petter Gleditsch (Dordrecht: NATO, 1997). 
100
 Fabrice Renaud et al., "Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?," Interdisciplinary 
Security Connections: UNU- EHS 5(2007). 31. 
101
 Vikram Kolmannskog, "Climate Changed: People Displaced," ed. Richard Skretteberg (Oslo: Norwegian 
Refugee Council, 2009), 6. Oli Brown describes these as Climate Processes and Climate Events. See: Oli Brown, 
"Climate Change and Forced Migration: Observations, projections and implications," in Human Development 
Report Office: Occasional Paper, ed. UNDP (Geneva: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 8. 
102
 Arthur H. Westing, "Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of Displaced Persons," Environmental 
Conservation 19, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 205. 
103
 Westing, "Environmental Refugees," 206. 
 
 
36 | P a g e  
 
to return due to the permanency of the changes.104 Inclusion of this third category is 
important because it captures an often overlooked political dimension to 
environmental change and population movements.  
Understanding the causes of migration as a result of environmental change as well 
as the technicalities of who is a refugee or forced migrant is important in the context 
of this thesis only inasmuch as these issues relate to security. Although there is a 
wider debate as to whether migration should be considered a security issue at all105, 
the security aspect of migration as it relates to the environmental security discourse 
revolves around the likelihood of conflict brought about by environmentally induced 
migration. Myers initially raised the idea of environmental refugees from a security 
perspective in 1986,106 increasing the profile of the topic even more in 1993 after 
declaring that global warming was likely to induce up to 150 million environmental 
refugees worldwide. Myers’ writing has consistently had a securitising effect on 
migration, in this case suggesting that “(i)t requires a leap of the imagination to 
envisage 150 million destitutes abandoning their homelands, many of them crossing 
international borders. They would be all the more disruptive in a world struggling to 
cope with a plethora of environmental problems”107. By 2002 he estimated that there 
were already 25 million environmental refugees.108 A more recent report has 
suggested that the number could increase to a neat billion by the middle of the 21st 
century.109 It is unsurprising then, that with numbers like these, and suggestions 
such as those put forward by the ECAC project linking large scale migrations with 
violent conflict, that security scholars have increasingly concerned themselves with 
the idea of environmental refugees. 
As has already been observed, this is generally not thought of as conflict between 
nations in the realist sense, but conflict at the intrastate level. The main research 
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relevant to migration, the environment, and security presented as part of Homer-
Dixon’s ECAC project is Ashok Swain’s work on the tension between India and 
Bangladesh that has arisen due to large migrations from Bangladesh to India already 
described above. In a separate article Swain discusses group versus group conflict 
more generally:  
Wherever environmental migrants settle, they flood the labour market and add to the 
local demand for food and other basic necessities, which puts new burdens on 
society…The influx of migrants is likely to deplete local food supplies and to drive up 
food prices…(and t)he increasing competition for common property resources – 
water, grazing areas, forests – is likely to be especially damaging to the local 
hosts.110   
As to whether the results of Swain’s studies in South Asia are applicable across 
cultures and geographies is an interesting question.  
Reuveny’s more recent paper focuses on two case studies: ‘the dustbowl’ of the 
Great Plains in the USA in the 1930’s and Bangladesh since the Farakka Barrage. 
His conclusions broadly align with those of Swain above and can be broken into four 
categories. Firstly, the arrival of migrants can burden the receiving area’s economy 
and resource base, creating native-migrant competition. Second, environmental 
migrants and receiving area residents may belong to different ethnic groups, further 
heightening tensions. Third, the receiving government may fear that migrants wish to 
destabilise its rule. Fourth, migrants may be encouraged by vested interests to 
challenge or blame the state for their poverty, inflaming existing seeds of conflict.111 
Reuveny explains that environmental migration can lead to conflict but does not 
necessarily promote it. He suggests that from a policy perspective, “adaptation-in-
place” can have a positive effect.112 Reuveny’s analysis introduces an important 
aspect of migration and conflict, that is, the potential for state based conflict as a 
secondary effect of localised tensions and conflict. 
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Surhke is more sceptical about the likelihood of conflict as a result of environmental 
changes and catastrophes. She links the causes of environmental migration more 
specifically to the likelihood of conflict, observing that sudden-onset migrations such 
as from flooding, famine and earthquakes are usually within the remit of aid and 
international disaster relief agencies and, therefore, conflict is more easily 
mitigated.113 Slow-onset disasters, because the effects are spread over time, allow 
“both migrants and receiving areas some room to manage”114. This contrasts 
somewhat to both Homer-Dixon’s, Swain’s and Reuveny’s assertions that slow-onset 
disasters such as the Farakka Barrage can lead to conflict, as well as Kahl’s point 
that when elites inflame and direct tensions that result from, or are related to these 
slow-onset environmental issues, violence is possible. In either case, obviously the 
specifics of the situation are important.   
Barnett agrees that large migrations are likely as a result of climate change and, 
given that large migrations in the past have indeed brought about conflict, there is 
certainly a possibility that conflict may result from climate change induced 
migrations.115 His main concern, however, is that by securitising the issue of 
migration and possible conflict, the focus is shifted from foreign policy and aid to a 
military perspective.116 Rather than focusing on the security, and therefore protection 
of those affected by environmental changes, securitising language tends to frame 
victims as threats, encouraging a defensive, national security agenda. Barnett’s 
human security approach to environmental security and migration views migration as 
more of an “exercise of agency” where individuals adapt to a changing 
environment.117 This contrasts with the language of disempowerment often used in 
environmental migration discourse which tends to view migrants as hapless victims.  
The links between environmental changes, migration and security are often tenuous 
and incomplete, and the classification of those impacted by environmental changes 
and the numbers likely to be affected are highly contested. Although there is no 
consistent causal connection between environmental changes, migration and 
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security issues, there are nevertheless frequently observed links between the 
environment, migration, and conflict. The large amount of literature on the subject is, 
once again, a good indication of the desire of academics and policymakers to 
understand the ways that environmental processes impact at various levels of 
analysis. In this case, the interest is in how environmental processes impact on 
individuals and communities, and how this in turn can have negative consequences 
for both state and human security outcomes. Attempting to understand these links 
highlights the importance of a systemic understanding of environmental security. 
Although there are many intervening variables that operate between environmental 
changes, migration and security, the evidence suggests that there are connections 
that must be taken seriously and investigated in any study linking the environment 
and security.  
Positivism and Quantitative Studies 
A smaller but important part of the environmental scarcities and violent conflict 
literature is the positivist approach led by Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Gleditsch, a quantitative researcher, is particularly 
critical of Homer Dixon. He believes the environmental security literature can be 
ontologically divided between neo-Malthusians on one hand and the Cornucopians 
on the other.118 Neo-Malthusians such as Homer-Dixon and Diamond focus on 
resource scarcity, population growth and conflict whereas Cornucopians are more 
optimistic, believing that ingenuity, technology and market mechanisms can solve 
current and future resource challenges.119 He provides a thorough positivist 
alternative to the main body of environmental security literature, instead focusing on 
causal mechanisms and hypothesis testing.   120 
Although Gleditsch somewhat misunderstands the value of case studies,121 his 
critique of the literature must be taken seriously by anyone involved in examining the 
links between the environment and security. He is particularly concerned about the 
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lack of evidence in regards to the statements and conclusions that are made about 
environmental security, leaving the field of inquiry open to “speculation and 
conjecture”122. He is critical of Homer Dixon in that Homer-Dixon’s work on 
environmental scarcity does not pay enough attention to regime type – more 
specifically it lacks consideration of the impact that democracy has on conflict.123 
Furthermore, many of the indicators used by Homer-Dixon tend to double as 
economic indicators, for example “certain types of environmental degradation – like 
deforestation, lack of water and sanitation, and soil erosion – are part and parcel of 
underdevelopment”124.  
His greatest criticism is saved for the untestability and over complexity of the models 
developed by Homer-Dixon. This is an understandable concern for a quantitative 
theorist focused on large-N studies. He points out for example that the case of 
Chiapas discussed in Ecoviolence is explained by “seven (mostly economic) 
independent variables acting through nine intervening variables and one additional 
independent variable”125. Or in the case of South Africa, the model relies on “four 
exogenous variables, acting through twenty-one intervening variables and forty-five 
causal mechanisms to account for the dependent variable, violence”126. He also 
criticises the lack of specificity of the variables themselves, for example, the variable 
‘health problems’ is overly vague. He then goes on to criticise the nature of the case 
studies undertaken by Homer-Dixon and the ECAC project; specifically that they 
were chosen on the dependent variable – violent conflict. Gleditsch points out that 
choosing cases on the dependent variable comes with severe limitations to 
testability, replicatability and the ability to draw conclusions about positive causal 
links. In a separate article, Gleditsch and his associates quantitatively examine the 
role of a nation’s ecological footprint in incidences of civil conflict, finding “little if any 
evidence for a connection between the neomalthusian factors captured by these 
indicators of sustainability and the onset of civil conflict”127. 
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Gleditsch is also critical of the literature that claims that environmental scarcity leads 
to violent conflict, pointing out that it is often war that leads to environmental 
degradation. Furthermore, he criticises the propensity of environmental security 
studies to use the “future as evidence”128. The potential for violent conflict is often at 
the centre of environmental security discourse, rather than the evidence for conflict. 
In Gleditsch’s opinion, “(t)hese are hypotheses based on controversial theory and 
debatable extrapolations, rather than ‘data’ which may confirm predictions…‘There 
will be water wars in the future’ is no more testable than the proverbial ‘The End of 
the World is at Hand!’”129. He therefore suggests – no doubt with tongue firmly in 
cheek – that if researchers place bets on the likelihood of violent conflict caused by 
environmental degradation it may lead to greater scholarly precision.  
Laying differences between qualitative and quantitative studies aside for a moment, 
some of Gleditsch’s work on water resources is more specifically relevant to this 
thesis. His earlier work on the subject examined the idea of “water wars” between 
nations that share a river basin. Gleditsch and his colleagues suggest that shared 
river dyads have a higher frequency of violent outbreaks than those that do not share 
a river.130 It is unclear, however, whether the conflict is a result of the availability of 
water, or disputes over navigation, pollution, fishing, or territory.131 His follow-up 
article demonstrates a greater understanding of the various ways that nations share 
rivers, reflecting a more comprehensive and up-to-date river data-set.132 This 
investigation indicates that nations that share a river boundary are twice as likely to 
experience conflict as nations that do not.133 Two issues are of particular 
significance: the first is that the more developed a shared river dyad is, the less likely 
it is to experience conflict. The second is that the greater the water resources in the 
shared basin, the greater the likelihood of conflict. Both of the issues are relevant to 
the Mekong in that the basin is shared by developing nations and it has an 
abundance of water resources. The idea that an abundance of water rather than 
scarce water resources is more likely to lead to conflict is antithetical to the position 
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of Homer-Dixon. This scenario, often referred to as the “resource curse” requires 
further investigation in relation to shared rivers, according to Gleditsch and will be 
examined in more detail in the next section.134  
It is evident that there is a small, but nevertheless important, component of the 
environmental security literature that focuses on quantitative and positivistic 
research. Much of the work done in this area serves to critique previous literature on 
environmental scarcity and conflict – especially that of Homer-Dixon. Although the 
literature often leads to generalised conclusions that give a broad view rather than 
insights into specific cases, the findings contribute to the overall depth of knowledge 
of environmental security.   
Section Three: Towards Human Oriented Environmental Security 
Political Ecology and Violent Environments 
A major critique of the second wave of environmental security is from the school of 
political ecology.  In Violent Environments, Peluso and Watts provide a harsh critique 
of the environmental scarcities and violent conflict literature. For the most part, it 
singles out the work of Homer-Dixon, deconstructing, critiquing, and criticising his 
theoretical framework, his methodological approach, and, on occasions, his 
motives.135 Whereas Gleditsch’s positivist critique focused on the over-complexity of 
Homer-Dixon’s framework, Peluso and Watts claim the opposite, stating that “the 
entire analysis is based on a simple, causal model of social friction and violence with 
few theorised intervening processes”136. According to Peluso and Watts:  
For Homer-Dixon, environmental change is driven by ‘precursor ideational factors’, 
an inchoate notion embracing a shopping list of ‘institutions, laws, rights, and norms.’ 
No effort is made to theorize or place institutions within specific political economic 
forms (e.g., authoritarian capitalism, social democratic welfare capitalism, 
postsocialism), thereby to suggest, for example, conditions under which these 
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institutions might differ in form or effect…(Homer-Dixon’s model operates from) an 
incoherent (and partial) account of environmental transformation that does not stand 
on a theory of social transformation or political economy…So much of this work fails 
dramatically in virtue of its ad hoc character, its tendency to overgeneralise, and a 
sort of “blender” approach to causality as variable upon variable is thrown into a 
theoretical stew pot.137  
Peluso and Watts identify what they describe as three fatal weaknesses to Homer-
Dixon’s approach. Firstly, empirical weakness: “it must be demonstrated that there 
are clear and unequivocal connections between ‘environmental scarcity’ and 
dislocation or hardship, intergroup segmentation, and the weakening of the state. 
These connections must be shown, not simply asserted”138. Secondly, under-
specificity: “the contours of the broad political economy (under which complex class 
and social forces operate) and how the rhythms of environmental change and 
accumulation shape the processes of exclusion, disenfranchisement, and 
displacement must be specified”139. Finally, Homer-Dixon’s use of ingenuity: “the 
ingenuity hypothesis is exceedingly weak and porous…The supply of ingenuity is an 
astonishingly banal and inaccurate concept to explain why certain political outcomes 
occur – as if all political struggles simply require a nifty invention that the less 
developed and “transitional” world is too maladaptive or pedestrian to accomplish”140.  
In summary, Peluso and Watts believe that Homer-Dixon’s model is empirically 
weak, under-theorised, overly general – and therefore lacking in specificity as well as 
lacking an overarching theory related to political economy and power structures. This 
way of thinking is perpetuated and reinforced in subsequent political ecology texts 
without further research or consideration of the work of Homer-Dixon.141 Instead of 
this “ad hoc” approach they forward political ecology as an alternative. A blend of 
Marxian political economy and a Foucauldian approach to ecology,142 political 
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ecology views violence as “a site-specific phenomenon rooted in local histories and 
social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation and 
power relations”143. Both temporal and spatial/scale specificity are important to 
political ecologists144: “The specification of actors – peasants, indigenous peoples, 
workers, the state, transnational capital – in a particular historical moment of 
violence is made with respect to their positions within precise systems of 
accumulation and fields of power”145.  
The unusual blend of Marxist power structures and post-structural discourse analysis 
means that political ecology has a foot in both camps of the international and the 
local. Specificity is derived from analysing the minutiae of the local – individuals, 
communities and specific political and historical contexts. On the other hand a broad 
context of anti-globalisation and postcolonial discourse is often the overarching 
theme of the case studies provided in Violent Environments.146 This approach 
undoubtedly brings an element of specificity, and an overarching political economic 
theory, however it does leave political ecology open to the same questions of bias 
and over-generalisation that they themselves level against Homer-Dixon. For 
example, Hartmann accuses Homer-Dixon of blaming local inhabitants for the violent 
conflict occurring as a result of localised environmental degradation instead of 
placing the blame where, according to her, it belongs – at the feet of multinational 
corporations and the global North: “Effective demand elsewhere also may drive 
environmental degradation much more than local poverty and population growth”147. 
This is not to suggest that there is no merit in the assertion, but instead, that the 
“clear and unequivocal connections” that they desire from researchers outside 
political ecology appear to be absent at times within their own field.  
Although political ecology interacts somewhat with the environmental security 
literature – specifically the environmental scarcities and violent conflict literature – 
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the question must be asked whether political ecology actually fits within the realm of 
security studies. On reflection, it is highly questionable whether inclusion was the 
intention of the authors of Violent Environments. There is no attempt to securitise 
issues within the book by driving them up the policy agenda, nor is an alternative 
security framework or coherent securitising theory put forward in place of what they 
have deconstructed. According to Peluso and Watts, the main aim of Violent 
Environments is: “that a better understanding of the specific ways in which history, 
memory, and the practices of people, states, and the forces of capitalism often come 
together violently might provide for an optimism of both the intellect and the will”148. 
Absent is any specific reference to the environment. Given the “devastating critique” 
that they claim to have served up to Homer-Dixon, one would have expected them to 
have also engaged with the national security literature that led to the development of 
Homer-Dixon’s theoretical framework. 
As it stands, political ecology is in fact anti-security. It is difficult to place political 
ecology into any realm of old or new security – even environmental and human 
security – although it certainly brings a greater specificity to the local, human level of 
analysis. This does not mean that it should be dismissed out of hand. Given Homer-
Dixon’s large presence – and that of the notion of environmental scarcities and 
violent conflict – in the environmental security discourse, such a clear critique should 
be taken seriously. Political ecology is relevant then in that critiques the under-
specificity often found in environmental security literature and because it highlights 
the need for a greater focus on the power structures that lead to violent conflict and 
environmental destruction.   
 
Dalby and Critical Ecology 
Simon Dalby’s Environmental Security is a considerable step away from the 
environmental scarcities and violent conflict thesis. His analysis is critical in that it is 
similar to that of the Copenhagen school, questioning the state as the referent object 
of security, as well as critical in the Foucauldian sense, questioning ideas that 
appear ‘self-evident’.149 As with Homer-Dixon, Dalby’s contribution to the 
environmental security discourse is complex, challenging commonly held 
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perceptions of what is meant and understood by ‘environment’ as well as the 
commonly held notion that environmental change is always a negative and unusual 
occurrence. 
In many respects, Dalby concerns himself with the North/South divide, and for this 
reason is highly critical of Kaplan’s “oversimplified geopolitical specification of 
Malthusian-induced social collapse” and its influence on political and security 
thinking.150 According to Dalby, this geopolitical oversimplification is evident in 
Kaplan’s division of the world into the rich North and the poor South and his adoption 
of Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations thesis. This leads Kaplan to the conclusion 
that environmental degradation, overpopulation, and a tendency in the South 
towards violence and crime will lead to increasing political instability and social 
disruption that threatens the richer but less populous North. “Nature unchecked” is 
therefore something to be feared.151 Similar to political ecology’s critique of Kaplan, 
Dalby refers to this “geopolitical shorthand” as the “antithesis to detailed 
geographical understanding”152. 
Unlike political ecology, Dalby does not conflate Kaplan with Homer-Dixon. He takes 
both Homer-Dixon’s ECAC and Baechler’s ENCOP projects seriously, summarising 
their findings authentically without the bias demonstrated by Peluso and Watts. 
Dalby, however, highlights and expands on what is an important alternate framework 
to the scarcities and violent conflict model: the resource curse. These differing 
perspectives have been described as either a “shrinking pie” or “honey pot”153 – 
“shrinking pie” referring to the neo-Malthusian concept of resource scarcities and 
“honey pot” referring to an abundance of natural resources. Dalby refers to de 
Soysa’s argument that countries with a high proportion of natural resource extraction 
have a greater tendency towards civil war. The argument generally applies to non-
renewable resources such as oil, diamonds and copper, but has also been applied to 
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renewable resources – especially timber.154 Elites who are able to capture and 
monopolise these resources have little, if any, incentive to develop manufacturing or 
agriculture within the state, seeking instead to protect – violently if necessary – 
sources of natural wealth generation. It is therefore argued that “greed rather than 
grievance is more usually the cause of conflict concerning resources”155.  
This is a divergent view from Homer-Dixon’s findings that resource capture results 
from elites monopolising scarce resources. According to the “honey pot” thesis, elites 
capture the resource for exactly the opposite reason, and political instability and 
violent conflict results from competing factions vying for control of the abundant 
resource in order to benefit financially from the wealth it creates.156 As a result, 
innovation and competition also suffer, turning Homer-Dixon’s ingenuity thesis on its 
head. According to de Soysa then, ingenuity is more likely to be stifled by abundance 
than by scarcity.157 As is usual for theoretical debates of this kind, there are strong 
arguments for both sides.158  
Dalby is also critical of the ECAC project in that it assumes that environmental 
change is a negative occurrence. From Dalby’s perspective, which is reflective of 
themes within political ecology, changing environments are normal processes of life. 
To try to “secure” the environment against change is nonsensical from this 
perspective.159 The assumption that environmental change is a negative occurrence 
that must be avoided also contradicts discourses of development that are premised 
on changes in the environment brought about by developments in agriculture, 
infrastructure and industry. These environmental changes are often what enable 
economies to shift their status from least developed, to developing, to developed. 
Therefore according to Dalby, if environmental changes are indeed negative, and 
threats to environmental security, then it is “the dominant structures of the global 
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economy, in its (violent) processes of expansion and disruption” that are the greatest 
drivers of change.160 
Dalby expands on this notion through the theme of “Empire”. Empire relates to 
patterns of consumption in the global economy that shift resources from the 
periphery to the core. “Ecosystem people”, who usually live subsistence lifestyles at 
the periphery, are much more vulnerable – due to their reliance on local renewable 
resources and their relative poverty – than those at the core, or the “biosphere 
people”, who – due to their relative wealth – are able to draw food and other 
important resources from various parts of the globe through the complex system of 
trade that upholds the global economy.161 Violence and political disruption at the 
periphery, therefore, is frequently related to these consumption patterns at the 
core.162 Resistance to disruptions from activities that privilege the core over the 
periphery (in that goods are transferred from the periphery to the core), such as ‘land 
grabs’, deforestation, industrial development, and pollution, as well as competition 
over control of and profits from tradable resources, are even better explanations for 
violent conflict and civil war than the dichotomous “shrinking pie” or “honey pot” 
theses, according to Dalby.163 This highlights the idea that the expansion of empires 
and modern industrial society is usually a violent process.164 
Dalby asserts that as a result of the modern globalised economic Empire, human 
beings are currently living in the age of the Anthropocene: 
What is most worrisome to anyone who observes these matters is not any single 
concern – be it climate change, biodiversity loss, synthetic chemicals, deforestation, 
long-lived radio isotopes, or any one of many other matters – but the totality of the 
disruptions caused by modern industrial systems and the consumption of their 
products, whose cumulative and increasing impact has reached into all parts of the 
biosphere.165  
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In large part, these changes are driven by “carboniferous capitalism”166 which is 
responsible for significant changes in the composition of the atmosphere and other 
harmful polluting externalities.167 There is another contradiction in operation here. 
Economic liberalism, which is often seen as the panacea for poverty and 
environmental insecurity in the developing world, relies on patterns of consumption 
and economic growth that undermine the stability of the greater biosphere. As Dalby 
puts it, “civilisation does things to nature in the process of doing things to itself”168. 
The themes of Empire and the Anthropocene not only raise questions about the 
traditionally conceived links between the environment and conflict, it also raises 
questions about the meaning of ‘environment’ itself. ‘Environment’ is a colonial 
construction, according to Dalby, “one that operates on the urban assumptions of an 
external nature whose resources are to be managed, rather than a context, place, or 
home that is to be lived in”169. The environment as commonly perceived in the 
modern era is therefore:  
…a catchall residual category which usually refers to the non-human material context 
of human activities. Premised on the extraordinary modern assumption that divisions 
between humanity and the rest of the biosphere are a useful ontological starting point 
the term environment has come to encompass the definition of the part of ‘nature’ 
that provides the backdrop for human affairs.170 
Due to the scale of anthropogenic disruptions in the biosphere and their complex and 
far-reaching interactions, thinking about the environment as the backdrop to human 
activities and history is no longer appropriate.171 Conceiving of the environment as 
‘other’ or separate from humanity has allowed civilisation to be built on the untenable 
assumption that consumption of natural resources and pollution of the environment 
effects ‘the environment’ but not humanity as such – at least, not the urban core. As 
long as nature’s abundance remained plentiful, this fiction could continue; however, 
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the scale of modern anthropogenic disruptions now necessitates a change in 
thinking.  
Dalby therefore suggests thinking in terms of ecology rather than the environment.172 
Ecology includes, rather than excludes; it connects rather than partitions. Ecology 
recognises that nature and ecosystems are connected in complex and interactive 
ways whereas the traditional way of thinking about the environment is to break it up 
into it separate components: rivers, mountains, fields, oceans etc., that are often 
linked with territorial boundaries. Ecology enables the possibility of thinking about the 
biosphere as a whole – and humans as integrally connected and dependant yet 
autonomous in that they are able to manipulate it to the extent witnessed in the 
Anthropocene.173  
The crucial point from a security perspective is that thinking about nature and the 
biosphere in these interconnected terms challenges the most basic assumptions of 
international relations: that states are the main object and preserver of security.174 
Furthermore, as Dalby observes, “the most important ecological processes are rarely 
contained neatly within the administrative boundaries of states”175 meaning that there 
is a fundamental mismatch between state-based practices of sovereignty and the 
ecological crisis.176 In fact, it is frequently the activities of states – especially in the 
global North – that allow and encourage environmental destruction through 
economic and military activities that have driven the growing global insecurity of the 
Anthropocene. Poorer states in the global South often lack the capabilities and 
development levels to be able to implement the needed changes.177  
This is indeed a serious challenge to the idea of environmental security specifically 
and security more generally. As Dalby points out, “(s)ecurity is a derivative concept, 
one that assumes that there is something else, outside of itself, that has to be 
secured”178. Invoking the term ‘security’ not only raises issues in terms of policy 
priority, it also captures and provokes ideas of the protection and vulnerability of 
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certain collectives from dangers or perceived future threats emanating from outside 
the collective. However, from a critical ecology perspective, international politics is 
something that happens within the biosphere, rather than environmental issues 
being an internal variable within the international order that can be addressed 
according to familiar patterns of behaviour and thinking.179 The question relevant to 
environmental security is therefore: “what exactly is being secured?”180 Is it the state, 
the international order or the natural environment?181 
Dalby himself does not offer a comprehensive answer to the question or the 
challenges of state-based thinking about sovereignty and its juxtaposition with 
ecological challenges.182 Instead he suggests a range of options such as: a greater 
reliance on the governance of municipalities and corporations;183 the localised skills 
and knowledge of those who live in rural areas;184  a shift in cultural values from 
conspicuous consumption to conspicuous aestheticism;185 and a general suggestion 
of a global security policy that focuses on reducing ecological disruption, enhancing 
the disaster assistance of states and militaries, and establishing patterns of aid and 
trade in response to ecological disruptions instead of confrontation and conflict.186 
More recently he has forwarded the idea of ‘sustainable security’ as formulated by 
the Oxford Research Group. Sustainable security focuses on “human security as 
primarily a matter of prevention, rather than violent action in the face of emergencies 
(which necessitates) thinking through the connections between ecological, economic 
and social changes”187. As Dalby suggests, “A security strategy that fails to deal with 
the processes already in motion that are making people insecure is one doomed to 
failure”188. 
Dalby’s contribution is immensely valuable, given that his analysis progresses the 
environmental security discourse by shining a critical light on both the meaning and 
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usage of environment and security. His suggestion for a shift in thinking towards 
ecological disruption rather than environmental change is valuable in that it shifts the 
focus off the state as the referent object of security and the rigid demarcations 
associated with state-based thinking. The question of what, or who, the referent 
object of security is, still remains. What is clear, however, is that whether the concern 
is in relation to the biosphere, states, communities or individuals, the question 
continually comes down to: how does the natural environment interact with and 
threaten to negatively impact these various units of analysis? For Dalby the question 
is adjusted slightly: How do global economic and industrial processes threaten the 
natural environment, creating social and civilisational vulnerabilities? Mankind, it 
seems, rather than nature, is the driver of the negative changes that threaten 
civilisation.  
Jon Barnett and Human Security  
In The Meaning of Environmental Security, Barnett takes a normative approach, 
arguing that human security should be at the core of environmental security. In 
coming to this conclusion he first critiques the environmental security discourse and, 
in a similar vein to Dalby above, forwards the idea that using ecological principles 
provides a superior way of understanding environmental issues that interact with 
security. The idea of ecological security more easily leads to analyses that place 
humans at the centre of security discourse, rather than the usual state-centric 
prioritisation.189  
Before outlining his framework for understanding human security in an environmental 
context, Barnett also examines and critiques the earlier environmental security 
literature. As with the political ecology and critical ecology critiques above, he is 
highly critical of national and military security conceptualisations of environmental 
security that stem from the realist paradigm and place the nation-state as the 
referent object of security.190 He observes that war and the preparation for war 
generally bring negative impacts to the environment. Military budgets also divert 
funds from other programs designed to improve social and ecological well-being.191 
For these reasons, when considering the linkages between environmental change 
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and violence, Barnett asserts that “the causal connections between direct violence 
and environmental change are far stronger when considering direct [military] 
violence as a cause of vulnerability to environmental change, and far weaker when 
considering environmental change as a cause of direct violence”192. According to 
Barnett, the post-Cold War agenda of national security, as discussed in the first 
section above, brought environmental and social issues under its umbrella and had 
“the effect of broadening national security…without changing the nation-state as the 
referent object [therefore allowing] the further colonisation of domestic society by 
realism’s ultimately violent logic”193.  Accordingly, “(i)n this broader (but not deeper) 
agenda, security is still the preserve of states acting in their own interests”194.   
Barnett also criticises those who claim that resource scarcities are a direct cause of 
violent conflict. The idea of “resource wars” is imbued with a range of assumptions 
including the notion that humans, especially those in the global South, will resort to 
force and coercion rather than co-operate over scarce resources.195 He questions 
the assumption that conflict and instability are always negative outcomes and that 
the status quo is therefore the optimal desire. Instability tends to be associated with 
negative outcomes when discussed in environmental degradation and violent conflict 
literature. However in cases of severe injustice, instability and a shift in the status 
quo is often what is required to bring justice and equity.196 Barnett singles out 
Homer-Dixon’s work as “the most engaging and thoughtful” of the environmental 
degradation, population and conflict literature197 and outlines what he believes is the 
most important finding within Homer-Dixon’s work: that “environmental problems are 
contributing to social disturbances, which may involve violence or, less sensationally 
but no less importantly, more structural forms of disadvantage”.198 The conclusion 
that he draws from this is that Homer-Dixon’s research actually implies little 
connection between environmental scarcities and security – when security is viewed 
from a national security perspective.199 Instead of continuing with research focused 
on violent conflict, therefore, a more productive research agenda – according to 
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Barnett – would be to “examine cases where, in the face of similar pressures, 
violence was not the end product”.200  
The question that remains, therefore, is why there such an interest in the linkages 
between environmental degradation and violence.201 Barnett surmises that the 
environment and conflict literature obscures the role and responsibility of the North in 
the current global ecological crisis, focusing only on one of the possible impacts of 
environmental degradation without taking the root causes of this degradation 
seriously.202 Most case-studies in the environmental scarcities literature are focused 
on the global South which, according to Barnett, can be read as “a case of ‘civilised’ 
Europeans constructing a barbaric Other”203. Although, there appears to be a lack of 
credible evidence that environmental scarcities are the cause of wars, “Politicians 
and military leaders …[continue] to present war in Darwinian or Malthusian terms as 
a fight over subsistence needs, but this ‘state of nature’ rhetoric is a pragmatic 
device that denies responsibility for peaceful action, and justifies violence in lieu of 
meaningful dialogue”204.  
The North-South divide in the environmental security literature raises a point similar 
to the idea of Empire as forwarded by Dalby. The environmental relationship 
between North and South is usually not one of violent conflict directed from the 
South to the North, but is instead a relationship of transference of harm, or 
environmental degradation from the North to the South through industrial 
processes.205 Wealth is contained in the developed North by the exploitation of 
cheap labour, materials and the environment of the South. Barnett therefore 
challenges the idea that environmental degradation is the most serious 
environmental security concern, instead asserting that the “most complex, uncertain, 
and potentially disruptive problems lie not in the realm of environmental sources but 
in silent, apolitical and pervasive processes which are overloading the planetary 
‘sinks’”206. Given this, the continued focus of scarcity induced violent conflict in the 
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environmental security literature “obscures Northern complicity in the generation of 
the very environmental problems it scripts as threats…[thus leading to] the 
obsession with only one of the possible effects of environmental degradation 
(conflict) at the expense of other effects, and at the expense of taking seriously the 
root causes of the degradation”207. 
Like Dalby and the proponents of political ecology, Barnett believes that a better 
understanding of what is, or should be, at the heart of environmental security can be 
gained by giving ecological processes a higher priority. “Ecological security” 
therefore emphasises the biosphere as that which is to be secured whereas 
traditionally, environmental security has been concerned with the security of the 
state.208 Shifting the perspective of security towards ecology means that ecological 
values can be taken more seriously at a policy level. The principal lessons that can 
been drawn from ecology are: that all life depends on a complex web of food chains; 
that these chains involve plants and animals, energy, water, carbon, and nutrients; 
that there are thresholds below which the viability of the species may rapidly and 
perhaps irreversibly decline; and that simple ecosystems tend to be more unstable 
than complex ones. [Additionally]…there are finite limits imposed by energy and 
material availability, and hence there are limits to the growth of human systems.209  
The complexity and interconnected character of natural systems means that 
“(s)ecurity from an ecological theory perspective…involves thinking about the whole 
rather than the parts”210. From an ecological perspective, therefore, complex 
ecosystems tend to be more stable than simple ones providing greater resilience in 
the face of disruption and change. In order to build resilience, social and ecological 
heterogeneity is the desired norm rather than social uniformity and ecological 
homogenisation.211 In this way Barnett directly links resilience with security, 
observing that traditional understandings of security that seek to protect the status 
quo and create groups of Others to be feared is the antithesis to the security brought 
about by diversity and difference.  
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Although Barnett makes the case for ecological security, he is pragmatic about the 
term’s deployment and its impact, or lack thereof. He observes that the literature 
about ecological security developed synonymously with the environmental security 
literature but that arguably, the ecological security literature has had very little impact 
on policy and discourse.212 According to Barnett, the concept of ecological security 
brings with it important understandings of the interactions between the environment 
and security, however, its alternative language means that it is less effective in 
impacting mainstram discourse. This makes ecological security the ‘Trojan horse’ of 
security that has been left outside the gates, “whereas environmental security has 
been wheeled inside” 213. Accordingly, one of the main functions of environmental 
security, according to Barnett, is to undermine and contest the meaning of security. 
Barnett therefore proposes to: 
…maintain the label of ‘environmental security’, but to empty it of its existing meaning 
and refill it with notions of human security and positive peace…The principal 
difference is that putting people first and retaining the label maintains the ability to 
contest the substantive issue of what security is and for whom it applies.214  
Barnett therefore set himself the task of refilling environmental security with meaning 
by shifting the focus to human security. Shifting the focus to human security 
undermines traditional understandings of security. Barnett frames human security 
using the concepts developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
explaining that according to UNDP, seven domains of human security have been 
identified: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. 
At the heart of human security is the “provision of basic material needs such as 
nutritious food, clean air and water, and shelter”215. In addition to these basic 
material needs, he also suggests that there are second set of requirements such as 
emotional, familial, and community support as well as opportunities that allow an 
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individual “a personal sense of involvement, purpose, belonging, excitement, 
challenge, satisfaction, love, enjoyment and confidence”.216  
Human security therefore not only challenges traditional formulations of security but 
also the discourse that is generally associated with environmental security: 
Thinking in terms of human security shifts the scale of analysis away from nations to 
the local level. It focuses on the immediate vulnerability of most of the world’s 
population, as opposed to hypothetical threats to nation-states. It provides a referent 
object which, when combined with environmental concerns, forms the basis for a new 
approach to environmental security.217 
The basic material needs required for human security – nutritious food, clean air and 
water, and shelter – require a healthy, functioning and resilient biosphere at the 
global level, and healthy, functioning and resilient ecosystems at the local level.218 
The provision of a healthy environment, therefore, not only enables the provision of 
the fundamentals of human and environmental security, but it also shifts the primary 
purpose of the state from violent protection (and subordination) of its citizens to an 
institution focused on the provision of their basic needs.219 This means that “the state 
is a critical institution for the support of livelihoods”220 and plays an important role in 
creating the conditions in which people can pursue their desired livelihood options. 
Having addressed the way in which human security understandings influence 
environmental security concerns, Barnett proposes a new definition of environmental 
security: “the process of peacefully reducing human vulnerability to human-induced 
environmental degradation by addressing the root causes of environmental 
degradation and human insecurity”.221 In a separate article, Barnett defines 
environmental insecurity as: “the vulnerability of individuals and groups to critical and 
adverse effects caused directly or indirectly by environmental change”222. These 
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definitions are understandably anthropocentric, focusing on human vulnerability and 
insecurity and anthropogenic environmental degradation. It also dovetails easily into 
Dalby’s theory of the “Anthropocene”, suggesting that although, on the surface, the 
primary impacts studied in environmental security – such as scarcity of renewable 
resources and biodiversity loss – appear to be environmental problems, at their core, 
the majority of the negative environmental effects are in-fact human induced. 
This definition must be read in conjunction with the definition of human security 
developed as an outworking of the Global Environmental Change and Human 
Security Project (GECHS), in which Barnett was also a participant. According to the 
GECHS defintion, human security is something that is achieved:  
…when and where individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, 
mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human, environmental, and social rights; have 
the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in 
pursuing these options.223 
There are several important elements of this definition to keep in mind. Firstly, that 
the focus of human security – from an environmental change perspective – is on 
needs, rights and values. Secondly, human security is a variable condition where 
people have agency and the ability to participate in the management of their own 
human security. Finally, the definition relates to both individuals and communities, 
recognising that in many cultures, “the collective social group is of more value than 
the individual”224. 
Barnett’s definition focuses on risk and vulnerability and consequently these two 
ideas must be explored in more detail. According to Barnett, “environmental security 
is about risk, and risk needs to be democratically negotiated to determine the most 
urgent risks and the best ways of dealing with them”225. As a consequence, the risks 
of greatest concern to environmental security are those things which threaten the 
most basic elements of human security – that is, basic health needs such as clean 
water, sufficient nutritious food and a reasonable level of health and hygiene. These 
risks are the core concern for Barnett: “That one fifth of the world’s people do not 
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have their basic health needs satisfied is the fundamental injustice with which this 
book is concerned. That these people are also extremely vulnerable to perturbations 
in weather or economics is also of great concern: these are risks proper”226. 
The vulnerability that leads to this risk is a product of poverty, exclusion, 
marginalisation and inequities of material consumption. The corollary of this is that 
vulnerability occurs as a result of social, economic and political process, rather than 
simply due to processes of environmental change.227 Although environmental 
degradation and natural disasters are certainly variables that cause death and 
destruction, the most at risk to these perturbations are those who are most 
vulnerable due to poverty and inequity. Barnett uses the example of the cyclone that 
struck Bangladesh in 1991, resulting in an estimated 139,000 deaths. The 
vulnerability of those most affected by the cyclone was “fundamentally a function of 
poverty”228. The harm that prima facie was caused by the cyclone itself, is, on closer 
analysis, a form of structural harm otherwise known as structural violence.229 
According to Barnett then, environmental security, is about people and politics.230 It 
is about people, in the sense that human security is fundamental to the construction 
of security that extends beyond simply the security of the state. It is also about 
people in that much of the transference of environmental harm from the North to the 
South is as a result of the consumer culture in the developed world – a culture that 
must be countered if the environmental security of millions in the developing world is 
to be enhanced.231 This requires individuals in the North to take “conscious political 
actions…(which include) consuming less, consuming with greater discernment, and 
being more involved in actions at all scales from local to global for human and 
ecological causes”232. 
Environmental security is about politics inasmuch as it is often political decisions – or 
the lack thereof – that cause or exacerbate insecurity related to environmental 
                                                          
226
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 131-32. 
227
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 132-33. 
228
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 133. 
229
 See: Barnett, "Environmental Security and Peace," 6; Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," 
Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 170-71. 
230
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 141. 
231
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 142-47. 
232
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 146. 
 
 
60 | P a g e  
 
change. The global ecological crisis that the world is currently facing requires 
political solutions and “(t)he failure to act is therefore fundamentally a failure of 
politics and governance”233. Additionally, the problems associated with globalisation 
and industrialisation require enhanced forms of global governance that are able to 
regulate the environmentally socially harmful activities of multinational 
corporations.234 As Barnett concludes:  
In the final analysis, enhancing environmental security involves no less than 
overcoming the negative aspects of modernity. This means thinking seriously about 
the nation-state and ways to reform it. It means resolving difficult issues to do with 
politics, justice, responsibility, diversity, and the situating and scaling of legitimate 
institutions of governance.235 
Barnett’s conception of environmental security moves the referent object of security 
away from the state and firmly into the realm of human security. At the same time, he 
draws the discourse away from the ‘environment’ and towards the ecological. In 
doing so he indicates a systemic approach that focuses on the way that global 
processes impact on local environments and how this in turn impacts on individuals 
and communities. Although the state as the primary referent of security is dismissed, 
its important role in supporting individuals and communities is not.   
Conclusion: Framing Environmental Security 
ESS has had a haphazard development. From its beginnings based in the growing 
environmental movement of the 1970s, it has taken on a variety of different forms. 
Environmental security emerged as a broad idea concurrent with the splintering of 
security studies at the end of the Cold War. In its initial phases, a range of traditional 
security scholars attempted to understand how the environment would impact upon 
national security considerations. The ideas developed during the initial stage were 
tested in the second phase of ESS by large projects such as ENCOP and ECAC. 
These projects discovered more nuanced links between the environment and 
security but focused primarily on violent conflict and migration. In the third period of 
ESS, the suppositions of the first period were interrogated, in particular, the 
assumption that the state is the primary referent of security in an environmental 
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context. Throughout this period, the dominance of traditional security 
conceptualisations of environmental security was greatly reduced and generally 
replaced with a human security orientation.  
The above literature review demonstrates clearly that there is no central premise to 
ESS and it therefore aids in answering the first research question of the thesis. 
Chapter three will use this knowledge to build on and consider why there is no 
central tenet to ESS. It will also use the literature review to assist in answering the 
second research question, by enabling an exploration of the similarities across the 
literature.  
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Methodology Section 
Chapter Two: Methodology 
 
Simply inserting environmental factors into existing social scientific models is 
more problematic than recent researchers have recognised. 
Daniel H. Deudney: Contested Grounds.236 
Introduction 
A strong methodology is particularly important in a thesis examining environmental 
security issues due to the multiple competing approaches and the potentially large 
scope of such an examination. Structuring the methodology, and therefore the 
thesis, around the aims outlined in the introduction, ensures that the methodological 
approach both marries with the research agenda and is well focused. This 
methodology chapter will therefore establish the elements necessary for providing a 
strong methodological examination of the research questions and a well-grounded 
theoretical exploration of the main premise of the thesis. The structure of the 
methodology chapter is as follows:   
1. Research Design: Initially, the research design for the thesis will be 
explained, reviewing the research problem, the research objective, and the 
research questions. The statement of the thesis and the identification of the 
links between empirics and theory have already been outlined in the 
introduction. 
2. Thesis Scope: Second, the scope of the thesis will be outlined, detailing what 
is to be studied in the Mekong River Basin.  
3. Epistemological Overview: Third, the merits of the mixed methods or 
pragmatic approach will be discussed, with a focus on why the thesis is 
weighted towards the qualitative angle rather than quantitative.  
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4. Case Study Design: Fourth, the case-study design will be outlined detailing 
the structure, variables and a justification of the case study.  
5. Data Collection: The final part of the methods section will focus on the data 
collection techniques used in this thesis, and the rationale behind these. 
Section 1: Research Design 
The research design adopted in this thesis is based on the strategies outlined in both 
Yin’s Case Study Research: Design and Methods and George & Bennett’s Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. The research design that 
follows has been based on the objectives specified by these researchers as 
important in establishing a sound case-study research design.237 It outlines the 
research problem, the research questions and objectives, and the statement of the 
thesis. 
Research Problem 
The scope and speed of environmental challenges today are immense. From 
changes in global environmental processes to disruption to ecological services at the 
local level, the large numbers of people that these currently impact, and are likely to 
impact in coming decades, is of deep concern. At risk is the stability of states, the 
functioning of national economies, the social cohesion of cities and communities, 
and the health and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of individuals. The lack of a 
coherent analytical framework through which to understand the security issues that 
are occurring as a result is highly problematic. Security studies in general, and the 
policy world that is informed by it, is poorer for the lack of this approach. 
Arguably, environmental security has the potential to provide a way forward in 
understanding these environmental challenges and the security issues that arise as 
a result. The problem – as outlined in the introduction –is that there is no analytical 
bridge between the environment (environmental science), the state (traditional 
security and international relations) and the individual (human security). Much of the 
literature focuses on either the security of the state, or the security of individuals. 
Environmental security, therefore, is essentially an intersection of conflicting ideas 
from a range of disciplines. This is a problem because it hinders these complex real 
                                                          
237
 Yin, Case Study Research, 21-28; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005), 73-87.  
 
 
64 | P a g e  
 
world environmental/social/political challenges and their impacts – such as climate 
change and large-scale ecological destruction – from being comprehensively 
understood from a security perspective. The sub-field of environmental security is 
arguably the theoretical lens that would enable such an understanding, yet because 
it is such a splintered notion – as outlined in the literature review – no such 
comprehensive understanding is available. As a result, national policymakers usually 
fall back on the traditional theories of realism and liberalism, and international 
policymakers either do the same, or subscribe to the human security discourse.  
This means that environmental security – for all its potential to analyse these issues 
broadly – is unable to provide an analytical framework that would enable local, 
national and international policymakers to understand in greater detail the plethora of 
security issues linked to the complex challenges created by a rapidly changing 
environment. Furthermore, it appears that there is little concern that this is in fact the 
case. There is no attempt within the literature to conceive of environmental security 
in a united or coherent fashion and there has been no attempt to find a theme that 
links the disparate elements together.  
Research Objective and Research Questions 
The objective of the research is therefore to move towards resolving this problem. In 
this case, the analytical framework of Systemic Environmental Security has been 
forwarded as a potential solution. The primary objectives of the research are to 
initially understand the disparate nature of the environmental security literature, 
secondly, to discern the common theme within this literature, and finally, to 
determine how taking a systemic approach to environmental security differs from 
more standard approaches. It is intended that this will provide a stronger theoretical 
understanding and a more insightful approach to complex environmental security 
problems.  
These objectives have been broken down into research questions that aid in quickly 
informing the research agenda of the thesis. Although they have already been 
outlined in the introduction, it is valuable to state them once again here at the 
beginning of the methodology:  
 
 
65 | P a g e  
 
1. Does environmental security have a central theoretical core that enables it to 
coherently analyse the linkages between security and the environment?   
2. Is there a common theme that can be discerned within the literature on 
environmental security? 
3. Does Systemic Environmental Security provide any unique insights into the 
relationship between security and the environment? 
It is intended that in answering these three research questions, the research 
objectives for the thesis will be met.  
Section 2: Scope and Security Perspective 
As has been outlined in the introduction, the case study chapters focus on 
hydropower in the Mekong River Basin. For various reasons, this scope could be 
considered either too large or too narrow. This section justifies the scope of the 
thesis, discussing the somewhat broad focus on a single river system shared by five 
nation states, as well as the narrow concentration on only one environmental 
component – the negative effects of hydropower. The aim of this section is to justify 
the thesis’s focus on hydropower development in the Mekong River Basin and arrive 
at a research agenda for the case-study that establishes a balance between being 
overly expansive – and therefore overly speculative and indeterminate – and being 
overly narrow – and therefore theoretically irrelevant.238  
The Broader Environmental Context of the Mekong  
From the perspective of the global biosphere, or the greater Asian region, examining 
the Mekong River Basin (MRB) is a comparatively much more manageable unit. 
Even so, the environmental issues in the MRB are expansive and are outlined below 
in order to demonstrate the way that the case-study subject matter has been 
narrowed. Climate change, in particular, is already having an impact on this region, 
particularly on hydrological processes. Four water related issues are particularly 
salient: flooding; storms; sea-level rise; and changes to precipitation – including 
drought.239  
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The natural flooding cycle is a vital element of life on the Mekong River as it interacts 
with fisheries and agricultural production and is generally welcomed by the 
population who have lived with this natural cycle for millennia. Flooding is particularly 
important to the Delta region as it brings crucial fertile silt to this agriculturally highly 
productive area keeping salinity levels down in the process. As the impacts of 
climate change have been making their presence felt throughout the MRB, the 
intensity and severity of flooding has increased, especially over the previous two 
decades. This is partly related to the second issue of monsoons and storms which 
are less welcome because the devastation that accompanies them can cause severe 
economic impacts and loss of life and livelihoods.  
Changes in precipitation patterns also have obvious links with both flooding and 
storms given that precipitation is forecast to increase over coming decades. Although 
somewhat variable throughout the basin, the main changes associated with climate 
change and precipitation is an increased volume, but at less regular intervals. This 
means that one of the wettest places on the planet will also be threatened by drought 
over the coming decades, bringing with it severe consequences to livelihoods, 
especially at the Delta, where drought allows increased salinity intrusion. This then 
links with sea-level rise which is in part responsible for increased salinity in the Delta 
region as the sea gradually pushes inland and inundates farmland. Drought, which 
decreases flow from the Mekong and therefore decreases freshwater flow out of the 
Delta, interacts with sea-level rise which is simultaneously pushing salt water inland. 
The impacts of sea-level rise and salinity threaten to have the biggest impact on the 
Delta, because of the potential numbers of those displaced as well as the disruption 
to agricultural production that accompanies the increasing salinity. 
Although the overview above is necessarily brief, what should be evident is the 
interactive nature of the impacts of environmental processes in the MRB. Changes in 
precipitation cannot be de-linked from flooding and storms. Additionally, drought 
often increases the impacts of salinity and, therefore, when drought or lower river 
flows and sea-level rise occur simultaneously, the impacts to agriculture can be 
devastating. These systemically linked issues further highlight the need for an 
understanding of environmental security from a systems thinking approach because, 
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when drawn together, all the evidence points to a severe disruption to the water 
resources in a region where water is relied upon as the main element of subsistence 
through fisheries and agriculture.  
These linked issues remain overly broad in scope for a thesis, however. Attempting 
to outline and explain the science behind them, and then to form a coherent 
theoretical analysis would result in the work becoming overly large and speculative. 
Focusing on only the impacts of hydropower development – which will be justified in 
more detail below – limits the analysis greatly and provides a much more 
manageable focus for the case-study chapters. Nevertheless, given that a systemic 
perspective is desired of this thesis, it is important to keep in mind that the water 
related issues identified above provide an important background and context to the 
research presented here.  
Security Perspective 
The process of elimination that limits the scope of the thesis to hydropower was far 
from arbitrary. The serious impacts of flooding, storms, drought, sea-level rise and 
salinity intrusion are without doubt impacting on the lives of millions in the region as 
well as national economies. What is more difficult to identify is a strong link to 
security in terms of both their impacts and their causes. In particular, it is difficult to 
discern the political element to these issues; the political arguably being one of the 
more important elements of any security analysis.240 To some degree there is a 
political element to the impacts of these environmental changes in that there is a 
degree of adaptation that occurs as a result of political decisions.241 There is also the 
potential for longer term political impacts that may occur as many – especially within 
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the Delta – are forced to migrate due to salinity and sea-level rise making parts of 
the delta uninhabitable.242 
In regards to the causes of these environmental issues, it is possible to consider the 
changes in climate that drive them as caused by the anthropogenic processes of 
modern industrial society and globalisation and the failure of the international 
community to achieve a workable carbon emissions reduction agreement.243 This 
would certainly introduce a political element, but result in lifting our level of political 
analysis from the local or regional to the global, and as a consequence would once 
again result in an unmanageable scope. Indeed, it is the difficulty in assigning causal 
blame for the global changes in climate that is at the very core of disagreements 
over carbon emissions reductions and this could no doubt be the subject of its own 
thesis.244 It is for these reasons that the four localised environmental issues, referred 
to above, have been discounted as potential research targets. That is to say, they 
have no immediately identifiable political element at the level of either cause or 
effect.  
At this juncture, what is important to note is that the choice of hydropower projects in 
the Mekong River Basin as the focus of the case study chapters, is due to there 
being a closely related political element. As will become evident, the decision to 
construct hydropower dams occurs at a regional and national level and is often the 
focus of intense political scrutiny and debate. As for the impacts, these are at times 
more difficult to identify from a purely political perspective. As a consequence, the 
conception of security used here is more flexible than a singular focus on the 
political, affording a level of importance to social aspects of security – at the 
community and individual levels. This gives the thesis relevance at the level of both 
national security and human security. This important issue about the meaning of 
security – from a Systemic Environmental Security perspective – will be discussed in 
much greater detail in Chapter Three and the concluding chapters. It would be 
premature to do so here but suffice to say that for an issue to register as relevant to 
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environmental security, it must have: a) a political or economic cause; b) an 
environmental or ecological effect that has; c) a negative impact on the political or 
social level.  
The Importance of Hydropower to the Mekong System 
Just as a there are a variety of different environmental issue areas related to climate 
change that have been identified, so there are a variety of localised, human-driven 
environmental issues that fit the causal description above. Such issues include 
deforestation, industrial pollution of waterways, overfishing, sand-dredging of the 
Delta and aquifer pollution.245 These issues were considered as potentially worthy of 
examination in this thesis, however, were excluded in order to keep the scope 
manageable. These issues therefore sit at the periphery of the thesis and, once 
again, provide the context for the environmental challenges in the region.   
Hydropower development was chosen over the above potential candidates for one 
important reason: The most obvious environmental issue to consider in a river basin 
is water, and arguably the most pressing water issues in the MRB are those that are 
arising as a result of hydropower projects. Although hydropower developments are 
essentially engineering projects that are focused on creating energy and foreign 
income, they also come with severe ‘externalities’ similar to the externalities of air, 
ground and water pollution created by other industrial processes. These externalities 
are in the form of environmental and social impacts that have knock on effects to the 
security of people and possibly nations.246 These in turn have serious Hydropower 
development on the Mekong therefore provides a rich source of data to facilitate the 
exploration of the idea of Systemic Environmental Security. 
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It is important to note that a strong argument can be made for continuing the honing 
down process from the level of a river basin. The MRB, for example, is home to 
around 60 million people covering an area of 795,000 km2 and the river is shared by 
six discrete nation states.247 Studying such a large area covering a handful of states 
remains problematic given the overly expansive research area and the mind-
boggling number of possible variables. The argument is valid but can be countered 
in part by considering the MRB not as a political unit, but as an ecological one. For 
example, the Mekong delta in southern Viet Nam – sometimes referred to as the 
‘rice-bowl of Asia’ – is at significant risk from hydropower projects for a number of 
reasons. In terms of hydropower, one of the greatest risks to the Delta is from the 
Lancang Dam Cascade in the upper, Chinese section of the river, thousands of 
kilometres away. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Four, the silt captured behind 
these dams is having a significant impact on the fertility and survival of the delta – 
interacting with the problems already occurring from sea-level rise and salinity 
intrusion. This fact is seldom – if ever – recognised by Chinese authorities due to the 
state-based thinking that dams are state-owned and operated and, therefore, the 
impacts that occur as a result of their construction are only a concern if they impact 
on the state that own and operate them.  
This state-based thinking runs counter to a systemic approach that recognises 
ecosystems as ecosystems rather than as political units to be conquered and 
divided. Rivers are unique and interdependent ecosystems where changes in one 
section can have significant impacts in another section thousands of kilometres 
away. Studying the delta in isolation, for example, is analogous to a surgeon, in 
trying to diagnose the numbness in a foot, only examining the foot, whilst ignoring an 
injury to the upper spine; or a mechanic attempting to discover the cause of black 
smoke emitting from the tailpipe who only examines the exhaust. The Mekong River 
Basin is an ecosystem, and like the parts of the body, or the functioning of a car, in 
order to understand the symptoms in one area, an understanding of the total system 
is crucial. This is the purpose and power of Systemic Environmental Security. For 
this reason, it is vital – if anything is to be learned about SES in the MRB – to study 
the system, not simply the artificial political division and units that have been 
assigned to the geography over the centuries.  
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Nevertheless, in a complex ecological-political system such as the MRB, without a 
clear research agenda, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 
data generated in the research process.248 In order to avoid this situation, this 
section of the methodology has systematically narrowed the scope of the thesis so 
that it is sufficiently limited so as not to be overly speculative and inclusive but not 
throttled to the extent that the thesis is overly narrow and therefore uninformative to 
the literature on environmental security more generally.249 The scope has been 
narrowed from the global to the regional and from the regional to a single river 
system. From the large range of potential climate related and human induced 
environmental challenges across the river basin one has been chosen: Hydropower 
construction. This was chosen because it strongly links the political with the 
environmental and social. Section four below will outline in even greater detail the 
more specific case study methodology which further defines and confines the scope 
of the study. Having now established the scope, the following section will provide 
even greater detail on the methodological approach of the thesis.   
Section 3: Epistemological Approach – Combining quantitative 
and qualitative research in a mixed methods or pragmatic 
approach 
A researcher’s epistemology will have a strong influence not only on their research 
agenda, but also on the way that they present their findings. As will become evident 
throughout the literature review, environmental security studies exhibits a wide range 
of approaches across the full spectrum of scientific and social science research 
strategies. On one end is Gleiditsh’s quantitative research based on a positivist 
epistemology; towards the middle is Homer-Dixon and Kahl who focus on empirical 
sense-making through theory generation; and at the other end of the scale is Dalby’s 
critical ecology leaning towards Foucauldian deconstruction and the Copenhagen 
School’s critical security ethic.250 The absence of a single theoretical core to 
environmental security means that there is no ready-made methodological approach 
                                                          
248
 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, "Building Theories From Case Study Research," Academy of Management Review 
14, no. 4 (1989): 536. 
249
 For a discussion of the importance of scale see: David Delaney and Helga Leitner, "The Political Construction 
of Scale," Political Geography 16, no. 2 (1997); Matthew Wheatley and Chris Johnson, "Factors Limiting Our 
Understanding of Ecological Scale," Ecological Complexity 6, no. 2 (2009). 
250
 See for example: Gleditsch et al., "Conflicts over Shared Rivers."; Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities."; 
Colin Kahl, "Demographic Change, Natural Resources and Violence: The Current Debate," Journal of 
International Affairs 56, no. 1 (Fall 2002); Dalby, "Environmental Security: Ecology or International Relations?." 
 
 
72 | P a g e  
 
to take, indicating that another way must be found. It is therefore the aim of this 
section to clarify the epistemological approach taken in this thesis. This will be 
achieved in two ways: Firstly, the difficulties of, and reasons to avoid using a 
theoretically siloed research agenda will be discussed. Secondly, the pragmatic or 
mixed methods approach will be introduced as well as the justification of its use, 
focusing on the importance of balancing qualitative and quantitative research. 
Avoiding Theoretical Siloes in Environmental Security Research 
Far from simply and objectively searching for causes and relationships, a great deal 
of research begins with an epistemological paradigm and works toward a problem, 
analysing the problem or question from that perspective. Political Ecology, which is 
discussed in detail in the literature review, is a good case in point, explicitly calling 
for research to be based “on a theory of social transformation or political 
economy”251. This practice of anchoring research in a specific epistemological 
approach is particularly true for international relations and security studies which 
tend to divide into competing “isms”.252  
Although it has merit in that it enables the researcher to stay close to a well-defined 
research agenda and discount data unimportant to the chosen theoretical approach, 
it also has some obvious drawbacks in that a researcher may discount or miss 
relevant evidence due to the deliberately siloed approach. Furthermore, it has the 
tendency to be self-reinforcing rather than methodologically valid because it risks 
hampering the production of new ideas and the development of new and novel 
theory.253 Given that the aim of the thesis is to re-evaluate the environmental security 
discourse, it is important that the epistemological approach here does not favour one 
theory over another. To do so would demonstrate bias and skew the analysis. 
Favouring either realism or human security, for example, is going to have an obvious 
impact on the findings. To do so would compromise the objectivity and integrity of 
the research in that it would run the risk of discounting or missing relevant evidence 
to theory and practice. Consequently, a different approach to research must be 
found; one that enables a wider view of theory. 
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The Mixed Methods Approach 
For this reason, this thesis sits within what Creswell refers to as a “pragmatic 
knowledge claims” or a “mixed methods” approach based on the idea that “the 
problem is most important, and researchers use all approaches to understand the 
problem”254. In a mixed methods approach the philosophical assumptions are 
secondary to the problem itself. “Pragmatism is not committed to any one system of 
philosophy and reality” and researchers are able to “choose the methods, techniques 
and procedures of research that best meet their needs and purposes”255. A 
researcher employing the mixed methods approach therefore aims “to capture a 
complete, holistic picture of the subject matter, presumably with a view to uncovering 
something that might have been missed with a simpler research design”256. This is 
an important element of this thesis, given the need to understand both theory and 
empirics. In order to understand environmental security problems, a researcher must 
have a knowledge of various security theories, as well as knowledge of the scientific 
literature as it pertains to the specifics of the case.  
One of the strengths of the mixed methods approach is that it combines both 
qualitative and quantitative research in order to answer the research question as 
effectively as possible.257 This is vital to any study of the links between the 
environment and security given that security studies tends to be qualitative in nature, 
and that the environmental links or causes of insecurity generally sit within a 
scientific or quantitative paradigm. By combining both qualitative and quantitative 
data, the mixed methods approach challenges the more stringent ideals of the binary 
either/or approach of qualitative and quantitative research – fields of enquiry that 
have been described as “at war”258.  
As already eluded to, the work of Gleiditsch provides a strong demonstration of the 
quantitative approach in environmental security studies. Quantitative research tends 
to be focused on probability and statistical theory, using large data sets and multiple 
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duplicatable experiments to test a theory or causal hypothesis. This enhances the 
verifiability and maximises the generalisability of the theory.259 Quantitative research 
“tends to be based on numerical measurements of specific aspects of 
phenomena”260. Ideally, this is to be achieved under controlled circumstances, as an 
experiment to test the independent variables of a theory in order to observe the 
outcome.261 As far as the specific single experiment or case is concerned, a 
quantitative researcher is less interested in this than the generalisable outcomes of 
multiple experiments or cases. Anomalies are not treated as causes for investigation, 
and are often treated as statistical error. Mahoney and Goertz describes this as “the 
effects-of-causes approach”262.  
On the other hand, one of the main concerns of a qualitative research is to discover, 
retrospectively, what causal process led to a given outcome. For example, 
attempting to “identify the causes of World War I, exceptional growth in East Asia 
(or) the end of the Cold War”263 are sensible questions for a qualitative researcher. 
This is the “causes-of-effects approach”: the outcome is known, but the reason or 
reasons for the outcome are not. Individual cases tend to provide stronger 
explanatory power due to the ability of the researcher to more deeply examine the 
causes of the effect. Cases tend to be selected on the dependent variable, and 
cases that are an exception to the rule require examination and explanation, often 
leading to a revision in theory. 
In relation to the mixed methods approach, this thesis is more heavily weighted 
towards qualitative research and analysis given that it incorporates a detailed case-
study that is concerned with explanation and specific detail rather than 
generalisability and duplication. Using a quantitative approach such as that 
forwarded by Gleditsch would act as a “methodological straightjacket (that would 
serve to) severely constrain research in the field”264. The impact of hydropower in the 
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Mekong River Basin on security is the primary focus of the case-study and it is 
acknowledged from the beginning that this research and its findings are not designed 
to be generalisable to all cases related to environmental security, nor all cases 
related to hydropower development. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the empirical 
research informs the theoretical research and that more can be learned about the 
nature of environmental security from this single, focused case-study than from a 
statistical aggregation of data related to hydropower and violent conflict, for example. 
This will be discussed in more detail in section four, below, outlining the details of the 
case-study. 
What is important in relation to the mixed methods approach is that it is a pragmatic 
research design that facilitates research into real world problems without having to 
be anchored to any particular epistemological paradigm. On this point, Dubois and 
Gadde posit that “(t)he main objective of any research is to confront theory with the 
empirical world”265. This is an iterative process and is described more effectively by 
Ragin who states that “(a)s researchers our primary goal is to link the empirical and 
the theoretical – to use theory to make sense of evidence and to use evidence to 
sharpen and refine theory. This interplay helps us to produce theoretically structured 
descriptions of the empirical world that are both meaningful and useful”266. This, 
primarily, is the aim of this thesis, which initially overviews the environmental security 
literature in detail, followed by a case-study that confronts this literature with a real 
world problem, then returning to a theoretical analysis of the findings of the case-
study, positing what this means to theory more broadly. 
What is important to note is that in this thesis, the research question drives the 
epistemological agenda rather than vice versa. In this sense the research is neither 
positivist nor post-positivist.267 There is no attempt to try to ‘prove’ a particular branch 
of international security right or wrong as such, nor to be strictly tied to any particular 
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theoretical paradigm. Confining the thesis to a single school of thought would 
essentially defeat the purpose of the research. The main purpose is to understand 
how approaching security issues related to the environment in a systemic way 
reveals different insights into environmental security.  
Section 4: Case Study Design 
A good case study design is important in order to achieve a sound overall research 
design. This section will overview the case study structure, the research questions 
specific to the case, and the importance of understanding the tension between single 
and multiple cases.  
Case Study Structure 
As already outlined in the introduction, the case study will be broken into two 
chapters. The first chapter – Chapter 4 – will take a macro approach, examining the 
Lancang Cascade built on the Chinese section of the Mekong mainstream and its 
contribution to environmental issues that cross national boundaries. The second 
chapter – Chapter 5 – will take a micro perspective, looking at a single dam within a 
single nation, the Nam Thuen 2 Dam in central Laos.  
Case Study Research Question 
Of the three research questions set out above, the most relevant to the case study 
chapters is the third question that seeks to understand the unique insights that arise 
when using a Systemic Environmental Security approach. The first two questions 
regarding the disparate nature of environmental security are more theoretical in 
nature and are based on a sound knowledge of the literature. It is the third question, 
therefore, questioning the relationship between security and the environment that will 
have the most pertinence to the empirical chapters.  
The Mekong River Basin as a System: The power of the single ‘N’ 
There is controversy and debate in case study methodology theory about the 
number of cases that should be selected. Some theorists suggest that multiple 
comparative case studies, because they are more readily generalisable, are the only 
way to gain valuable knowledge about causal processes. Others believe that a single 
case can provide rich sources of data on which to base strong theoretical 
conclusions. Given that the empirical section of this thesis uses a single case, 
viewed from a macro and a micro perspective, it is important to understand how this 
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fits into this wider methodological debate. This section of the methodology therefore 
justifies the use of a single case, rather than a multiple case study comparison.  
The wider epistemological debate surrounding case study research revolves around 
how the desired ends inform the means. If the desired outcome is that the case 
study or studies are to be generalisable, then a multiple “N” case study (many 
comparable cases) is usually desired. In contrast, if a depth of analysis is desired for 
a richer understanding of the case involved, then a single “N” case study meets the 
criteria. In this sense, the tension “between specificity and generalisability”268 is 
similar to the difference between qualitative and quantitative research. The work of 
Gleditsch, to be detailed in the literature review, exemplifies the quantitative point of 
view. In his study of shared river boundaries, he uses a dataset of 250 river basins 
examining a single dependent variable, the “onset of militarised interstate 
disputes”269. His language is typical of quantitative research, referring to “regression 
analysis”, “positively related” variables, and “probability of conflict”. This is what 
Homer-Dixon refers to as correlational analysis.270 While quantitative findings may 
be informative in a general sense, they provide only limited value to a researcher 
wishing to know about specific conditions in a single river basin.  
The general nature of quantitative and positivist research contrasts with the depth of 
knowledge required for a more geographically specific understanding, and indicates 
why a case study – rather than a quantitative analysis – is warranted when 
researching the Mekong River Basin. It is possible, however, to have a positivist 
outlook whilst doing qualitatively based, case study research. Mitchell and Bernauer 
for example, have strong foundations in the positivist mindset and take their cue from 
Popper’s falsification thesis.271 In their opinion, “drawing valid and unambiguous 
conclusions about a single causal claim contributes more to our knowledge…than 
research that more boldly attempts to evaluate many causal claims but that uses an 
indeterminate research design with insufficient cases to validly substantiate any of 
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the claims”272. A case, therefore, is “a phenomenon for which we report and interpret 
only a single measure of any pertinent variable”273. This positivist view holds that an 
independent variable can and must be isolated in order to study its causal 
relationship with a dependent variable. The assumption here is not only that the 
independent variable can be separated clearly in a real-world setting, but that there 
are no other variables that may be intervening in the causal process. Only in this 
way, could a researcher claim “unambiguous conclusions” about a knowledge claim. 
By Mitchell and Bernauer’s own admission, “the real world often fails to offer up 
cases that fit these demanding criteria”274. Indeed, it is difficult to know how any 
sophisticated theory could be developed based on these strict criteria, nor how 
anything with complex causal pathways could be researched. According to Mitchell 
and Bernauer, therefore, a minimum of four case studies would be required to 
examine the single independent variable.275 Their case study methodology is much 
closer to that which is found in the physical sciences and, in the case of this thesis, is 
unhelpful. 
Eisenhardt, although describing her own approach to case studies as “a positivistic 
view of research”, is more concerned about theory generation than tracing causal 
processes: “theory building research is begun as close as possible to the idea of no 
theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test”276. In her opinion “the process 
(of case study research) is directed toward the development of testable hypotheses 
and theory which are generalisable across settings” 277. Although she believes that 
case study research is a strategy that focuses on “the dynamics present within single 
settings”278 she also holds that in order to create good theory from case study 
research, “between 4 and 10 cases usually works well”. This is because “(w)ith fewer 
than 4 cases, it is often difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and…(w)ith 
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more than 10 cases, it quickly becomes difficult to cope with the complexity and 
volume of the data”279.  
There are several assumptions in operation in Eisenhardt’s work: firstly, that the 
main purpose of case study research is to build theories; secondly, that theory 
building is done in some sort of vacuum, starting from a theoretical tabula rasa; 
thirdly, that case studies should be generalisable; and finally, implicit within this 
worldview is the belief that a single case study is not sufficient to create theory 
relevant to a larger universe. In regards to points one and two, it is clear that the 
case study in this thesis is not simply about creating a testable hypothesis within a 
theoretical vacuum – if indeed this is possible. It falls somewhere between Mitchell 
and Bernauer, and Eisenhardt, in that, although there is an element of theory testing 
involved, there is still opportunity for theory building and modification. In regards to 
the possibility of generalisability, this thesis does not propose that the case of the 
Mekong is necessarily generalisable to other large river systems. Nevertheless, 
understanding the way that hydropower development interacts with environmental 
security will very likely provide key insights into, and raise important questions about 
other large river basins. This speaks to the final point: insights from this single case 
are likely to have relevance in other contexts. 
Yin also believes that multiple case studies are preferable and that if large “N” 
studies are not possible, even a “two-case” case study will yield better results. His 
argument is that “(i)f under…varied circumstances you still can arrive at common 
conclusions from both cases, they will have immeasurably expanded the external 
generalisability of your findings” 280. Yin compares case studies to experiments: “the 
ability to conduct 6 to 10 case studies, arranged effectively within a multiple case 
design, is analogous to the ability to conduct 6 to 10 experiments on related 
topics”281. This view, once again, leans towards a positivist mindset, aiming for 
generalisability across cases rather than searching for unique insights. Yin, however, 
appears to understand that the real world cannot be controlled in a similar way to an 
experiment. In his opinion a case study is needed when “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is 
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being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has 
little or no control”282. 
Perhaps this is why Yin concedes that there are occasions where a single case is 
warranted: the case may be a critical case in testing a well formulated theory; an 
extreme or unique case; a representative or typical case; a revelatory case; or a 
longitudinal case.283 In regards to Yin’s account, the situation in the Mekong River 
Basin is a critical case. According to Yin, if a “theory has specified a clear set of 
propositions as well as the circumstances within which the propositions are believed 
to be true (then)…(t)o confirm, challenge, or extend the theory, a single case may 
meet all of the conditions for testing the theory”284. The research design above has 
outlined how this thesis will challenge and extend the environmental security 
literature by examining the case study of the Mekong River Basin from a Systemic 
Environmental Security perspective.  
There are more substantial reasons for choosing a single case than simply thinking 
of it as a critical case. Dyer and Wilkins criticise Eisenhardt’s use of 4 to 10 cases 
describing it as “cases study” rather than case study research. In their opinion, 
Eisenhardt loses the essence of what constitutes case study research: “the careful 
study of a single case that leads researchers to see new theoretical relationships 
and question old ones”285. They refer to the specificity versus generalisability 
dualism, indicating that a researcher must choose between “deep understandings of 
a particular social setting and the benefits of comparative insights”286. They strongly 
advocate a single case study approach because this allows a researcher to 
“understand and describe the context of the social dynamics…(and) to make the 
context intelligible to the reader and to generate theory in relationship to that 
context”287. Accordingly, “(t)heory that is born of such deep insights will be both more 
accurate and more appropriately tentative because the researcher must take into 
account the intricacies and qualifications of a particular context”288. This stands in 
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stark contrast to the positivist claims that replicatability and generalisability lead to 
more accurate knowledge claims.  
Ragin expands on this idea, explaining that case-oriented researchers “treat cases 
as singular, whole entities purposefully selected, not as homogenous observations 
drawn at random from a pool of equally plausible selections”289. Accordingly, case 
study researchers “study the cases they do because these cases are historically, 
politically, or culturally significant in some way”290. This moves case study research 
away from variable oriented theory testing and towards research able to cope with 
specificity and more complex causal dynamics. In this way, case study research is 
better placed to understand “the empirical world (that) is limitless in its detail, 
complexity, specificity, and uniqueness”291. 
Homer-Dixon refers to the difficulties in studying complex ecological-political systems 
in his methodological paper on the issue: 
The systems under study are characterised by an immense number of unknown 
variables and unknown causal connections between these variables, by interactions, 
feedbacks, and nonlinear relationships, and by high sensitivity to small perturbations. 
Such complexities and uncertainties make it virtually impossible to choose cases that 
control for potentially confounding variables… Highly complex systems also present 
problems for controlled case comparisons. Such an approach, which, ideally, varies 
cases on the independent variable, is appropriate only if the researchers can be sure 
that all other variables…are controlled. Then they can see what happens with the sole 
difference of variation in the independent variable.292 
On this basis, the Mekong River Basin, which is clearly a complex ecological political 
system, does not warrant comparative cases in order to meet the research goals of 
the project. It is difficult to see how, in such a complex system, a series of controls 
could be established that account for all the possible variation. 
The study of the Mekong River Basin is an important case-in-point in regards to the 
specificity versus generalisability debate. Attempting to understand the complex 
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security concerns surrounding hydropower dams, the resource scarcity of water, soil, 
and fisheries, and the outcomes related to environmental security, demonstrate the 
difficulties of a positivistic approach to complex ecological-political systems. It may 
be possible to compare the Mekong, as a river basin, with other river basins, in terms 
of hydrology and ecology – although this is surely contentious – however, once we 
include the political and social layers, keeping in mind that the river is shared by six 
riparian states, with a population of around 87 million, a level of complexity arises 
that is difficult to manage in and of itself, let alone attempting to compare and 
contrast this with other river basins.  
Although there is hydropower development occurring throughout Asia, and there are 
certainly some similarities between some of these and the Mekong, in order to 
compare and contrast, a researcher would have to identify these similarities and 
focus on them to give some meaning to the comparison. In doing this, the depth of 
research must necessarily be throttled in favour of width, the more so, the more 
cases added to the study. Although this would allow the researcher to code the data 
and search for cross case patterns, important understandings – such as the specific 
political and social environment – would need to be significantly simplified due to the 
necessity of keeping the research and data manageable. In doing this, the research 
risks being “hollowed out” in favour of less specific knowledge claims that are 
perhaps more generally accurate to river basins with hydropower, but less accurate 
to the Mekong and undoubtedly less insightful in terms of the Mekong system as a 
whole.  A more specific knowledge of the environmental, social, and political factors 
surrounding the case is favourable because it gives the researcher a much richer 
platform on which to test and build stronger theory, and it allows the reader a deeper 
understanding about how the conclusions were arrived at.293 
Case Selection and the Insights of the Negative Case 
In addition to choosing the number of cases, deciding whether to select a “positive” 
case – one with the presence of the dependent variable – or a “negative” case – a 
case in which the dependent variable is absent – is an important part of case 
selection. As will be outlined in the following chapter, much of the environmental 
security literature revolves around whether environmental scarcities lead to violent 
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conflict. This is because the most well developed theoretical framework associated 
with environmental security – that of Homer Dixon – suggests that there are links 
between the two. However, in relation to the Mekong there is no conflict between 
nations and no violent conflict that appears to be linked with the resource scarcity 
and environmental changes that have been brought about as a result of hydropower 
construction. This means that in regards to the environmental scarcities and violent 
conflict framework and traditional security considerations of conflict between states, 
there does not appear to be anything of major concern.294 The choice to use the 
Mekong therefore – and to focus specifically on hydropower – means that the case is 
essentially a negative one. 
Much of the criticism of Homer-Dixon’s work is based around the fact that he 
selected cases on both the independent and dependent variables.295 Levy suggests 
that one way of overcoming this is to research societies facing similar levels of 
environmental scarcities, but with differing levels of violent conflict.296 Levy’s analysis 
stems from the national security literature and a traditional view of security. The 
dependent variable, violent conflict, remains the main point of interest in his view and 
his assumption is that similar levels of environmental scarcities will cause, or 
contribute to, various levels of violent conflict. His research agenda does not 
consider negative cases, only differing levels of positive outcomes.  
Homer-Dixon defends his decision to select cases based on both the independent 
and dependent variables as part of a strategy of attempting to determine if these 
variables are causally linked. This method, referred to as process tracing, is 
particularly helpful during the early research phase of a given subject and aligns 
itself reasonably well with Eisenhardt’s view that the purpose of case studies is to 
build and test theory.297 Ragin agrees that selecting positive cases is a worthwhile 
endeavour, criticising “simple minded” statistically-based critiques of positive case 
selection.298 His argument is that in order to select negative cases, a body of positive 
                                                          
294
 This will be made clear in Chapters Four and Six. 
295
 See for example: Homer-Dixon, "Strategies for Studying Causation."; Gleditsch and Urdal, "Ecoviolence?."  
296
 Levy, "Time for a Third Wave?", 57. This obviously assumes that finding similar cases is possible. See: 
Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 63. 
297
 Homer-Dixon, "Strategies for Studying Causation," 133, 40-41. Homer-Dixon's version of process tracing is 
somewhat different to that of King, Keohane, and Verba: King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Enquiry, 
227.  
298
 Ragin, "Turning the Tables," 34-35. 
 
 
84 | P a g e  
 
cases – that have enabled the development of a theory – already need to exist. 
Indeed, it is the series of positive case studies on environmental scarcities and 
violent conflict that have already been carried out which facilitate the use of the 
negative case in this thesis. The absence of violent conflict in the Mekong, in the 
presence of the environmental changes that are occurring due to hydropower is of 
considerable interest.  
To counter the selection of positive cases, Gleditsch and Urdal suggest examining 
cases without conflict or cases “likely to explode in the near future”299. As is 
consistent with their positivistic outlook they link back to the quantitative, multiple 
case method as discussed above. Similarly, Barnett states that a “more revealing 
strategy” is to examine cases without violent conflict; although his motives for this 
suggestion are far from quantitative.300 In his opinion, this would “shift the emphasis 
away from reaction to adaptation”301. He is critical of attempts to explain these 
complex issues using positivist research strategies and suggests that a more 
normative approach is needed focusing on “the day-to-day insecurities associated 
with the erosion of individual and group welfare and resilience”302. In this regards, 
this thesis aligns itself more with Barnett’s suggestion that unique security insights 
can be gathered from a negative case, or one without violent conflict. 
As already indicated, selecting a negative case is certainly similar to a positivist 
approach in that rather than process tracing from causes to effects, the study is more 
closely linked to the ‘effects of causes’. Even so, it is dissimilar from positivist 
methodology in that it is not an experiment; there is no control, and the variables 
cannot be manipulated given the case study is a real world scenario. Although the 
evidence used is a mix of qualitative research and quantitative data, it must be 
reiterated that the analysis is strongly qualitative. 
Case Study Design Conclusion 
Given the aims of this thesis and the complexity of the ecological-political system of 
the Mekong River Basin, a strong case study research design is essential. The 
above case study design section has outlined the case study structure in terms of a 
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macro and micro analysis, introduced the limitations of variable oriented testing to 
the overall research design, explained and justified the use of a large single case 
study, and framed the case as a negative case in the context of the preceding 
literature on the subject. It is intended that this well considered case study design will 
provide the overall research agenda with a strong empirical foundation on which to 
re-evaluate the environmental security literature and develop the idea of Systemic 
Environmental Security. 
Section 5: Data Collection 
One of the most important strategies in a mixed methods case-study approach is the 
use of triangulation.303 Triangulation enables the researcher to view the problem 
from different perspectives through multiple data collection techniques. The data 
collection techniques used in this thesis can be broken down into four elements: the 
literature review; interviews; document analysis; and media coverage. This section 
overviews these data collection techniques.   
Literature Review 
The literature review for this thesis is roughly broken into two component parts, one 
looking at theoretical perspectives on environmental and international security, and 
the other overviewing the literature more specifically relevant to the Mekong river 
basin and the environmental changes occurring there. In regards to theoretical 
perspectives, the relevant academic journals on the subject were examined, as well 
as monographs, edited books and textbooks from a wide range of sources and 
authors. Chapters Two and Three contain the majority of reviewed theoretical 
literature and form the basis for the re-evaluation of environmental security.  
Gathering Mekong specific literature required a wider cross-disciplinary search, not 
necessarily specific to security issues. This included literature from human 
geography, hydrology, agricultural sciences, climate sciences and other 
environmental sciences relevant to food, water and hydropower. In addition to the 
scientific literature, social and political discourse on the Mekong was also explored in 
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order to determine the way in which issues related to hydropower on the Mekong 
have been considered from a security perspective – whether explicit or implicit.304 
Additionally, literature that provided a cultural and historical background was also 
reviewed in order to provide a deeper and more specific understanding of the social 
and political machinations present in the Mekong river basin. 
Interviews 
Interviewing in case studies for the purposes of triangulating data is a standard 
research method consistent with the mixed methods approach.305 Triangulating in 
this way enables the researcher to produce more objective and valid results and is 
considered an important component of a solid case study.306 The interviews 
conducted for this thesis are divided between expert interviews and villager 
interviews. Given the macro and micro perspectives of this thesis, the interviews 
were designed to shed light on both of these areas. The expert interviews tended to 
give a perspective on the macro (although some NGO interviews also related to the 
micro) and the villager interviews were specifically designed to give insight into the 
micro level – that is, the way that the construction and operation of a hydropower 
project specifically impacts on the lives of villagers in the Mekong River Basin.  
Both expert interviews and villager interviews were carried out during fieldwork to the 
Southeast Asian region and in accordance with the University of Sydney’s ethical 
guidelines. Expert interviews were carried out by interviewing experts within the field 
of inquiry in regards to their knowledge of the thesis’s research topics and took place 
in Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia. Villager interviews were conducted in 
Lao PDR near the site of the Nam Theun 2 Dam (NT2) and were designed to bring 
much deeper perspectives on the social impacts of hydropower projects in the 
Mekong.  
Expert Interviews 
Expert interviews require specific skills and methodologies from the researcher. The 
methodology used for these interviews is what is referred to as a ‘democratic’ 
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process.307 This means that the interests and objectives of both the interviewer and 
the expert is taken into account.308 For this reason, the interviews were semi-
structured.309 Yin refers to this as a ‘focused interview’ where “the interviews may still 
remain open-ended and assume a conversational manner, but you are more likely to 
be following a certain set of questions derived from the case study protocol”310. This 
enables the researcher to test the case at hand, but also the ability to discover new 
and unexpected insights from a more flexible structure.  
Potential interviewees were contacted according to the University of Sydney’s ethical 
guidelines. Altogether, over 150 email requests were sent, which secured only 
around 20 significant responses. Many phone-calls were also made on arrival in the 
various locations, often resulting in a “managed approach” to calls, requesting 
questions to be emailed or the interviewer to call back at another time. When 
interviews were secured, these were carried out as a face-to-face interview in the 
interviewee’s places of work so as to set the informants at ease. According to the 
semi-structured approach, a list of questions were drafted that married with the 
interviewees expertise. A list of the various interview questions that were asked of 
the expert interviewees can be found under Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis. 
The semi-structured interview environment enabled the expert, or “informant”311, to 
both answer the set questions but also to lead the conversation onto topics that he or 
she believed was salient to the thesis or project. This process allowed the researcher 
to “probe emergent themes or to take advantage of special opportunities which may 
be present in a given situation”312. It also enabled the informant to share knowledge, 
shed light on unexpected topics and to display possible biases or agendas. The 
revelation of bias or specific agenda is an important aspect of the research and this 
knowledge helps the researcher when analysing the data to be aware of and discuss 
threats to validity.  
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Villager Interviews 
The villager interviews took place along the Xe Bang Fai River and the Nakai 
Plateau in central Laos over a two week period. Interviewing villagers affected by this 
dam was a critical part of gaining insight at the micro level of the impacts to 
individuals and communities of hydropower projects. These interviews were 
designed to uncover the perspective of villagers who have been impacted by the 
dam in order to understand what changes have occurred and how these may relate 
to security.  
The target area for interviews was around the Xe Beng Fai basin – the drainage area 
for the Xe Bang Fai River and the NT2 – as well as the area immediately 
surrounding the reservoir of the NT2. These two areas were specifically targeted 
because prior research had indicated that these were the most affected by the 
construction and operation of the NT2. Village headmen and village elders were 
interviewed through a translator exploring their experiences in regards to resource 
scarcity following the construction of the Nam Theun 2 Dam (NT2).  
A note must be made here regarding my interpreter and guide, Somboun. My 
greatest concern regarding an interpreter was that they would interpret poorly by 
omitting important information regarding interviewees’ insights into political matters. I 
had been warned by several NGOs that ‘official’ Government of Laos interpreters 
frequently did this and would refuse to interpret questions for villagers that they 
considered inappropriate. In order to get the most accurate view of how villagers’ 
lives had been impacted by the NT2, I searched for an independent interpreter who 
would ask the questions that I posed and relay the answers as accurately as 
possible. I also wanted to engender trust between myself and the interviewees, and 
given the Government of Laos’ poor human rights record, I did not believe that the 
way to achieve this was by using an official government interpreter.  
Somboun was recommended to me by a local NGO leader in Bangkok. He had 
previously reliably interpreted for two separate NGO field research trips around the 
NT2 and elsewhere. His fee was US$100 per day in addition to accommodation, 
living expenses and transportation. At the time he was an undergraduate student of 
the University of Laos studying environmental science. He had been born and raised 
in the Xe Bang Fai region and had extensive knowledge of the local area.  
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Somboun must be mentioned here because the potential for bias must be 
acknowledged. As a former resident of the Xe Bang Fai Basin, there is no doubt that 
his family had been impacted by the construction and operation of the NT2 – in fact 
he acknowledged this fact and related it to his decision to study environmental 
science. As a result, it is possible that he deliberately guided me to areas that were 
badly affected by the NT2 and that were not representative of the overall region. 
However, on the rare occasions where I ignored his advice on travel time or difficulty, 
I found that his insight was invariably correct and regretted my decision to override 
his advice. While we rode through the region, I was able to witness the widespread 
impact of the NT2 – be it through erosion of riverbanks or flooded forests – without 
the need for an interpreter.  
The other major concern regarding Somboun was that he may interpret incorrectly 
and only give me answers that he either thought I was looking for, or given the 
possibility of his own agenda, bring a more negative light on the situation regarding 
the impacts of the NT2. To counter this I firstly ensured that he was paid well 
(US$100 is a large sum of money in Laos with an average GDP per capita of 
$US1645) and made it abundantly clear that my research was for a thesis that would 
only be read by a handful of people. I told him that there was no need to embellish 
issues, but to only ask the questions I ask, and to interpret as accurately as possible. 
Somboun agreed to these terms. Given the slightly unknown quantity of Somboun – 
in that he may represent a bias – and the absolutely known quantity of a government 
interpreter – in that they would definitely skew my results, I chose Somboun.313 
Returning to the villager interviews, due to the limited communication in these 
remote areas, contacting potential interviewees prior to arriving in the area was not 
possible. There is limited overland communication via telephone, and equally limited 
mobile phone connection. The same can be said for internet connection. As a result, 
phoning or emailing ahead is not an option. This meant that I was heavily reliant on 
my guide and interpreter, Somboun, for his local knowledge of the area. Each 
evening, we planned where we would go the following day over a detailed 
topographical map of the region. I told him the general area that I wished to go and 
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he informed me about travel time, river crossings, difficult terrain etc. that might 
impact on our travels or cause me to modify my plans.  
This meant that interviewees were usually recruited and interviewed on the same 
day. Elders and village headmen were targeted due to the likelihood that they would 
possess a longer oral history and greater knowledge of local conditions. Somboun 
and I would ride into a village and request to see the village headman. If he was 
available, I would introduce myself and Somboun, inform him of my study, and ask if 
he would be willing to be interviewed regarding the impacts of the NT2. If he was not 
willing, I thanked him for his time and moved to the next village. I found that this 
rarely occurred and that people in general were willing and often keen to share their 
experiences. If the headman was willing, I arranged a time that this could be carried 
out. Often this happened immediately. If the headman was not there, I would attempt 
to ascertain when he would return and then try to schedule to return at the same 
time. Often this was not possible as the following day Somboun and I may have 
moved onto a different area.  
Recruitment was therefore by no means an exact science. I followed a set procedure 
for each recruitment attempt, informing the potential interviewee of my study and 
asking them if they would be willing to be interviewed. There are two important points 
to note here. Firstly, recruitment was essentially a random sample of headmen from 
villages in a targeted geographical area. The implications of this is that there were 
many headmen and villages throughout the region that were not included in the 
study. Given the time, financial and the logistical constraints of a lone, postgraduate 
researcher on an extremely limited research budget, this was unavoidable. 
Secondly, the fact that the targets were village headmen means that the potential for 
gender-bias exists within the study. To some degree this was ameliorated in 
interviews where the wife of the headman voluntarily contributed to the interview. At 
other times, when headmen were not available, male and female village elders 
volunteered to be interviewed and give their own perspectives. Even so, concerns 
about a gender bias within the study are warranted and further or follow up studies 
would need to take this into account.314  
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Semi-structured interviews were used although opportunities for conversation were 
somewhat limited due to language constraints. I worked through a list of interview 
questions that can be found under Appendix 2 at the end of the thesis. The interview 
questions revolved around villagers’ perceptions, or qualitative information, rather 
than trying to obtain quantitative information in regards to changes. Relocated 
villagers were asked to assess the ways in which their livelihoods, health and food 
security has changed (or remained unchanged) since being relocated. Downstream 
residents along the Xe Bang Fai River were asked the same questions in relation to 
the changes that have occurred since the commencement of hydropower operations. 
Both relocated villagers and downstream residents were interviewed so as to get a 
broader view of the impacts.  
Document Analysis 
The document analysis focused on documents and reports relevant to hydropower 
and resource scarcity.315 Reports from non-government organisations, such as 
International Rivers, Oxfam and Greenpeace, were analysed to provide a human 
security perspective. Other civil society organisations, such as the Mekong River 
Commission, have produced a vast array of reports on hydrology and fisheries data 
which were analysed in detail and relevant documents from hydropower companies 
were examined where available.  
Although publicly available government documents were analysed where possible as 
part of the document analysis, one of the most challenging issues for a researcher in 
the Mekong River Basin is the opaque nature of the governments in the region. 
Obtaining documentation from or getting an interview with government officials is 
difficult due to the authoritarian nature of the regimes and the suspicion that is often 
held towards foreigners. This was especially true in Lao PDR and not only applied to 
the government, but also to the Mekong River Commission and hydropower 
companies due to the controversy surrounding the construction of hydropower 
projects. The ability to gain access to documents from these sources was sporadic at 
best. 
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Media Sources 
Due to the difficulty in gaining access to government sources, media sources 
became a vital part of the research process. This is partly due to the fact that many 
of the main newspapers in the region are the voice of the government and therefore 
provide the official line on any given subject. Contrasting or conflicting views over an 
issue from newspapers from different nations can provide excellent insight into 
tensions between various governments. This is especially true for Vietnam and 
China; Vietnam and Lao PDR; and Cambodia and China over hydropower projects. 
In countries like Thailand where there exists a freer press, contentious issues such 
as dams are often allowed a higher profile and therefore relevant social issues that 
may not receive a voice in other countries are highlighted by the Thai media.  
Additionally, media sources often provide information regarding new data or reports 
that are available relevant to local environmental changes. For a researcher not 
living in the region these are crucial links. Media also provides an awareness of 
current events – especially those to do with environmental changes and disasters – 
but also cultural, social, and religious. Obviously data collected from media sources 
needs to be treated carefully and checked for veracity, but as suggested above, 
media sources are much more than conduits of fact, providing a rich source of 
political, cultural, and social perspectives relevant to the thesis. 
Conclusion 
According to Yin, a good research design will pass four common tests: construct 
validity; internal validity; external validity; and reliability.
316
 By carefully constructing 
the research design, outlining the construction of the case study, and triangulating 
the data, it is hoped that the thesis has sound construct validity. There are certainly 
risks to internal validity, and the conclusions made in regards to the consequences 
of hydropower construction must be well considered, tentative where necessary and 
allow for exogenous possibilities. Considering rival explanations will also be part of 
achieving internal validity. External validity is possible because this single case study 
has been carefully linked with pre-existing theory. As has been explained above, 
however, the main aim of the case study is not to be generalisable – and therefore 
‘externally valid’ – but instead to give unique insight into what is occurring in the 
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Mekong river basin from the perspective of environmental security. This being said, it 
is nevertheless intended that the research contained within this thesis will be 
applicable to other river basins facing similar hydropower development, as well as 
providing insights into the way that a systemic approach to environmental security 
can inform the security literature more generally. Finally, by documenting the 
procedures of the case study, and providing evidence of the empirical data and 
theory used within the thesis, a researcher wishing to replicate the research process 
should be able to do this, thereby passing Yin’s test of reliability. 
By providing this clear methodology – in terms of both the overall thesis and the case 
study more specifically – it is intended that the research contained within this thesis 
will be carefully focused and directed towards the research problem and questions. 
The methodology above has achieved this by providing a clear research design, 
limiting the scope of the thesis, outlining the epistemological approach and 
overviewing the data collection methods. In addition to this it has provided more 
specific insight into the case study design, explaining and justifying the importance of 
the single, negative case. By considering in detail the theoretical and empirical 
components of the thesis, the links between the two can be tied more strongly 
together as it progresses. The next chapter will begin this process by considering the 
theoretical development of environmental security.    
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Theory Development 
Chapter Three: The Problem with 
Environmental Security  
 
The first step in creating a more satisfactory basis for managing the 
interrelationships between security and sustainable development is to 
broaden our vision.  
Brundtland Report: Our Common Future.317 
Introduction 
The  literature review outlined the evolution of environmental security studies and its 
differentiated focus – from the nation state to a human security orientation. Building 
on this knowledge, this chapter acts as a bridge between the literature review and 
the empirical section of the thesis in order to help direct the empirical research more 
specifically. It achieves this in two ways. Firstly, it will summarise the lack of a 
theoretical core within Environmental Security Studies (ESS), outlining its divisions 
and the challenges that it faces in being understood as a discrete area of knowledge. 
This is related to the difficulty in defining exactly what environmental security is. 
Secondly, it will outline the as yet unrecognised yet discernible similarities running 
through the literature, what can be referred to as a common theme. Using this 
knowledge, it will then explain in more detail the premise behind the analytical 
framework of Systemic Environmental Security (SES). As part of this exploration, the 
various conceptualisations of environmental security will be represented in 
diagrammatical form in order to simplify these ideas and convey them visually. By 
developing this theoretical groundwork the following empirical chapters can explore 
more directly the elements most relevant to SES.   
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Environmental Security – an idea divided 
The literature review chapter demonstrated that there is no central, theoretical core 
to the idea of environmental security. Clearly there has been a movement of sorts 
from a focus on state-based thinking towards a more human-oriented environmental 
security, but there are few similarities in the approach of early scholars with more 
modern conceptions of the idea. The problem then, is that locating where 
environmental security sits as a theoretical entity is virtually impossible.318 
Consequently, conceptualising, defining and deploying it as a guiding principle for 
policy development, risk avoidance, and securitisation in general, is highly 
problematic.319 
There are a variety of reasons for this lack of theoretical coherence. Firstly, the 
evolution of ESS from a national security focus to a human security orientation has 
not led to a well-developed field of interest with a large number of scholars 
participating in debates common across the field of enquiry. Secondly, the fact that 
both environment and security are highly contested terms leads the concept into 
immediate trouble. This leads to a great deal of ambiguity in regards to the definition 
of ‘environmental security’. Of particular concern is the discipline of security studies 
which is itself a highly splintered field of enquiry. Finally, the necessarily cross-
disciplinary nature of ESS means that a variety of perspectives from a variety of 
disciplines either combine or compete in their analysis of environmental security 
issues. This section will explore these three barriers to understanding environmental 
security in a more coherent way. 
A Disjointed Evolution 
Although ESS arose during the opening up phase of security studies in the lead up 
to and after the Cold War, it has not enjoyed the same success in infiltrating the 
broader security discourse as have other schools of thought such as constructivism, 
post-modernism and critical security. A simple review of the number of articles, 
books and indeed scholars involved in ESS compared with these other schools of 
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thought gives a clear indication of this. In large part, this has resulted from 
environmental security’s highly disjointed developmental process. 
In its genesis, a variety of international security scholars demonstrated a keen 
interest in the links between environmental change and security but lacked the 
analytical tools to recognise and understand these links. International security, as a 
sub-branch of international relations, has for many years been dominated by the 
competing international relations’ theories of realism and liberalism. Realism’s main 
concerns revolve around aspects such as power balances and interstate conflict in 
an anarchic international environment where each actor seeks to maximise its own 
gains in what is believed to be a zero sum game.320 This state-centric focus on 
international conflict and outward looking national security left realism poorly placed 
to understand and conceptualise the potentially destabilising impacts of destructive 
environmental changes that frequently display both local and global elements 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, concerns about the 
environment and its negative effects continue to resonate within the national security 
literature (see figure 2).321 
 
Figure 2: Traditional Security Conceptualisation of ESS 
Alternatively, the other dominant traditional security field, liberalism, offers more 
cooperative ways of dealing with environmental problems, with its focus on relative 
rather than absolute gains. Trade, economic competition, the liberalisation of 
markets, liberal institutions and globalisation have been credited with maintaining – 
for the most part – a level of peace and prosperity in the second half of the 20th and 
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beginning of the 21st century.322 It is believed that the spread of democracy has also 
been an important driver in the spread of liberalism and peace.323 The potentially 
more cooperative international environment envisaged by liberal theorists, 
particularly liberal institutionalists, provides theoretically fertile grounds for 
understanding and solving environmental problems.324 For example, international 
institutions, such as the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank, have 
demonstrated deep concern for the impacts of negative environmental changes on 
the security, economic prosperity and livelihoods of those most vulnerable to these 
changes.325 
Although there is certainly a degree of concern regarding the effects of 
environmental change in liberal international relations thought, issues such as 
carbon pollution, habitat destruction, species extinction and the pollution of 
waterways are still rampant and continue at a rapid pace. This is in part because 
liberal thought and globalisation go hand in hand with modern capitalism and market 
economies.326 Growth driven economies require ever increasing consumption from 
expanding middle classes, fuelled by significant non-renewable resource inputs such 
as coal for energy, oil for transportation, as well as renewable resources such as 
forests for the production of goods, and water as an industrial throughput. In other 
words, although liberalism is on one hand concerned about the negative security 
consequences of environmental change, on the other hand, its fundamental 
underpinnings are in large part what has driven that change for the past century or 
more, and what continues to drive that change at a rapid pace.  
For these reasons, the movement from traditional security to environmental security 
was always going to present difficulties. Dissatisfaction regarding the links between 
national security and the environment has been expressed since the early days of 
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ESS. The most controversial issues have revolved around whether environmental 
security should sit within the remit of national security at all and whether violent 
conflict is an appropriate focal point. The problem is that there is very little sustained 
theoretical attention to these issues – at least from the national security 
perspective.327 The realist mindset continues to dominate and struggle with the 
inclusion of environmental security issues that traditionally sit outside the purview of 
national security and there is little, if any, engagement with the critical and human 
security literature of Barnett and Dalby.  
Deudney in particular was a harsh critic of linking national security with 
environmental issues, arguing in the early 90s that the zero-sum, short-term and 
nationalistic mentality of the national security mindset was counter-productive to 
solving environmental problems.328 He was also critical of the environmental 
movement’s foray into security, suggesting that “it seems doubtful that the 
environment can be wrapped in national flags without undercutting the ‘whole earth’ 
sensibility at the core of environmental awareness”329. He concludes:  
Environmental degradation is not a threat to national security. Rather, 
environmentalism is a threat to ‘national security’ mindsets and institutions. For 
environmentalist to dress their programmes in the blood-soaked garments of the war 
system betrays their core values and creates confusion about the real task at 
hand.330  
The work of Homer-Dixon moved the debate away from a primarily state-centric 
focus and towards an empirical exploration of the assumption that scarcities in 
renewable resources such as fish, forests, soil and fresh water would lead to violent 
conflict. The results of the case studies of the Environmental Change and Violent 
Conflict (ECAC) project demonstrated an absence of links between environmental 
scarcities and conflict between nations. Concerns regarding mass migration, 
environmental refugees, and the failure of states as a result of significant 
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environmental changes remained however. For this reason, environmental scarcities 
and violent conflict have sustained their conceptual links and Homer-Dixon’s 
framework has continued to find a place in public, political and academic 
discourse.331 
The difficulty with Homer-Dixon’s framework is that it is easily appropriated by 
national security arguments.332 Kaplan’s ‘Coming Anarchy’ is the obvious example 
presented in the literature review, redirecting Homer-Dixon’s empirical work towards 
Kaplan’s own agenda, which led to a range of public concerns about competition 
over dwindling resources.333 The consequence of this, however, was that the focus 
on violent conflict had the effect of initially lending itself to national security and 
military concerns about environmental degradation, and subsequently giving birth to 
a range of critiques that splintered rather than solidified the idea of environmental 
security.  
Two of these critiques demanded much greater specificity, albeit from totally different 
paradigms. Gleditsch questioned the veracity of the work of Homer-Dixon due to its 
lack of quantitative rigour, requiring instead more exacting research focused on the 
careful construction of quantitative models drawn from large data sets. Political 
ecology, on the other hand, demanded much greater qualitative specificity drawing 
on the temporal and spatial details of a particular setting in which environmental 
change occurs. Both of these critiques led to a degree of debate around the turn of 
the century, most significantly between Homer-Dixon and proponents of political 
ecology.334 An important discussion also arose between Gleiditsch and Homer-Dixon 
regarding the neo-Malthusian versus cornucopian debate, also known as the 
“shrinking pie or honey-pot” thesis.335 Far from moving ESS towards a more united 
view, these debates further splintered the idea with political ecology remaining 
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outside the security discourse and Gleiditsch remaining firmly entrenched in a 
quantitative mindset. 
Around this same period, the work of Dalby and Barnett moved the discourse in a 
different direction, Dalby towards critical security and Barnett taking a human 
security turn. In questioning the assumptions within the environmental security 
discourse, Dalby introduced inclusive ecological principles rather than the popularly 
understood idea of nature and the environment being separated from humans and 
human practices.336 This understanding points to the idea that rather than nature or 
the environment being responsible for the harm that occurs due to negative 
environmental impacts, it is in fact humans who are responsible through the modern 
processes of globalisation and the “Anthropocene”. 
Barnett’s human security approach takes a parallel position with Dalby in some 
regards, agreeing that much of the harm that occurs in the global South is due to 
consumption habits in the global North and the practices of globalisation and 
industrialisation. He answers Dalby’s question of who or what is being secured in 
environmental security by purposively emptying it of its old meanings regarding 
national security and violent conflict, and filling it with notions of human security (see 
figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Human Security Conceptualisation of ESS  
Individuals and groups are environmentally insecure if they are vulnerable and at risk 
of having their basic material needs diminished or removed as a result of the 
adverse effects of environmental change. According to this principle, there are 
hundreds of millions of people in the developing world who are environmentally 
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insecure due to the structural violence of poverty and inequity. Only through 
increasing, ensuring, and/or protecting their resilience can this risk and vulnerability 
be mitigated. Taking a long term perspective, this must be achieved by shifting the 
focus away from states as power maximisers, to states as providers and protectors 
of these basic needs.337  
Quite clearly, the idea of environmental security is highly disjointed. As suggested in 
the introduction to this thesis, ESS seems to be little more than what occurs when 
scholars from a variety of academic fields discuss security issues from their own 
perspective as it relates to the environment. There is no central tenet and few 
theoretical debates that span the width of the field. One of the most serious 
challenges is that the literature on environmental security has not led to a critical 
mass, but rather a conglomeration of writing around a vague notion. The three 
scholars who have provided the most sustained attention on the subject – Homer-
Dixon, Dalby and Barnett – are by no means united in their views: Homer-Dixon 
focused on violent conflict and complex causation; Dalby on the global and 
Anthropocene; and Barnett on the impact of environmental processes on 
communities and individuals. Nevertheless, each brings sorely needed depth and a 
scholarly approach which are reflected in their efforts to understand, conceptualise 
and theorise around this most complex of subjects.  
What’s in a Name? Environment and Security 
Environmental security encounters serious challenges as a unitary concept not least 
because both ‘environment’ and ‘security’ are such ambiguous terms.338 It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that the term ‘environmental security’ tends to defy definition. 
Dalby’s work in particular critically engages with the meaning of both environment 
and security, recognising that both are words with contested and controversial 
meanings. He questions how the state can remain the referent object of security, 
considering what it is that is being secured from an environmental security 
perspective. There is no need to rehash in detail Dalby’s argument in reference to 
the environment. However, it is worth keeping in mind that Dalby considers the 
‘environment’ to be a constructed term that refers to the “non-human material context 
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of human activities”339. The environment – as popularly conceived – regards nature 
as external, a thing to be managed and controlled. This idea of nature as external to 
humanity, rather than humans being a part of it, is a common misconception in public 
and political discourse.   
As an alternative, both Barnett and Dalby suggest that using ecological principles, 
rather than traditional conceptions of an external ‘environment’, can provide greater 
insight into environmental security issues. This presents a serious challenge to 
environmental security and raises the question as to whether the term should be 
replaced by the more inclusive ‘ecological security’.340 Using ecology as a guiding 
principle would enable the simultaneous incorporation of mankind and ecological 
systems within the large system of the biosphere. In regards to this point, this thesis 
follows Barnett’s assessment that the term ‘ecological security’ lacks the ability to 
impact upon policy and discourse and, therefore, the word ‘environment’ is used as a 
more pragmatic term. Additionally, as will be demonstrated, understanding the 
environment as something separate from civilisational units such as the state or 
communities can provide a useful conceptual platform from which to work. 
Nevertheless, the ecological principles as introduced by Dalby can by no means be 
dismissed.  
Although the idea of the environment is obviously an important part of this thesis, in 
essence, this is a security thesis, consequently privileging the security side of the 
debate. As Floyd observes, “anyone working in environmental security studies needs 
a firm grounding in the different theories of security, and to a lesser extent also in 
International Relations theory”341. The literature review in Chapter One that followed 
the evolution of environmental security through its various iterations, tells the story of 
not only a divided notion of environmental security, but also a splintered idea of 
security in general. Security studies range from the traditional realist, liberal and 
strategic accounts to constructivist, post-structural and critical discourse, to peace 
research, feminist, and human security debates.342 The fact that security studies of 
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the environment cannot find an epistemological home is at least in part a reflection 
on the multiple and varied perspectives of security across the global academic 
community. 
There is no intention to go into the specific arguments between schools of thought 
within security studies here. It is important, however, to understand not only that the 
disparateness of environmental security is a product of the more general security 
discourse which is itself splintered, but to also understand how this plays out in more 
specific ways that impact on our understanding of the concept of environmental 
security. Of primary concern here is the argument about who or what is to be 
secured. Traditional accounts of security focus on the security of the state or the 
international community, whereas critical and human security approaches tend to 
focus on the individual. Much of the debate in security studies surrounds this 
dichotomous approach of either the individual or the state as that which is to be 
secured.343  
In this sense, the concept of environmental security is an outworking of this 
bifurcated view of security. The argument over the referent of security in ESS – 
whether it be the individual or the state – is usually dialectical,344 but is hardly unique 
to ESS. What is unique is that this debate is occurring within a single branch of 
security studies – highlighting the splintered nature of the concept of environmental 
security. Even though this is the case, what is fascinating and perhaps peculiar to 
ESS is that it acts as a unifying sector of interest between the level of the state and 
the individual. Although the epistemological perspective of realism and human 
security studies are obviously leagues apart, both share the common interest of 
attempting to understand the way that environmental processes impact upon 
security. This suggests that the either/or dichotomy of security studies may not be 
the appropriate approach for environmental security studies. 
Crossing Disciplines 
The final characteristic that adds to the theoretical splintering of ESS is its cross 
disciplinary nature. Security studies sits under the general umbrella of the social 
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sciences, whereas ‘the environment’ is generally associated with the natural 
sciences. In addition to these we must also add migration studies which tends to be 
situated within human geography – but is itself often interdisciplinary (See figure 
4).345 Furthermore, as the above section clearly demonstrates, even within 
disciplines or schools of thought there are strong debates regarding methodological 
and epistemological approaches and, as has been demonstrated in the case of 
security studies, what or who the referent of security should be. The fact that 
disciplines themselves are by no means homogenous only adds to the complexity of 
a cross disciplinary approach. 
 
Figure 4: Cross Disciplinary Conceptualisation of ESS 
Apart from the obvious fact that the title of this field of interest includes both the 
environment and security – two divergent academic fields – it is the range of 
empirical concerns and interests in the environmental security literature that require 
a cross-disciplinary mindset. Environmental issues such as soil degradation, 
fisheries destruction, deforestation, fresh water challenges, food security, climate 
change, ozone depletion and pollution, intersect with social and political dimensions 
including refugees and migrants, state instability, human vulnerability, population 
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growth, ethnic tensions, globalisation and conflict related to environmental scarcities. 
As has been suggested elsewhere, “(i)n view of the diversity of work it has been 
called on to perform, it is perhaps inevitable that the meaning of environmental 
security has remained diverse and often contested”346. This vast range of interests 
interact in complex and non-linear ways that do not lend themselves to simple 
explanations. 
This presents a considerable challenge to any involved in the environmental security 
discourse. In fact, the complex issues tackled by ESS present a serious challenge to 
the knowledge siloes of tertiary scholarship more generally – including post-graduate 
research such as this thesis.347 Homer-Dixon describes this situation accurately: 
“(R)esearchers must acquire detailed knowledge of a daunting range of disciplines, 
from atmospheric science and agricultural hydrology to energy economics and 
international relations theory”348. This raises serious questions as to the level of 
knowledge required in any environmental security research: Should environmental 
security experts be trained in both the political and physical sciences, or can 
environmental security be grounded on just one side of the divide? Alternatively, 
should environmental security research always be collaborative – given its cross-
disciplinary nature? 
This further raises the question of whether environmental security itself can ever be 
considered to be a discipline as such. In their study of interdisciplinarity, Hulme and 
Toye suggest that there is a difference between knowledge communities and 
disciplines. In their opinion, knowledge communities are:  
…a network of knowledge-based experts who share an interest in a subset of 
knowledge issues, and who accept common procedural protocols as criteria to judge 
the success of their knowledge creation activities. What is essential here is not that 
all members of a knowledge community know or communicate with each other, but 
that they have common intellectual interests and aims, and a shared understanding 
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and acceptance of the methods by which their sort of knowledge is successfully 
created.349 
On the other hand, “disciplines arguably share not just aims, interests and 
methodological norms, but also a distinctive culture – made up of attitudes, 
aspirations and social values”350.  
According to this definition and based on the evidence presented here, it is obvious 
that environmental security is by no means a discipline. The disparate nature of 
environmental security studies and the highly varied perspective of scholars on the 
subject leaves this area of research interest absent of its own distinctive culture and 
methodological norms. In fact it is difficult to see environmental security even as a 
knowledge community if “a shared understanding and acceptance of the methods by 
which…knowledge is successfully created” is required. On the other hand, for the 
most part, those involved in the environmental security discourse generally have 
similar intellectual interests and aims in that they are attempting to understand the 
way that environmental processes interact with security – in whatever form of 
security they consider to be superior.  
An example of this cross-disciplinary challenge exists within the environmental 
refugee component of ESS. On one side are security minded scholars focused on 
violence and conflict – the maximalists – and on the other, geographers and 
migration experts focused on the specifics of the migration process – or the 
minimalists.351 Minimalists, such as Black, tend towards the view that in the absence 
of a clearly identified causal mechanism between the environment and migration, it is 
safer to continue to discuss migration in terms of the push and pull factors mostly 
associated with social opportunity, political stability and economy –issues that 
generally fall within the remit of human geography. Maximalists, such as Myers, 
over-emphasise the links, undoubtedly mistaking correlation with causation at times. 
Although the maximalist agenda obviously falls within the remit of security studies, it 
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has been criticised for its potential to view victims of environmental change as 
threats to the state, rather than people in need of support and protection.352 
What these cross-disciplinary debates emphasise is that to understand the broader 
nature of the relationship between the environment and security, perspectives and 
methods of disciplines outside of the normal scope of international relations must be 
researched, understood and to a certain degree, applied. Failure to do so is likely to 
result in the ignorance of a large body of already well-established literature. If cross-
disciplinary perspectives are ignored in order to avoid confusion and methodological 
difficulties, deliberately siloing environmental security within the arena of the social 
sciences, then the depth of knowledge and theory required to understand 
environmental issues in a security context is significantly weakened to the point of 
being irrelevant to and ignorant of the broader issues.  
Why the Continued Effort? 
It is abundantly clear that the idea of environmental security is a highly splintered 
notion. ESS face a range of complex challenges in conceptualising it as a holistic 
idea. If we are to take Matthew’s advice, there is in fact no need to try to understand 
it as a coherent whole: 
Like environmental justice and sustainable development, environmental security 
should not be regarded as a clear and distinct idea, a simple principle or norm, but 
rather as an ongoing, multi-perspectival discussion that brings environmental 
concerns into new areas of human value and activity.353  
It has also been suggested that environmental security is “a polysemous category 
encompassing a wide range of analytical and normative meanings and positions”354. 
This is essentially a glamourous way of saying that environmental security is little 
more than a confused discourse with no central theoretical or methodological 
platform, incapable of bringing its own coherent perspective on the interplay between 
the environment and security. On this note, Gleditsch cynically suggests that “(l)ike 
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common security, structural violence or sustainable development, environmental 
security (makes) a good slogan…But political success does not make a slogan into a 
workable research tool”355. If this is indeed the case, then arguably the term should 
be abandoned. If it does not stand for anything, then why the persistence with it as a 
category? 
Although Matthew and Gleditsch may have accurately captured the incongruity of 
environmental security, accepting this as the status quo is by no means necessary. 
The increasing environmental challenges that are arising as a result of a range of 
issues such as climate change, global population growth, globalisation, decreasing 
water tables, increasing pressure on food systems and the interruption of ecological 
processes and services from industry and infrastructure means that more than ever 
our understanding of the interaction between the environment and security needs to 
be deeper and clearer. In achieving this, it is crucial to understand the complex 
challenges faced by ESS in order to move the notion of environmental security 
forward. 
Environmental Security – Common themes and interests 
The understanding that environmental security is a highly fractured idea raises a 
number of questions. If environmental security is such a disparate notion, then what 
is it that holds it together as a rough idea? Furthermore, can it ever be more than just 
the sum of its parts, or can we move towards conceiving and conceptualising it in a 
more united fashion? These are serious questions that no doubt require a great deal 
of investigation and theorisation and it is not possible to go into enough depth and 
research to answer these comprehensively in this thesis. It is possible however, to 
posit a common approach within the environmental security literature and investigate 
how this approach impacts on our understanding of environmental security, and 
furthermore, consider how it can be used to bring some unity and clarity to the 
subject. This section therefore outlines this common theme, focusing primarily on the 
preeminent authors of environmental security: Homer-Dixon, Dalby and Barnett.  
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The Similarities in Environmental Security Research 
In presenting the ‘story’ of environmental security as told in the literature review – 
and any number of books and articles for that matter – it is tempting to view 
environmental security as 
a ‘progression’ from the 
national security literature 
(NS) to the human (HS) 
and critical ecology (CE) 
discourse via the 
environmental scarcities 
and violent conflict (ESVC) 
literature. Thinking of environmental security in this way obviously implies that one 
step has naturally led to another, building on the knowledge gained from previous 
iterations (see figure 5).  
As has been demonstrated above, however, environmental security is essentially 
what results when scholars and policymakers from a variety of perspectives 
securitise and discuss the links between the environment and security. Yes, there 
has certainly been a form of temporal and theoretical progression: Clearly Homer-
Dixon’s work built upon and investigated the earlier national security literature. His 
framework, however, stands apart from that literature, finding little evidence to 
support a realist perspective. The focus on environmental scarcities and violent 
conflict created its own micro-discourse that was by no means a natural outworking 
of the national security literature. In the same vein, the critical security analysis of 
Dalby and others does not ‘progress’ from the national security nor the 
environmental scarcities and violent conflict literature. The same can be said of the 
work of Barnett and others who bring a deeper human focus to environmental 
security. There is no doubt that the later literature provides a much greater depth of 
analysis – and this should not be downplayed –  however, this is to some degree a 
privileged temporal position due to the literature that has come before it rather than a 
simple progression from one idea to the next.  
Figure 5: Temporal Evolution of Environmental Security Studies 
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By instead using a wide lens in our perspective of environmental security and 
viewing it as a connected discourse surrounding the interactions between the 
environment and security, rather than a historical progression from national security 
to human security, a different picture emerges. Initially, we find the obvious 
similarities between the various approaches to environmental security. Each has an 
interest in the environment as well as security. Furthermore, each is interested in the 
interactions between environmental 
processes – in one form or another 
– and the security outcomes. The 
obvious problem, as identified in 
the section above, is that there is 
no agreement on the security 
perspective used or the 
environmental processes to be 
focused on (see figure 6). Nor is 
there agreement on the 
methodological approach deployed 
in order to research and 
understand these interactions. 
 
If we look more carefully however, there is another, less obvious similarity that may 
assist in ameliorating these differences to some degree. Each approach – from the 
national to the human security perspective – is not only exploring the relationship 
between environmental processes and security, they are attempting to do this in a 
systemic way. That is to say, they demonstrate an awareness that there are linkages 
between the impact of environmental processes and a range of security referents. 
This point must be expanded upon in order for us to understand it more clearly.  
One of the most important questions asked of environmental security by Dalby is: 
“what exactly is being secured?”356 Is it the state, the international order, individuals 
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or the natural environment?357 This apparent competition between security referents 
within environmental security has driven a large part of the discourse but, on closer 
examination, it can be observed that despite there being a variety of approaches, 
each has similar aspirations. For example, the early literature that engaged with 
national security demonstrates a keen awareness that the security of the state is in 
some way linked with not only environmental processes, but also the security of 
millions of people in the developing world. State security is therefore linked 
‘downwards’ with individuals, and ‘upwards’ with the international order.358 Ullman’s 
revised definition of security specifically incorporates individuals and institutions 
within the interests of the state, stepping outside the normal military mindset.359  
 
The point is that the national security discourse related to environmental security 
does not only make links between environmental processes and national security but 
also attempts to come to terms with the fact that in order to understand these links, a 
recognition that the simultaneous incorporation of individuals, the environment and 
the state was required (see figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: State Security, the environment and Human Security (State as Referent of Security) 
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In a similar fashion, although the human security literature linked to environmental 
security is critical of the national (military) security discourse, it nevertheless 
recognises that the state has an important, albeit fundamentally different, role. 
Individuals and communities are obviously the most important referent of security in 
this analysis. However, as Barnett and Adger observe, “the state is a critical 
institution for the support of livelihoods”.360 The role of the state, therefore, is not so 
much the violent protection and subjugation of its citizens, but instead, a provider 
and enabler of the conditions that provide the basic needs of individuals and 
communities.361 This, of course, means that policies created and actions taken by 
states must protect and enhance resilience, ensuring the environmental services that 
enable individuals and communities to meet these needs, particularly when it comes 
to subsistence livelihoods. Once again, the point here is that scholars of human 
security are stepping outside the bounds of their primary field of interest, not only 
towards understanding how the environment impacts upon human security, but also 
conceptualising the role of the state (see figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Human Security, the environment and the State (Individuals and Communities as Referent 
of Security) 
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The environmental scarcities and violent conflict (ESVC) framework demonstrates 
explicit awareness and acknowledgement of the links between the state, individuals 
and the environment (see figure 9). Homer-Dixon focused on scarcities of renewable 
resources in regards to the environment, and investigated the ways that these 
scarcities might lead to violent conflict impacting on states (simple scarcity conflicts), 
individuals and communities (group identity conflicts), and economies and 
institutions (deprivation conflicts).362  
 
Figure 9: ESVC and ESS 
Rather than viewing people as individuals, as in the human security literature, the 
ESVC literature tends to aggregate more, and there is a clear demographic tilt that at 
times views people in their millions rather than as individuals and part of 
communities. In a point of difference to both the state and human security discourse, 
the ESVC literature is not stepping outside of its methodological or paradigmatic 
boundaries, given that Homer-Dixon outlined his agenda in On the Threshold.363 
Although on one fringe of the discourse sits political ecology and on the other 
Gledistch and quantitative studies, the majority of the research is fairly neutral in its 
security perspective, following a semi-positivist approach to research, focusing on 
complex causation. Whatever the case, there is no doubt that the work of those 
involved in the ESVC discourse, demonstrates a desire to understand the way that 
environmental processes impact upon individuals and not just states.  
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Returning then to the critical security discourse, Dalby’s theorisation around the idea 
of Empire gives an indication as to his views. His discussion of ‘ecosystem people’ – 
living subsistence lives at the periphery – and ‘biosphere people’ – those at the core 
drawing resources from the periphery to maintain and uphold their wealthier 
existence – demonstrates a more nuanced understanding that transcends the usual 
state versus human security dichotomy.364 The consumption habits of the wealthier 
core have an impact on the 
security of those at the periphery 
through the destructive 
environmental changes wrought by 
the globalised economy. The role 
of the state is subsumed somewhat 
by the international or global in this 
scenario. Nevertheless Dalby sees 
the state as important in a positive 
sense when it enhances the 
human security of its population.365  
 
State-based thinking, on the other hand, hinders our conceptualisation of 
environmental problems that pay no heed to national boundaries.366 Although 
Dalby’s work is considerably different to that of other environmental security 
scholars, it demonstrates the same interest in the relationship between the state, 
individuals and environmental processes in a security context (see figure 10).  
What we observe, therefore, is that each of the principal approaches to 
environmental security have similar aims in that they are trying to understand and 
conceptualise the way that the state, individuals and the environment interact in a 
security context. Some are more obviously explicit in their attempts whilst others are 
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Figure 10: Critical Ecology - human activity and ecological processes 
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more implicit, but each is at least attempting to make sense of the way that security 
is impacted in ways that do not fit in with pre-established methodological and 
epistemological mindsets. Instead, they are stepping outside of the usual bounds of 
security in trying to understand the way that a range of security referents are affected 
rather than just one. In particular, they are attempting to understand the links 
between the national and the human security elements of environmental challenges.  
Environmental Security – a systemic approach 
The analysis above outlines both the disparate nature of ESS, but also the similar 
knowledge aspirations of many of those involved in the discourse. It indicates that 
although environmental security is a splintered idea, it nevertheless contains 
elements of similarity across the field of investigation. It further indicates that the 
either/or approach of focusing on either state security or human security is an 
inappropriate platform from which to understand environmental security. From this 
perspective, the important question of “what is being secured in environmental 
security?” can be answered – but not within the normal bounds of expectation. 
Rather than settle on one referent object over the other – for example, state security 
as more important than human security – the answer appears to be that it is not 
either/or but both. Focusing only on states as the referent object of security is 
inappropriate in an environmental security context. Individuals and communities are 
the most vulnerable to environmental perturbations but tend to be invisible in national 
security analyses. On the other side of the equation, focusing only on the security of 
individuals and communities to the exclusion of states, is clearly an unrealistic goal 
in a world that continues to be dominated by state-based politics and the 
Westphalian order. States clearly remain an important part of the security equation, 
even if the nationalistic, border mentality of state-based thinking is inappropriate in 
solving complex ecological problems.367 
Which brings us to the idea of Systemic Environmental Security in which the focus is 
on the system rather than each of the referent objects. The context of that system is 
both the international political order of states as well as the global and biospherical 
system of ecology that underpins it. We are therefore not only asking whether the 
security of the state is at risk: state security is important but not the end of the 
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investigation. We are not solely asking if human security is being impacted: it is vital 
but not the only piece of the puzzle. We are not only asking if the viability of 
ecosystem services and environmental processes are being impacted by or are 
impacting upon individuals or states: this is obviously an important consideration, but 
once again, not the primary question. We are investigating how each impacts on the 
other in a systemic way. In something of an anathema to traditional academic 
research, Systemic Environmental Security posits that important knowledge is to be 
gained not by narrowing the focus of the research, but by widening our perspective 
in order to incorporate the system (individuals, states and the environment) as a 
whole  (see figure 11). In this respect we are borrowing somewhat from critical 
ecology’s conceptualisation of environmental security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Systemic Environmental Security - Linking Ecological and Civilisational Units 
This is, of course, not the first time that a collective or systemic approach to security 
has been forwarded.368 Of particular note in this respect is Buzan who, in a similar 
vein to Dalby’s analysis of environmental security, questioned the referent object of 
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security in regards to national security.369 Instead of the regular dichotomous 
approach to security referents, Buzan observes that “since the security of any one 
referent object or level cannot be achieved in isolation from the others, the security 
of each becomes, in part, a condition for the security of all”370. He goes on to 
conclude:  
Some sense can be made of individual, national and international security, and of 
military, political, societal, economic and environmental security, as ideas in their own 
right. But a full understanding of each can only be gained if it is related to the others. 
Attempts to treat security as if it was confined to any single level or any single sector 
invites serious distortions of understanding.371 
This “integrated view of security”372 has a similar perspective to Systemic 
Environmental Security. But whereas Buzan’s integrated security incorporates 
virtually all elements of security, Systemic Environmental Security is not so bold. 
From the literature, it is clear that the main elements of interest are states, 
individuals/communities and environmental processes. This is more than enough for 
this investigation.  
In essence, therefore, Systemic Environmental Security does not ask “what is being 
secured?” It instead asks: What is the security relationship between the state, the 
individual and environmental processes? A visual indication of the context of this is 
given in Figure 10. Other than critical ecology, this differs greatly from previous 
conceptions of environmental security.373 At the civilisational (political and social) 
level, there are links between international, national and human security. From a 
systemic environmental security perspective, however, we can see that these 
civilisational activities occur in an environmental/ecological context. Ecology teaches 
us that these environmental processes, from the global/biospherical to the local, 
have strong interconnections and it is artificial and unhelpful to separate them.  
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This being the case, although figure 11 is useful in visually conveying the context of 
Systemic Environmental Security, it struggles to express the relationships between 
the various components of the system. As it appears, the environment – or 
ecological processes – form the backdrop for the civilisational level. 374 However, if 
we take Figure 11 and invert it, what we find is that environmental processes do not 
form the backdrop for human activities, but instead are foundational to them (see 
figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Systemic Environmental Security – Links security and the environment 
What has hindered this understanding is that the bulk of security studies discourse 
has occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, during a period of hyper-
industrialisation and an explosion in technological knowledge. This has occurred at 
least in part because the international system has its foundations in the Westphalian 
order of non-interference and respect for sovereign boundaries – an idea that has 
infiltrated deeply into international politics. Security studies has therefore also 
evolved during a period of mass urbanisation which has enabled security theorists, 
the majority of whom are based in Western universities, to theorise in almost total 
ignorance of the environmental context of human activities. This is what Dalby 
means when he describes ‘the environment’ as a colonial construction or “one that 
operates on the urban assumptions of an external nature whose resources are to be 
managed, rather than a context, place, or home that is to be lived in”.375  
The fact that the importance of ecological processes and systems to the overall 
security make-up needs to be so painstakingly laid out gives a good indication of 
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how far removed the bulk of traditional security studies has become from the world in 
which it operates. This does not imply that the nature of the relationship between 
states is unimportant, nor does it follow that national and global economic processes 
are irrelevant. Instead, Systemic Environmental Security posits that to ignore the role 
of environmental processes, and to fail to recognise how these are intricately 
connected to each other and to human activities in general, is to only get a part of 
the security picture. This is the challenge for traditional security studies. The same, 
of course, can be said for human security, but human security – with its roots in the 
Brundtland Report, already has strong connections with environmental principles.376 
The key for human security – from a Systemic Environmental Security perspective – 
is to understand the role of the state and its part in the system. To advocate for 
human security issues without the requisite recognition that states play a crucial part 
in enhancing, encouraging or hindering it, would appear to be a serious flaw. The 
challenge for human security scholars is therefore to find ways of engaging states in 
a discourse that leads towards policies and actions that enhance and protect human 
security.  
Returning to the important question of the referent of security, Systemic 
Environmental Security outlines the linkages between the state and the individual 
through the environment (see figure 13). It does not favour one referent over the 
other, however, given the evidence presented in the literature review and this 
chapter, it suggests that the traditional security discourse has the furthest to travel in 
terms of understanding – and perhaps accepting – these linkages. Systemic 
Environmental Security therefore investigates how the various parts of the system 
impact upon each other to enhance or degrade security and what actions and/or 
policies are appropriate for enhancing security and circumventing insecurity. This 
avoids the usual dichotomies of security and forwards an approach that, at least to 
some degree, ameliorates the differences between the various thought centres of 
ESS. It also perhaps presents an opportunity for these various approaches to 
understand and work with each other in a more productive fashion.  
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Figure 13: Systemic Environmental Security - links between state and human security 
 
From Theory to Empirical Exploration 
The aim of this chapter has been to take the literature on environmental security, 
analyse it, and look for a potential way of understanding the disparate elements in a 
more united way. The analytical framework of Systemic Environmental Security 
suggests that all the elements of civilisation are simultaneously important in the 
security makeup, and this combines with a recognition that the ecological processes 
and systems that support it are connected in complex ways. This is, therefore, a 
deliberate attempt to progress the discourse, that is to say, it is an attempt to take 
certain elements of the literature and form them into an analytical framework that 
may assist in a clearer conceptualisation of environmental security. However, at this 
stage, it is underdeveloped and only theoretical in its outlook. For this reason, the 
thesis now turns to an empirical investigation into how a Systemic Environmental 
Security approach may shed light on the interaction between security and the 
environment in a specific context. The following chapters provide an opportunity to 
explore the idea of Systemic Environmental Security and how it relates to 
hydropower development in the Mekong River Basin.  
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Section 3: Case Study Section – The Macro Perspective 
Chapter Four: The Upper Basin – The 
Dominance of Traditional Perspectives 
As regional economic relations deepen, it will become increasingly clear…that 
serious environmental and human security problems in one country can 
jeopardise the economic growth of the whole region. 
Evelyn Goh: Developing the Mekong.377 
Introduction 
Chapters three and four constitute the case study chapters of this thesis. This 
chapter will take a macro approach, looking more specifically at the upper part of the 
Mekong River, in particular the Lancang Cascade and its impacts on the system as a 
whole. The following chapter will focus on a single dam, taking a much narrower, 
more focused approach in order to shed light on the micro impacts of dam 
construction in the Mekong River Basin. Both chapters will begin by outlining and 
analysing the biophysical and ecological effects of hydropower construction through 
a review of the scientific literature on the subject. Following this, the security 
discourse relevant to these issues will be considered in detail in an attempt to 
understand the ways in which these environmental security challenges are perceived 
or overlooked by the security community. 
The chapter sets out to investigate how the either/or approach to environmental 
security impacts on perspectives in a given context – in this case the Mekong River 
Basin. In this chapter, the macro examination lends itself to the traditional or national 
security discourse. These perspectives tend to focus on national security and 
national economies, but absent from most of the discourse is any reference to 
human security and development. The security referent under consideration in this 
chapter is therefore the nation state.  
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Section One: The Lancang Cascade and its impacts on the 
biophysical processes of the Mekong River Basin 
The Mekong River Basin 
Before moving on to the specifics of the case study we must firstly set the overall 
context by introducing the Mekong River Basin (MRB). The Mekong River is the 
largest river in south-east Asia flowing from its Chinese source in the eastern part of 
Qinghai Province, dropping greatly in elevation from around 5,000 metres above 
sea-level until it flows into the south of the South China Sea. The river’s total length 
is approximately 4,900 kilometres,378 flowing firstly through Qinghai and Yunnan 
Provinces in China – where it is known as the Lancang Jiang – then through 
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia until it finally meets the ocean after flowing 
through the massive Mekong Delta in the southern regions of Vietnam. From its 
source to the ocean, the river travels through at least seven biomes (distinct, 
naturally occurring ecosystems) including alpine meadows and tropical and 
monsoonal forests.379 Myanmar contributes very little of the water flow to the Mekong 
(2%), has no planned projects for the river, and its considerable land mass only 
skirts the edges of the river for a very small distance. For this reason, and due to its 
seeming lack of interest in Mekong issues generally, it will not be included as part of 
the analysis. 
The Mekong Basin can be subdivided into the upper – China’s Yunnan and Qinghai 
Provinces –  and lower basin and, although the Mekong is popularly associated with 
the southern reaches such as the Delta region, nearly half of its length is in the 
Chinese, upper section of the basin. It is estimated that the MRB as a whole is home 
to between 58 - 73 million people and ninety five different ethnic groups,380 covering 
an area of approximately 795,000 square kilometres.381 The majority of those living 
in the MRB live subsistence lifestyles that rely heavily on the natural resources of the 
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basin, particularly agriculture and fishing, for both subsistence and employment.382 
Although estimates vary, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) predicts that the 
population of the lower basin alone will increase to over 100 million by 2025 which 
will undoubtedly increase the pressure on the renewable resources of the region.383 
The Mekong’s considerable annual flow of 470 km³ is split between distinct wet and 
dry seasons with 70 to 80 per cent of the annual discharge occurring between June 
and November.384 This means that the ecosystems of the MRB, including the 
abundant fisheries of the river, have evolved around an annual flood pulse; just as 
those who live within the basin have adapted their livelihoods and subsistence to this 
annual pulse over previous millennia. Of particular significance in regards to flooding 
is the annual reversal of the flow of the Mekong into the Tonle Sap Lake (Tonle Sap). 
Each year, between June and November, the immense floodwaters of the Mekong 
backup at the narrow neck of the river to the south of Phnom Penh in Cambodia, 
close to the border with Vietnam. This creates a remarkable natural phenomenon 
that reverses the river’s flow, pushing water in-land through the hundred kilometre 
long Tonle Sap River tributary, transforming the surrounding landscape. 10 to 20 per 
cent of the Mekong’s annual flow inundates the Tonle Sap, which grows from around 
2,500 km² to 10,000-15,000 km², increasing the lake’s average depth from 0.5 to 6-
9m.385 The regularity of this flood pulse cycle is crucial to the survival, growth and 
distribution of fisheries, as the timing of the flood triggers spawning and migration 
behaviour and the unique ecosystems of the Tonle Sap provide important fish 
habitats.386  
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The annual flood pulse that occurs on a basin-wide level is also inextricably linked to 
the life cycles of the majority of Mekong fish species throughout the entirety of the 
basin.387 This flood pulse is therefore absolutely essential for the subsistence, 
livelihoods, and economic productivity of the MRB given that arguably, the most 
valuable resource in the MRB is its fisheries. The lower Mekong Basin is the most 
productive inland fishery in the world – producing between 2-3 million tonnes of fish 
per annum with a value of US$2-3 billion at first sale and a retail value of nearly 
US$8 billion.388 As the majority of fish collected from the MRB is also consumed 
there, this valuation is indicative only of the economic cost of replacing this vital 
protein source if depleted or stressed.389 Fish is essential for livelihoods and health, 
particularly in the lower basin, with annual average fish consumption at 56.6 kg per 
person. 390 Fish and fisheries’ products contribute between 47 – 80 percent of total 
animal protein consumption in the lower basin,391 in addition to providing a vital 
supply of micronutrients.392 The Tonle Sap alone provides livelihoods for at least one 
million people.393  
Although there are a range of other renewable resources that play an important part 
in the livelihoods and economy of the MRB, the one other vitally important resource 
in the Mekong is silt or sediment. The Delta, in the southernmost part of Vietnam, 
has been built up over millennia by the slow but steady deposit of fluvial sediment 
that flows into the mainstream from the Mekong’s many tributaries, travelling from as 
far away as the Tibetan plateau. Research indicates that around fifty per cent of the 
annual total sediment load in the Delta – estimated at between 150 and 170 
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megatons per year – originates from the upper, Chinese section of the MRB.394 This 
sediment not only has a barrier effect, in that it both builds up the Delta over time – 
holding back the ocean as well as combating sea-level rise – but it is also a natural 
source of fertiliser. This is one of the major reasons why the Mekong Delta is one of 
the most fertile deltas in Asia and is often referred to as the rice bowl of Southeast 
Asia.395 The farmers of the Delta produce over twenty million tonnes of rice per year, 
fifty-four per cent of Vietnam’s total, exporting over seven million of this, worth 
approximately US$3.5 billion396. This contributes to making Vietnam the second 
largest exporter of rice in the world, a significant player in the international grain 
market and an important contributor to global food security.397  
Given the size of the basin, there are obviously other important environmental 
factors that contribute to the security of those who live there. For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, the above introduction will suffice to set the context for the case 
studies in this chapter and the next. More specifically relevant and detailed 
information will be provided as these chapters progress. The next section will hone in 
on the upper segment of the MRB, focusing on hydropower projects and their impact 
on the basin as a whole. 
The Deleterious Effects of Dams 
Background of the Lancang Cascade 
Hydropower construction in the upper Mekong, or Lancang Jiang, occurs in the 
context of China’s immense thirst for energy. The past two decades of breakneck 
economic and industrial growth combined with the largest rural to urban movement 
in known history has created scores of mega-cities and industrial complexes, all 
requiring vast amounts of energy.398 China has historically derived the majority of its 
energy from coal, but due in part to the health hazards that have resulted from 
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skyrocketing air pollution, the Chinese central government has mandated that a 
minimum of fifteen per cent of its energy mix is to be derived from renewable 
sources by 2020.399 This has already led to China being the world’s largest 
hydropower producer and, in conjunction with the ‘Great Western Development’ 
campaign – sometimes known as ‘go west’ – has led Chinese hydropower 
developers to focus their attention on the vast potential hydropower reserves of 
Yunnan province.400  
The hydropower potential of Yunnan province is indeed vast. It is estimated that 
Yunnan has a potential hydropower output of 90 GW.401 To put this in perspective, 
this is over four times the amount of electricity produced by the massive Three 
Gorges Dam project on the upper Yangtze River, and more than the installed 
capacity of any of the three next largest hydropower producing nations: Brazil, the 
US and Canada.402 Of Yunnan’s immense potential, it is estimated that the Lancang 
Jiang could provide up to 25 GW of hydropower.403  
Given the great demand and huge potential of the river, it is unsurprising that 
Chinese hydropower firms have been constructing hydropower projects in the upper 
Mekong over the last two decades. Over ninety per cent of the elevation drop of the 
total river occurs in the Chinese section, and the Lancang Cascade, a series of eight 
dams with an expected output of 15.5 GW, has been under construction since the 
early 1990s in order to take advantage of this.404 China’s downstream riparians were 
not aware of the Manwan Dam, the first dam of the Lancang Cascade to be 
constructed, until near its completion in 1996.405 Since that time, five of the planned 
eight dams have been completed, with the sixth well under construction. Altogether, 
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the dam cascade withholds a staggering 40 km3 of water, nearly ten per cent of the 
river’s total annual flow at the Delta.406  
The next section will examine the environmental effects that the Lancang Cascade 
has had on the Mekong system as a whole and the importance of these to those who 
live on and around the river. 
Basin-wide Impacts of the Lancang Cascade: Localised impacts 
As would be expected with such a large project, the impacts on the river of the 
Lancang Cascade have been significant. An International Rivers Network brief 
warned, in 2002, before the completion of the Dachaoshan Dam, that these dams 
would affect fisheries, dry and wet season flows, agriculture, and hinder the siltation 
process.407 A 2004 World Bank report echoed the warning, confirming that there 
were already significant irregular flows occurring hundreds of kilometres downstream 
from the Manwan Dam.408 As evidence has accumulated over the last decade, the 
extent of the impacts on the ecosystems of the river basin are now becoming clear.  
Initially, very little information was available as to the impacts of the Lancang 
Cascade within China itself. In recent years, however, research has been published 
by the Chinese scientific community that examines the more localised impacts of the 
Cascade. This research has demonstrated that a dam within a cascade setting has a 
greater impact on its local environment than an isolated dam.409 Zhai et al., for 
example, studied the impacts of the Lancang Cascade on the river ecosystem 
integrity (REI) of the upper part of the Mekong, finding a post-cascade reduction in 
REI of over 65 per cent.410 Soil erosion, water and sediment capture, fisheries 
habitat and riverbank stability were all considered as part of the REI. Disturbingly, it 
was also found that the pressure placed on the tectonic plates in the region by these 
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dams has the potential to cause an earthquake with a value of over 3.0 on the 
Richter Scale.411 
This pressure is partly as a result of the construction of the massive 292 metre high 
Xioawan Dam, which alone withholds 15 km3 of water creating a reservoir with a 
surface area of 189 km2.412 Li et al., who studied the ecosystem surrounding the dam 
reiterated the findings of Zhai et al. regarding the ecological disruption to the river 
system of the Lancang Cascade. Unsurprisingly, they found that the Xioawan’s 
massive reservoir created a significant disruption to the surrounding ecosystem 
including loss of native vegetation at the same time as facilitating the invasion of 
exotic species.413  
In a subsequent investigation, Li et al. returned to the Xioawan Dam site to study the 
impact of the dam on the fisheries in the surrounding area. Baseline studies into the 
fisheries in the area before the construction of the dam found it to be “healthy and 
show(ing) little indication of anthropogenic disturbance”414. Within one year of the 
dam beginning its operations, they found that it had significantly changed the 
hydrological regime of the river affecting water temperature, velocity, transparency, 
suspended substances and water flow.415 The massive reservoir has slowed the 
river to a virtual standstill causing eutrophication and significant cooling in deeper 
sections of the river – where the depth has increased by up to 252 metres. Native 
fish species have been virtually wiped out in the reservoir, in part due to the blocking 
of migration routes and destruction of habitats, but also as a result of the introduction 
of non-native species.416 It is predicted that this will lead to a loss of genetic diversity 
of the fisheries of the upper Mekong as well as a homogenisation of the remaining 
fish fauna. A similar study on the impacts of the Manwan Dam, closer to the Laotian 
border, found that the changes in water temperature and obstruction of the river 
have had a similarly negative impact on local fish populations, destroying habitats 
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and disrupting spawning processes, putting a variety of fish species at significant risk 
of extinction.417  
The Lancang Cascade is having a significant impact on the ecosystems of the upper 
Mekong basin as the above section has made clear. For those that live in this area, 
the inundation of land due to the large reservoirs and the destruction of fisheries is of 
serious concern. The following sections will examine the impacts of the Lancang 
Cascade on the broader river basin, finding that this series of dams in the upper 
reaches of the river is affecting ecosystems as far away as the Delta.  
Water Flow 
The risks of changing the Mekong’s flow have been recognised by the Lower Basin 
riparians in that one of the most important components of the Mekong River 
Agreement, signed by the four Mekong River Committee (MRC) member states, is 
Article 6, which ensures maintenance flows of the mainstream.418 This issue was 
considered to be so important that a sub-document was signed outlining the 
details.419 Apart from ensuring a minimum flow level in the dry season, the 
Agreement attempts to ensure that water extraction or diversion from the Mekong 
mainstream does not hinder the annual flood which is crucial for the reverse flow of 
the Tonle Sap River. As has already been observed, the Tonle Sap is reliant on the 
annual cycle of flooding which backs up near Phnom Penh in Cambodia. It would, in 
fact, be a disaster if the Mekong did not flood. The MRC goes to great lengths to 
point out in its Annual Flood Report that the economic benefits of flooding far 
outweigh the costs associated with flood damage.420 Given the importance of floods 
to fisheries, agriculture and livelihoods in the lower basin, significant disruptions to 
the flow regime of the river in this part of the basin would come with a very high 
price.  
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It must be kept in mind that China is not a signatory to the Mekong River Agreement 
and therefore not part of the MRC. From the Chinese perspective therefore, it has 
been argued that evening out the flow between wet and dry season in the upper 
section of the river will have benefits in terms of salinity intrusion at the Delta, 
navigation and trade in the dry season, flooding prevention in the wet season and 
provide a more reliable flow for irrigation.421 These arguments are partly an attempt 
to justify the fact that the flow regime in the upper section of the LMB has been 
changed significantly since the construction of the first dams of the Lancang 
Cascade. One of the strongest assertions in this regards is that the difference 
between dry and wet season flows has decreased due to the practice of withholding 
water in the wet season in order to release it for hydropower production in the dry 
season.422 This is a somewhat controversial subject in the hydrological community 
focused on the Mekong,423 but what is clear from the research is that the flow regime 
has certainly altered, although these changes are spatially and temporally uneven. 
For this reason, various reports are in conflict over the true impacts of the Lancang 
Cascade on the flow regime of the river. This is likely due to the great variation in 
flows that have occurred as a result of the infilling of the five dams that have been 
completed over the last two decades. Studies by Quang and Nguyen, and Kummu 
and Varis found that dry season flows increased significantly in the years 
immediately following the completion of the Manwan Dam424 and Lu and Siew 
recorded significant drops in the total discharge of the upper section of the river as 
the Manwan Dam was filling.425 Other authors link these changes in the flow regime 
with climate change rather than dam construction which certainly muddies the waters 
so to speak.426  
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Even so, these authors acknowledge that the infilling of the massive reservoir of the 
Xiaowan Dam and the even larger reservoir 20km3 of the soon to be completed 
Nuozhadu Dam will certainly have an effect on the flow regime. Li and He, who 
compared the total storage capacity of the Cascade with average seasonal and 
annual flows, found that once the Xioawan and Nuozhadu Dams are completed, the 
Cascade will have the capacity to withhold 100 percent of a season’s flow in the 
upper basin.427 The MRC’s recently released Basin Development Strategy also 
raises concerns over the massive 292 metre high Xiaowan and the under 
construction Nuozhadu Dams and their impact on sediment transfer and seasonal 
water flows.428 These dams are obviously significant to the flow regime in the upper 
basin. It is less certain, however, what impact they will have further down the river 
towards the delta and the Tonle Sap. Downstream riparians certainly have concerns 
about the negative effects of these dams. Given that a) the impacts described above 
have mostly occurred as a result of the first three dams; b) the combined storage of 
these is less than ten per cent of the combined storage of the Xiaowan and 
Nuozhadu, and; c) it is expected that these dams will take approximately ten years to 
fill, their concerns are understandable.429 The challenge is that understanding the 
exact influence of the Lancang Cascade on the important ecological systems of the 
Tonle Sap and the Delta is difficult to determine.430  
Returning to the flow regime of the upper part of the river, many reports find variation 
between pre and post-dam water levels relatively insignificant on an annual scale, 
but much more significant on a daily and hourly scale.431 This has an important but 
often overlooked impact on agriculture. Villages in the Laotian and northern Thai 
section of the river have, for generations, planted crops in the sedimentary soils on 
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the banks and small islands of the Mekong during the dry or low river season.432 This 
type of agriculture has evolved over many years and relies on the consistent low flow 
of the river during the dry season. As a result of the irregular releases of water 
following hydropower production activities upstream, these crops and gardens are 
now being regularly washed away before they can be harvested.433 This has the 
secondary effect of heavy bank erosion. Furthermore, “(c)omplaints about irregular 
water levels and reduced fish stocks have been commonplace since the completion 
of the first two dams”434.  
Additionally, the capture of sediment by the dams of the Lancang cascade is having 
an effect on these riverside gardens which rely heavily on the silt deposits that flow 
from the upper basin. The loss of silt due to sediment capture behind the dams is 
exacerbated by the irregular water flows that washes away sediment and erodes 
gently sloping banks, areas that have traditionally been used for riverside gardens. 
The impacts of sediment capture have far wider effects on the basin as a whole, and 
the next section will examine this important issue in more detail.  
Sediment Capture 
As has already been observed, the Delta, in the southernmost part of Vietnam, has 
been built up over millennia by the deposit of fluvial sediment from the river and it is 
estimated that fifty per cent of the total sediment in the Lower Basin (LMB) travels 
from the Chinese section.435 This sediment is crucial to the Lower Basin for two 
primary reasons. Firstly, it builds up the delta, helping to protect it from both sea-
level rise and salinity intrusion. Secondly, it acts as a natural fertiliser that has helped 
to make the Delta the second most productive rice growing region in the world, 
contributing hugely to the developing economy of Vietnam. The sediment capture of 
the Lancang Cascade poses significant risks to the long term viability of the Delta 
and prosperity of its residents.  
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An important part of measuring the sediment load of a hydropower dam is to 
establish its trapping efficiency (TE), or the percentage of the total sediment load of 
any given section of the river that is captured behind the dam.436 The TE is strongly 
related to the residence time (RT) of the reservoir, or the time it takes for the average 
particle or water molecule to travel through the reservoir.437 This can vary from a few 
days for so-called ‘run-of-river’ dams to several months for larger dams. The longer 
the RT, the higher the TE: The larger and longer the reservoir, the slower the water 
moving through it, the less turbulence, and therefore the greater the opportunity the 
sediment has to settle to the bottom of the reservoir. In the case of the Lancang 
Cascade, the enormous heights of both the Xiaowan (292 m) and Nuozhadu (261 m) 
Dams are designed to take advantage of the large drop in elevation through the 
narrow gorges in the Yunnan section of the river, creating a much greater 
hydropower potential.438 This makes for long and narrow reservoirs, as indicated by 
the Xiaowan’s reservoir which covers a surface area of 189 km2 but stretches back 
178 km from the dam wall.439  
The first dam to be built across the Mekong mainstream, the Manwan Dam, was 
understandably also the first to be studied in depth in regards to sediment capture. 
The initial measurements of sediment build up in the Manwan reservoir found that 
the reservoir bed had been raised by 30 metres within the first three years. This 
same study found that “after three years, the siltation rate and loss of active storage 
had reached rates expected for the 5th and 15th years respectively”.440 Observations 
taken between 1993 and 2003 found that the dam trapped around 295-313 million 
tonnes of sediment during this period, around twenty-two per cent of the total 
reservoir capacity, resulting in an estimated TE of 60.5 per cent.441 This has led to 
estimates that the dam may reach the end of its usefulness as a hydropower 
generating operation as early as 2025.  
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The Manwan Dam, with a reservoir area of 23.6 km2, has a RT of 0.009 (just over 
three days), but given that its total storage capacity is just six per cent of that of the 
Xiaowan Dam and four per cent of the Nuozhadu, it is crucial to understand the 
impact that these two reservoirs are expected to have on the sediment load of the 
Mekong once they are fully operational.442 Kummu and Varis initially estimated the 
TE of both of these mega dams at 92 per cent each with the Lancang Cascade as a 
whole withholding a stunning 94 per cent of the total sediment load of the Upper 
Basin.443 In a subsequent study they slightly decreased the estimated TE of the 
Xiaowan and Nuozhadu reservoirs to 89 per cent each, but found that the Lancang 
Cascade still has the potential to withhold 72 Mt of the total annual upper basin 
sediment load of 90 Mt.444 This is approximately half of the sediment load of the 
entire MRB, tributaries included.  
This is a result of the long reservoirs of both of these dams creating an RT of 0.223 
(81 days) for the Nuozhadu and 0.257 (nearly 94 days) for the Xiaowan Dam. As 
already suggested, this is highly problematic for the sediment load at the Delta which 
relies on the consistent flow of sediment for progradation (growth).445 Of even more 
concern is the relationship between Delta stability and sand, as sand has “extreme 
importance for the stability of the delta shoreline in Vietnam”446. Sand is one of the 
heaviest elements of a river’s sediment load and is therefore also one of the quickest 
elements to deposit on the bottom of the reservoir. Due to the long RT and high TE 
of the two largest Lancang dams, it is predicted that all of the sand coming down 
from the Chinese section of the river will be captured by the Lancang Cascade.447 
The removal of this sediment creates ‘hungry’ or sediment starved waters, which 
then have a much stronger erosive effect on the river’s bed, creating ‘lateral 
expansion’ or bank erosion. It has been suggested that “the trapping of sediments by 
dams in China may eventually lead the Mekong to be a rock-cut canyon” due to the 
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lack of sediment transfer between the upstream and downstream sections of the 
river.448  
The effect of the Lancang Cascade capturing the river’s sediment is to increase the 
speed at which the natural subsidence of the Delta occurs, known as ‘accelerated 
subsidence’.449 This creates a scenario whereby deltas experience “apparent” or 
effective sea-level rise which may be greater than eustatic (or normal) sea-level 
rise.450 Although the Delta is already facing pressure from sea-level rise,451 it would 
appear that the Lancang cascade is exacerbating this, contributing to the ‘sinking’ of 
the Delta at a rate twice the speed of current eustatic sea-level rise.452 This can be 
expected to accelerate as dam building continues and the large reservoirs of the 
Xiaowan and Nuozhadu fill with sediment over the coming decades.  
The most serious impacts on the Delta of sea-level rise are inundation, coastal 
erosion and salinity intrusion which have the potential to force population movements 
in the not-too-distant future. Most of the Delta is below two metres above sea-level 
so even slight sea-level rise could have large impacts.453 Coastal erosion is already 
having a significant impact on the Delta with some sections of coastline eroding at a 
rate of 30-50 metres per year.454 This creates a feedback loop whereby coastal 
erosion then creates greater vulnerability to sea-level rise and the impacts of storms 
and flooding, because, as the coastline recedes, there is less protection from these 
events for the population inland, often due to the loss of protective mangrove forests. 
Floodwaters, tidal and storms surges, and salinity have the ability to penetrate 
further inland which in turn add to coastline recession.  
The second significant impact of silt capture behind the Lancang cascade is the 
removal of natural fertiliser. The result of this is that farmers either compensate for 
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the loss of this natural fertiliser with expensive industrial fertilisers, or crop yields 
decrease. A reduction in rice production in the Delta will have food security 
implications for much of Asia.  
Although Chinese engineers have concluded that “the Xiaowan project will have 
limited impacts on the lower reaches of the river” 455, the evidence above strongly 
contradicts this. Clearly the impacts of sediment capture by the Lancang cascade 
has significant and serious consequences for the 17 million people living in the Delta 
and the millions who rely on the Tonle Sap for their livelihoods and subsistence. This 
is a strong demonstration of why a holistic view of the river must be taken into 
account when examining the Mekong. Looking at dams in isolation and taking into 
account only the immediate area surrounding a dam is clearly an inadequate means 
of making an assessment about its impacts.  
Section 2: Security and the Lancang Cascade 
It is clear that Chinese developers are monopolising the water and silt of the upper 
Mekong that has traditionally formed part of a healthy ecosystem, providing 
environmental services, livelihoods and subsistence to millions throughout the entire 
Mekong River Basin. The Lancang Cascade brings with it significant environmental 
impacts as a result of this monopolisation of resources, and the section above has 
carefully outlined the current scientific knowledge on the subject, examining the 
environmental impacts both in the immediate area surrounding the Cascade and as 
far to the south as the Delta. This scientific detail provides no insight into the political 
and security ramifications of the dams, however. Within the scientific literature there 
are occasional vague references to the possibility of national security concerns, 
conflict or human security problems, but no engagement with the political or security 
literature. This is not necessarily a criticism of the scientific literature, but instead, an 
observation that the science alone, no matter how clear about the environmental 
outcomes of a given situation, is not sufficient to provide security insights on that 
same situation.  
This section returns the thesis to the security discourse in order to understand the 
ways in which the Lancang Cascade has been perceived from a security perspective 
and whether environmental security has played a part in this. As shall be 
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demonstrated, environmental security is an almost non-existent element of the 
security discourse surrounding these issues. The majority of analyses give a brief 
overview of the environmental challenges and then switch to either a realist or liberal 
institutionalist analysis of the political and economic issues. The environment as an 
entity fades into the background and becomes relatively insignificant to the 
discourse.  
This section will therefore be broken into two, looking firstly at the traditional security 
perspectives of the Lancang Cascade, followed by liberal institutional perspectives. 
Traditional perspectives tend to focus on China as responsible for downstream 
negative environmental occurrences, blaming China for its relative over-exploitation 
of the common pool resources of the Mekong. This occurs in both public discourse – 
usually through standard media outlets and blogs – and through academic analyses 
of the Lancang Cascade and China’s perceived poor performance in international 
relations.456 Liberal institutionalism asserts that the lack of conflict regarding the 
dams is due to the cooperative nature of the multilateral institutions that have 
developed over previous decades – particularly the Mekong River Commission and 
the Greater Mekong Subregion. Following this, the need for a systemic 
environmental security approach to these issues will be considered. 
Traditional Views 
There is little doubt that China views the construction of the Lancang Cascade as a 
national security issue, giving scant consideration for its impacts outside of China’s 
own borders.457 There has been sustained criticism of the Lancang Cascade since it 
was first revealed to the world in the mid-nineties.458 Several events in particular 
have triggered the most heated criticism. In 2003-04, water levels in the Golden 
Triangle region, in the upper reaches of the lower basin, fell to the lowest levels seen 
since the infilling of the Manwan Dam in 1994-95.459 Locals were quick to blame their 
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“domineering upstream neighbour”460 for the low water, while also linking years of 
declining fish stocks with the upstream dams. At a forum focused on the Chinese 
dams, local Thai fishermen expressed the growing anti-Chinese sentiment in the 
northern reaches of the Mekong: “It seems the government is afraid of mighty China 
and dares not touch China’s development projects despite the impacts on the 
livelihood of millions of people in the lower Mekong basin”461. Chinese dams have 
also been “suspected” as the culprits for increased flooding in and around Chiang 
Rai in 2008 and 2014.462 
In 2010, the water levels in the Mekong, particularly around Vientiane, again fell to 
critically low levels, capturing the attention not only of locals, but also the 
international media.463 The low water levels coincided with the infilling of the massive 
reservoir of the Xiaowan Dam which was blamed by those living in the region for the 
low water in the upper Mekong.464 Once again, “China’s intransigence”465 and 
hegemonic activity were blamed for the low water levels, although China itself 
deflected these claims and instead blamed climate change for a severe drought in its 
south-western regions.466 In an unusual move, and due to the sustained criticism, 
China sent envoys to its Southeast Asian neighbours to try to assuage fears that it 
was responsible for the low water, though this action was met with cynicism by 
some.467  
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What is significant about the dry water levels of 2010 is that there is no doubt that 
China was indeed suffering from a prolonged and severe drought in Yunnan.468 At 
the same time as it was dealing with international criticism in regards to the Lancang 
dams, Beijing was receiving condemnation from domestic sources in regards to its 
lack of preparation and ability to deal with drought within its own borders.469 It would 
therefore appear that China had a genuine justification – at least in part – for 
abrogating its responsibility for the low water in the upper Mekong in 2010. However, 
due to its long-standing lack of cooperation on Mekong issues, and coupled with the 
assessed likely impacts from the Xiaowan Dam, it is hardly surprising that these 
attempts at shifting the blame were met with scepticism from downstream riparians. 
Indeed, even the MRC was criticised for accepting China’s version of events.470 
Although public opinion and the perspective of the media do not necessarily 
influence the policy direction of governments, particularly in socialist and communist 
states, they nevertheless provide insight into the popular sentiment in one country 
regarding the actions of another. Biba believes that this rising popular resentment 
and media assertiveness in the downstream riparian countries “will at some point put 
immense pressure on the central governments of the downstream riparian’s to do 
more about China’s plans”471. Exactly what and how much influence they might have 
is uncertain, but what is clear, is that a range of commentators link China’s behaviour 
in regards to Mekong issues with traditional or realist accounts. Menniken, for 
example, perceives the problem from a game theory perspective, viewing China as 
the “stereotype of an upstream riparian… able to reap all the benefits and fully export 
the damages”472. In the case of the Lancang cascade, China is the “Rambo” of this 
game, having the geophysical, political, military, and economic dominance in the 
region, making cooperation improbable. This lack of cooperation is highlighted by 
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China’s withdrawal from the process of the World Commission on Dams and its 
refusal to become a member of the Mekong River Commission (MRC).473 In 
Menniken’s opinion, “China is therefore an essentially realist actor, focusing on 
pivotal categories like power, scepticism, and reciprocity”474. Even when China does 
engage in institutional arrangements and discussion, he believes they are still 
following an essentially realist mindset.475  
This point of view echoes the thoughts of Liebman who questions China’s own 
assertions of a “peaceful rise”. Liebman uses the case of the Lancang cascade to 
test the “high standards set by (China’s) own words”476 coming to the conclusion 
that, given its lack of cooperation and unwillingness to pay a price for it, China is 
acting in a similar way to any powerful nation in a similar situation. Although China 
could shift this impression by increasing cooperation, giving consideration to the 
impacts of its dams downstream, and being willing to pay a cost for this, it essentially 
shows little interest in such behaviour and therefore demonstrates itself to be a self-
interested power-maximising actor. Similarly, Sinha sees China’s hydropower 
development from a realist perspective, describing its approach as “unilateral, 
allowing little space for dialogue and accommodation”477. China is, he believes, 
clearly demonstrating hegemonic behaviour that can be described as “dominance by 
coercion”478. 
Others focus on the geographical and ecological hegemony of China created by the 
Lancang cascade. In particular, the giant Nuozhadu and Xiaowan Dams which give 
China almost total control over the seasonal flows of the Mekong. Ott, for example, 
demonstrates deep concern for this issue:  
The security implications could hardly be greater for the downstream states. With the 
dams, China will have literal control over the river system that is the lifeblood of Laos, 
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Cambodia, and Vietnam. The power this gives China is equivalent to an invasion and 
occupation of the country by the Chinese Army.479 
Cronin reveals similar anxiety on the subject suggesting that there is potential for a 
significant backlash against Beijing if Chinese developers transform the Mekong into 
the same state as the essentially ecologically dead Yangtze and Yellow Rivers.480 If 
the status quo remains the same, there is no reason to believe that China will 
change its current attitude to the river, and downstream riparians can expect it to 
“regulate the resource to suit its needs first…impact(ing) everything from fish 
migration triggers to agricultural cycles, and the shipping operations of Southeast 
Asian companies especially in Thailand and Laos”481. 
Conflict between states? National Perspectives  
Potentially the most serious security implication – as well as the most clearly linked 
to realist theory – of the Lancang Cascade would be armed conflict between nations. 
One commentator suggests that the combination of climate change, water shortages 
and the Chinese dams risks “future geopolitical conflict over the region’s lifeblood, 
Mekong river water”482 – thinking that parallels with that of Kaplan and Klare as 
described in the literature review. Other authors suggest that China’s non-
membership of the MRC and unilateral action on hydropower development in the 
upper basin are fertile causes for conflict.483 As Pearse-Smith observes though, a 
deeper consideration of the issues, the relationships between nations and the power 
disparities in play leads to the conclusion that actual armed conflict is extremely 
unlikely.484  
Even so, the situation of China’s emerging regional hegemony has caused 
consternation both within and outside the region, and has “been sufficient to cause 
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the United States to emerge from its post-Vietnam geopolitical torpor”485 according to 
Cronin. Indeed, concern about China’s regional influence and how this plays out 
through hydropower construction on the Lancang can be found at the highest levels 
in the US: Cronin was called before a US Congregational Hearing on the activities of 
China in Southeast Asia to give evidence in regards to Chinese hydropower projects 
in the Mekong.486 In 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched the 
Friends of the Lower Mekong initiative, putting forward a US$221 million assistance 
fund for education, environment, health and infrastructure projects. Mekong expert, 
Milton Osborne, described the policy as a counterbalance to Chinese influence in the 
region: “The continuing rise of China in economic terms is clearly a concern for the 
United States…(and) the Mekong initiative is one of several ways the United States 
is making clear that it is continuing to have a broad interest in this part of the 
world”487. This balancing behaviour can be read into Clinton’s statements at the 
launch of the initiative: “We are sending a clear message to the people of Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam: We are invested in your well-being and continued 
progress”488. More recently, U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, visited Vietnam’s 
Mekong Delta to launch a U.S. funded climate change initiative where the issue of 
hydropower projects was brought up explicitly: “No one country has a right to deprive 
another country of the livelihood and the ecosystem and its capacity for life itself that 
comes with that river”489.  
U.S. interest in China’s hydropower development is understandable in the context of 
the U.S. “pivot” or rebalancing towards East Asia. The Lancang dams, however, play 
just a small part in the overall security concerns of the U.S. in Asia and are 
presumably a long way down the priority list from other critical issues such as those 
that are occurring on the South China Sea. It would be expected, on the other hand, 
that the Lancang Cascade is a much higher security concern for the Lower Mekong 
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riparians. But although the media sources above indicate that Mekong citizens are 
deeply concerned about the Cascade and its impacts throughout the region, the 
rhetoric of Lower Mekong riparian governments does not appear to marry with these 
popular views, putting suggestions of conflict between downstream riparians and 
China in serious doubt.  
At least in respect to Cambodia, U.S. concerns regarding China’s growing influence 
may well be justified. After struggling to find loans from Western financial institutions 
such as the World Bank due to growing concerns over the environmental impacts of 
hydropower projects, Cambodia instead turned to China for technical assistance and 
finance.490 China has already completed the construction of one dam in Cambodia 
and has four other projects currently under construction. Chinese loans and grants to 
Cambodia, including increasing military aid, reached U.S. $2.7 billion by 2012, 
making China second only to Japan on the list of Cambodia’s donors.491 
Increasingly, this has led to the Cambodian government privileging Chinese interests 
including the establishment of “special economic zones”. Burgos and Ear suggest 
that “China’s goal is (to build) solid allegiances to advance its agendas related to 
foreign policy, image shaping, economic pre-eminence, and national security. All 
these instruments play out in Cambodia”492.  
The evidence suggests that Chinese investments in Cambodia is certainly paying 
dividends. In 2009, on the day before a state visit from then Chinese Vice President 
Xi Jinping, Cambodia deported to China twenty asylum seekers from the ethnic 
Uighur community who had fled to Cambodia to escape a Chinese government 
crackdown.493 In late 2012, Cambodia controversially supported Chinese interests in 
the South China Sea at an ASEAN summit causing heated disagreement and a 
failure of the leaders to issue a joint communiqué at the end of an ASEAN summit for 
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the first time in history.494 And in 2013, Cambodia, postponed scheduled exercises 
with the U.S. military, raising questions within the U.S. establishment about the role 
of China in the decision.495  
This is fascinating in terms of growing Chinese influence in the region and 
Cambodia’s relationship with China, but what is relevant to this thesis, is the impact 
that this has on Cambodia’s opinion of Chinese hydropower developments. As has 
already been indicated, Chinese corporations are already in the process of 
constructing hydropower within Cambodia itself, but the most controversial of these 
planned dams is the Sambor Dam which, if constructed, is destined for the Mekong 
mainstream.496 Although Cambodia is heavily reliant on the Tonle Sap for its food 
security and the livelihoods of millions, and both the Lancang Cascade and Sambor 
Dam greatly jeopardise the ecosystems and fisheries that sustain a large proportion 
of the Cambodian people, the Cambodian elite appear to be generally unconcerned 
about the risks. In 2010, Hun Sen was quick to publicly defend China’s role in the 
historically low water levels of the Mekong, instead blaming climate change and 
carbon emissions.497 As early as 1996, the official Cambodian position on 
hydropower projects was quite clear. A senior Cambodian representative to the MRC 
stated in regards to damming the mainstream: “Water is our oil, our mines of gold, 
our main natural resource…we must use our water to export, and get foreign 
currency to develop the country”498.  
Far from the expected tension between Cambodia and China over the Lancang 
Cascade, Cambodia and China are in fact engaged in joint hydropower development 
within Cambodia itself, putting the interests of energy development over the 
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requirements of life. Energy and foreign income are no doubt of crucial importance to 
the development of Cambodia, but the consequences of achieving this without due 
regard for the systems that sustain the lives of millions will undoubtedly have serious 
consequences for those who are already living in severe poverty. This point will be 
discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.   
China has no such influence in Vietnam. The relationship between China and 
Vietnam has been strained for many years due to having fought several wars and 
most recently, the tensions and standoffs in the South China Sea, or East Sea as it 
is known in Vietnam.499 It would therefore be unsurprising if the Vietnamese 
government sought to harness the public and official rancour over the South China 
Sea issues by linking them with Chinese hegemonic activity on the Mekong. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case, and contrary to the public concern displayed 
regarding the Lancang Cascade, Vietnam is officially very quiet on Chinese 
hydropower. This may well be due to the fact that Vietnam is heavily reliant on 
hydropower for its energy requirements, the majority of its energy imports coming 
from China, including power generated from the Lancang Cascade.500 Vietnam 
already has over 260 hydropower projects with a total installed capacity of over 
14,000 MW and in order to gain energy self-sufficiency, the Vietnamese government 
has mandated significant increases in its own hydropower capacity, planning an 
additional 30 major hydropower projects.501 Although not as heavily involved in 
hydropower in Vietnam as other downstream riparians, China has already assisted in 
the construction of three dams, with a further five of the planned projects being built 
or financed by Chinese interests.502 The relationship between the two nations is far 
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from stable, however, with construction halted on at least one Chinese built 
hydropower plant due to disagreements between Chinese developers and the 
Vietnamese government.503  
Chinese tensions aside, what is often overlooked in regards to the negative impacts 
on the Mekong Delta from hydropower construction is that tributaries upstream of the 
Delta, known as the ‘3S’ region, flow out of Vietnamese territory.504 This effectively 
makes Vietnam an upstream riparian to itself. This is controversial in that Vietnam 
has several dams on the Sesan River which also sit directly upstream from 
Cambodia. The Yali Falls Dam in particular has caused severe disruption to 
livelihoods for 8,500 Vietnamese upstream of the dam and has impoverished the 
lives of over 50,000 Cambodians living downstream.505 Ironically, the same 
environmental impacts that are occurring from the Mekong mainstream dams have 
affected Cambodians in the 3S region: irregular flows of water resulting in flooding 
and crop destruction; devastation of fisheries; sediment capture; severe erosion; and 
negative impacts on potable water. To exacerbate the problems, Vietnam has built a 
second dam on the same river, without consulting its downstream neighbours.506 
Additionally, Vietnamese finance and engineering is also being used to develop 
hydropower in Laos and, surprisingly, a Vietnamese state-owned power company is 
expected to construct the Lower Sesan 2 Dam, in the Cambodian section of the 
Sesan River.507 
Given that Vietnam is deeply involved in hydropower construction of its own, and in 
fact buys electricity from the Lancang Cascade, it is difficult to see how the 
Vietnamese leadership can be overly critical of the Lancang dams. It is perhaps 
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possible, however, to draw a distinction between the effects of tributary dams and 
those of the Lancang Cascade due to the deleterious impacts of the sedimentation 
capture and flow changes on the Delta. This argument would obviously be based 
around the critical importance of the Delta to Vietnam and the importance of 
protecting its ecological integrity and environmental services. Closer inspection 
shows that Vietnam is its own worst enemy in regards to the ecological health of the 
Delta, however. The agricultural boom that has turned the Delta into the abundant 
rice growing area that it is, has come with severe ecological impacts that threaten 
the long term sustainability of agricultural production and human habitation. 
Destruction of wetlands and mangrove forests, the construction of flood protection 
dikes, overfishing, pesticide pollution, sand dredging and water extraction are all 
putting pressure on the long-term viability of the Delta.508 
The scientific section above indicated the importance of sand to the health of the 
Delta, yet illegal sand-dredging operations in the Delta are having negative effects by 
changing the depth of the Delta channels, increasing the severity of erosion.509 Of 
even greater concern is the groundwater extraction that occurs for agricultural, 
industrial and domestic use. As groundwater is removed from the sedimentary soils 
of the Delta, these sedimentary layers compact and subsidence occurs. Aquifers in 
Ca Mau province have decreased by 15 metres in a decade resulting in a “cone of 
depression now nearly 20 m below sea level”.510 Of great concern is the subsidence 
occurring around Ho Chi Minh City and other cities within the Delta which are 
subsiding at rates of 4 cm per year.511 Given the speed at which Vietnamese 
development of the Delta is having such deleterious impacts on the biophysical 
processes and long term sustainability of the ecological services provided by the 
Delta, combined with Vietnam’s own hydropower developments and importation of 
the energy produced by the Lancang Cascade, there is little surprise that the 
Vietnamese government is very quiet in regards to the Lancang Cascade. 
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Similarly, Thailand is also heavily involved in hydropower construction and has come 
under sustained criticism from the Thai public due to some high profile projects, such 
as the Pak Mun Dam, that have had similar devastating effects to those of the Yali 
Falls Dam described above.512 Thai civil society is much freer to express opposition 
than Thailand’s downstream riparian neighbours, and therefore Thailand has sought 
to assuage public concerns by exporting the harm of hydropower projects to 
neighbouring countries, particularly Laos.513 The Nam Theun 2 Dam for example, the 
subject of attention for the next chapter, has been jointly constructed by the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT).  
Although Thais have been the most vociferous about the impacts of Chinese 
mainstream dams in the upper reaches of the Mekong, Thailand also purchases 
energy generated by the Lancang Cascade, having recently signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with China to purchase 3,000 MW of Chinese energy.514 
Furthermore, Thai energy company GMS power has been actively involved in the 
construction of the Jinghong and Nuozhadu Dams, both part of the Lancang 
Cascade.515 The power from the Jinghong Dam has been used predominantly for the 
Thai domestic market, with a 1070 km long power line directly linking the Jinghong 
Dam to Bangkok.516 Even more controversially Thai hydropower company Ch. 
Karnchang Public Company is currently in the process of constructing the first Lower 
Mekong Basin mainstream dam, the Xayaburi Dam in Northern Laos.517  
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Which brings us to Laos. In an attempt to become the “battery of Southeast Asia” or 
“Southeast Asia’s Kuwait”518, Laos currently has ten dams (>10 megawatts) on the 
Mekong tributaries, with seven under construction and a further twenty-five at the 
planning stage. Ten of the planned dams are on the Mekong mainstream. According 
to the Government of Laos’ (GoL) Department of Energy Promotion and 
Development, a further thirty-five large dams are in the feasibility stage.519 The 
Xayaburi Dam is currently under construction on the Laotian section of the Mekong 
mainstream about 350km upstream from Vientiane. Although presented as a “run-of-
river” dam it would in fact block the Mekong with a forty-nine metre high, 830 metre 
long dam wall, creating a reservoir at least 60km in length.520 The Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) for the Xayaburi Dam is extremely limited, assessing the 
impacts to a distance of only 10km downstream. No assessments are given as to the 
wider impacts on downstream hydrology, migratory fish and sediment loads.521 
Although two fish passes are proposed as part of the project, their potential 
effectiveness is highly questionable.522 
To complicate matters, it has recently been reported that construction work has also 
begun on the Don Sahong Dam near the Khone Falls in Laos’ southernmost regions 
of the Mekong mainstream, just a few kilometres from the Cambodian border. The 
Don Sahong Dam will create a relatively modest 240MW of power but will block a 
vital part of the river for fish migration. A technical paper released by the MRC in 
2002 warned of the serious implications of blocking the migration routes of fish on 
the mainstream, particularly in this region.523 A more recent report gives a clear 
indication as to the extent of damage to fisheries caused by this single dam: “If fish 
were unable to migrate above the Khone Falls, they would not be able to feed, 
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reproduce or complete other parts of their lifecycles above the Khone Falls”524. This 
would significantly impact fisheries in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap and the Mekong Delta 
as well as much further upstream from the dam. As with the Xayaburi Dam, it is 
highly improbable that fish passes will be effective in facilitating the sheer variety and 
quantity of fish in the Mekong.525 The Mekong is currently home to over 1500 fish 
species,526 and during peak fish migration season “at least 50,000 fish per minute 
are swimming past a given point on the Tonle Sap River” 527. Essentially, any dam 
built on the Mekong with high expectations that a fish pass will be successful would 
be highly risky and experimental at best; reckless and irresponsible at worst. A 
technical report written for the MRC sums up the situation well: “On the mainstream, 
the choice therefore remains: fish or dams”528.  
And the winner is…energy 
The fact that the Lancang Cascade has not led to strong disagreements and hostile 
diplomatic relations in this part of the world that has experienced war between states 
for millennia is, at first glance, somewhat surprising. What this section has 
demonstrated, however, is that suggestions that interstate conflict might occur over 
the construction and operation of the Lancang Cascade, are highly implausible. 
Although a realist perspective may provide some insight into Chinese behaviour and 
China’s growing regional influence, it would be a serious stretch to suggest that the 
construction of mainstream dams in the upper section of the Mekong River Basin 
constitutes a security threat from a traditional perspective. With the exception of 
Cronin, traditional security analyses fail to seriously attempt to come to grips with the 
complex environmental problems created by the construction of hydropower on the 
Mekong mainstream and how these might impact on more nuanced understandings 
of security. Instead, either environmental considerations fade into the background so 
that traditional security perspectives are able to hold their own, or pieces of the 
environmental puzzle are selected in order to fit a traditional picture. In the 
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meantime, the serious environmental and social implications of the Lancang 
Cascade and their affects or potential impacts on security remain poorly conceived 
and understood.  
Furthermore, from the perspective of Mekong riparian governments, there appears to 
be very little tension – at least in regards to hydropower construction. In addition to 
China’s mainstream dams, the GoL is already constructing its own mainstream dam 
– with nine more to follow, Cambodia is intent on building a mainstream dam, and all 
governments are heavily involved in the capture of the hydropower potential in the 
region. Little, if any, regard is given to the Mekong as a large and complex system 
providing difficult to quantify ecological services to tens of millions, including 
economic benefits through employment opportunities, food security, water security, 
fisheries, and perhaps most importantly, the basics of subsistence. This is most 
important because those who rely on the ecosystem services of the Mekong for their 
subsistence are the most vulnerable to the negative impacts of dam construction. 
The next chapter will examine these vulnerabilities in more detail. However, the final 
section of this chapter will focus on the security theory of liberal institutionalism, 
seeking to understand why Mekong riparians are so unsuccessful in understanding 
the Mekong as a complex ecological system. 
Section Three: Development and Institutions - The Mekong 
River Commission and the Greater Mekong Subregion 
The science in the first part of this chapter indicates that there are serious threats to 
the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem services of the Mekong river basin if 
construction of hydropower in the upper section of the Mekong River continues 
unabated. Nevertheless, China is continuing its construction of the Lancang 
Cascade as it strives to meet the internal energy demands of its rapidly growing 
economy as well as supplying energy for export to mainland Southeast Asia. As has 
been highlighted, there are serious public concerns in downstream riparian nations 
as to the consequences of the Lancang Cascade. Nevertheless, governments in the 
lower Mekong basin are not only buying energy from the Cascade, but are also 
heavily involved in the capture of the hydropower potential within their own borders. 
This section will focus on liberal institutionalism, considering why there is both an 
absence of conflict over hydropower development and why nations are developing 
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the Mekong River Basin at such a rapid pace without due consideration for the 
environmental consequences.  
Asia, and in particular south-east Asia has a plethora of multilateral institutions. 
Prominent examples are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), East Asia 
Summit (EAS) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).529 
This section will focus on two institutions that are less well known, but nevertheless 
the most relevant to the Mekong River Basin: the Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).  
The Mekong River Commission 
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) was established in 1995 after the Lower 
Mekong riparians of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam signed the “Agreement 
on the Cooperation of the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin” 
(more commonly known as the Mekong Agreement.)530 Although both China and 
Myanmar did not sign on to this agreement, they have subsequently been added as 
“dialogue partners”.531  
The Mekong Agreement set out ten principles of cooperation including: the 
protection of the environment and ecological balance of the basin; the reasonable 
and equitable utilisation of the river; and provisions for the maintenance of flows on 
the mainstream. Additionally, the Mekong Agreement included provisions for the 
prior consultation and timely notification of the proposed use of the Mekong’s water, 
discouraging the unilateral use of water by any single riparian. This has been 
broadened into the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement 
process (PNPCA) which has recently been put to the test by the commencement of 
the construction of the Xayaburi Dam and the more recent initiation of the PNPCA 
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process for the Don Sahong Dam – both projects being Mekong mainstream 
dams.532 
From an institutionalist perspective, the MRC is frequently held up as an example of 
an institution that enables the facilitation and sharing of knowledge, the peaceful 
discussion of water related issues, and a general increase in peace and stability.533 
Although the actual role and responsibilities of the MRC are vague – having evolved 
somewhat over the years – it currently sees itself as a body implementing the 
principles of Integrated Water and Related Resources Management.534 In doing this, 
the MRC is able to provide a regional and transboundary perspective on 
development activities within the basin. In keeping with this role, in the last few years 
the MRC has produced the IWRM Basin Development Strategy (BDS) and the 
Strategic Environmental Assessment of Mainstream Dams (SEA), both contributing 
significantly to the understanding of the impacts of hydropower development in the 
region.535 The MRC’s vision is to facilitate “(a)n economically prosperous, socially 
just and environmentally sound Mekong River Basin”536 and although this is no doubt 
a laudable goal, there are serious questions as to whether the MRC is able to 
influence actors and events to the extent that would enable it to achieve this. 
Although the MRC is held up as a body that is able to mitigate conflict and resolve 
water related disputes on the Mekong, closer inspection shows that it is “a rather 
toothless organization”537, an institution with virtually no power, unable to enforce or 
regulate IWRM issues and without the authority to resolve or adjudicate disputes 
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between signatories to the agreement.538 In a similar fashion to “the ASEAN way” the 
MRC facilitates multilateral discussion but discourages conflict, having no formal 
facilities for the resolution of disagreements about the use of the Mekong’s 
resources.539 The 1995 Mekong Agreement was not established as a rules-based 
institution because signatories were unwilling to surrender some sovereignty to a 
regional governance body.540 When differences of opinion occur, potential areas of 
conflict are lifted to the ministerial level and are dealt with bilaterally rather than 
within the MRC’s multilateral forum.541 This inability to deal with potential conflict 
over the exploitation of the Mekong is a severely limiting factor for the MRC, 
especially given the potential for conflicting views over the Mekong’s use.  
Additionally, given China’s upstream role in the capture and exploitation of the river 
in the upper reaches of the Mekong, and the deleterious impacts that have been 
outlined earlier in the chapter, China’s absence as a signatory calls into question the 
MRC’s ability to implement a holistic IWRM program.542 Furthermore, the lack of 
attention paid to the MRC and its recommendations is frequently displayed in the 
approach of downstream riparians who act according to their own national 
prerogatives rather than what has been proposed by the MRC as best practice 
based on the most up-to-date scientific data and environmental knowledge.543  
There is no better example of this than the twelve planned hydropower projects on 
the lower Mekong mainstream which would convert over fifty percent of the lower 
Mekong mainstream into reservoir, wiping out between 550,000 and 880,000 tonnes 
of fish annually and capturing a further fifty percent of the sediment load of the 
river.544 This would mean that in conjunction with the Lancang Cascade, the Mekong 
mainstream dams would capture a total of seventy-five percent of the total sediment 
of the river: a staggering 120 million tonnes of sediment withheld from the Delta 
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annually. Although proponents of the dams claim that the gains, in a best case 
scenario, could be up to US$33 billion, the worst case scenario could mean basin-
wide losses of over a US$250 billion.545 The MRC commissioned SEA provided 
strong evidence demonstrating the risks of going ahead with these projects, 
nevertheless, Laos has moved ahead with its plans to dam the Mekong with 
construction already started on the Xayaburi Dam and the PNPCA process for the 
Don Sahong Dam currently under way. Although the Don Sahong Dam has the 
potential to destroy the long term viability of the Tonle Sap fisheries, the PNPCA 
process does not require consultation from downstream affected communities and 
does not enable other riparians to veto or influence the decision – raising questions 
as to the point of the process at all.546 The MRC’s SEA recommendation that 
“(d)ecisions on mainstream dams should be deferred for a period of ten years”547 has 
clearly been ignored and the significant impacts – particularly of the Don Sahong 
Dam – have been discounted as important enough to warrant caution.  
This means that the MRC is essentially an impotent institution, valuable perhaps as 
a source of knowledge but having no obvious or enforceable influence on policy or 
action. So, although the MRC officially desires an economically prosperous, socially 
just and environmentally sound Mekong River Basin, it appears that MRC signatories 
are pursuing only the first of these objectives: the rapid development and exploitation 
of the Mekong – especially in the area of hydropower development. This is against 
the recommendations of the MRC and, although it may be an institution that 
facilitates information sharing, it is far from an institution that formally engenders 
peace and security – especially if security is understood as the well-being and 
prosperity of those who live within the borders of a nation state rather than simply 
those who control it. To understand why the Mekong riparians are pursuing this 
singular focus, we need to switch our focus to another Mekong institution, the 
Greater Mekong Subregion. 
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The Greater Mekong Subregion 
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) was established in 1992 under the auspices 
of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) when Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand and China all “entered into a program of subregional economic cooperation, 
designed to enhance economic relations among the countries”548. The GMS, with 
support from the ADB and other international donors, has implemented a program 
focused on projects related to “transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, 
human resource development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and 
agriculture”549. The GMS is focused on the economic development, modernisation 
and industrialisation of the region with around US$11 billion having already been 
spent on infrastructure projects since its inception in 1992.  
The GMS is a far more cooperative institution both on paper and in terms of its 
achievements. The fact that all six riparian governments are members of the GMS 
means that it has a much more realistic chance of implementing successful 
subregional and transboundary projects, particularly related to energy and transport 
infrastructure. The US$11 billion worth of projects already implemented is a clear 
sign of the effectiveness of the GMS program. Nevertheless, although the economic 
benefits of cooperation are potentially high, there are few costs associated with non-
cooperation. Joint projects only require agreement between two states, with other 
countries not required or requested to give approval before moving forward.550  
Furthermore, the broader costs to the environment and ecosystem services of the 
Mekong are rarely factored into GMS projects and frequently overlooked by planners 
and strategists. For example, the GMS’s energy strategy paper gives virtually no 
consideration to the negative impacts of hydropower development in the GMS, 
summarising the social impacts of hydropower into a single table displaying the 
negative social consequences as a small dollar figure per kilowatt hour.551 
Environmental considerations are sidelined from the main GMS program through the 
Core Environmental Program (CEP) which is responsible for environmental strategic 
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planning, environmental monitoring, environmental safeguards, biodiversity and 
climate change.552 Of relevance is the fact that the CEP is set apart from the GMS, 
with a separate website and headquarters.  
The CEP is realistic about its potential efficacy as far as fulfilling its mandate. Getting 
GMS countries to shift from their short term focus of “grow first – clean up later”553 is 
viewed as an “immense challenge”554. This is due to “inadequate regulatory 
frameworks, a lack of technical know-how, fragmented government institutions and 
cross-sector coordination, and a lack of information on natural capital stocks and 
ecosystem services (which) are among the many issues that need to be 
addressed”555. It is worth noting that the CEP is, in some respects, tasked with a 
similar informational role as the MRC, yet there is no official cross institutional 
collaboration on these issues. As with the MRC, the CEP’s efficacy at influencing the 
policy of and projects carried out by GMS countries is highly questionable, given the 
continued rapid development that gives so little concern for the long-term and 
broader consequences of the projects.  
Absent from both the GMS and its CEP is a centralised consideration of hydropower 
and its environmental or social consequences. Nor is water given separate 
consideration as a resource.556 Given the serious negative impacts of hydropower as 
outlined above, and the fact that the word ‘Mekong’ stands at the centre of the GMS, 
this appears to be a considerable oversight. Hydropower is seen as just one section 
of the energy mix in the GMS and given no special place in GMS strategies. The fact 
that hydropower is potentially worth US$33 billion in the Mekong River Basin alone 
suggests that the lack of consideration of water and hydropower as a single issue 
appears to be more omission than oversight.  
Sinha believes that this is in line with Chinese strategies of linking hydropower with 
economic growth rather than with social and environmental issues.557 Along similar 
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lines, Biba suggests that China’s actions in relation to economic integration are a 
deliberate form of ‘desecuritisation’ – or the shifting of issues off the security agenda 
and into the ‘normal’ realm of politics.558 China’s membership and strong 
participation in the GMS with its focus on economic issues, coupled with its non-
membership of the MRC which focuses on the MRB as a complex hydrological 
ecosystem that supports the livelihoods of millions of people, also supports this point 
of view. It would also help to explain why the CEP, even with its focus on the 
environment, is unable to discuss water issues as a discrete subject: its priorities are 
obviously guided by its member states.  
What is clear is that economic development in the MRB is facilitated by the GMS and 
that cooperation surrounding infrastructure, industrialisation and economic growth is 
generally high as a result. This is linked with ASEAN’s “strong economic 
development imperative, and a conviction that economic growth is a critical means of 
ensuring regime legitimacy and security”559. What is also clear is that this 
cooperation comes at the cost of viewing the environment as a servant to this 
economic development: “Forests, land, and water resources and the ecosystem 
services they provide are a major driver of economic development in the GMS”560. 
Far from seeing the Mekong River Basin as an interconnected ecological unit, the 
GMS encourages nation states to take a state-based view of the Mekong as far as 
the environment is concerned, remaining wilfully ignorant of the transboundary 
impacts of infrastructure projects.561 Ironically, this ecological fragmentation occurs in 
the context of developing subregional economic collaboration and integration.  
Conclusion 
This first case study chapter has focused on macro considerations of security issues 
surrounding the construction of the Lancang Cascade. It has three main 
achievements. Firstly, it demonstrates clearly that the Lancang Cascade has 
significant environmental impacts both in close proximity to the dams and as far 
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away as the Mekong delta. This impacts on the environmental services of the river 
and therefore on the people.  
Secondly, it demonstrates that although a realist perspective may expect hostility to 
occur between China and its downstream riparians due to China’s inequitable 
capture of the resources of the Mekong, conflict is in fact not occurring. Instead, the 
LMB riparians are exploiting, or seeking to exploit the hydropower potential in their 
own sections of the river as well as actually purchasing electricity generated by the 
Cascade. This only exacerbates the ecological and social problems caused by the 
Lancang Cascade and thus the decision to move forward with LMB mainstream 
dams threatens an ecological and social catastrophe on a scale which is difficult to 
measure.  
The final achievement of the chapter has been to explore the mentality behind the 
rapid and careless hydropower construction in the MRB. Quite clearly the economic 
and development prerogative override virtually all other considerations. Nowhere is 
this more clearly demonstrated than through the development priorities set by the 
ADB’s GMS, which give little to no consideration to environmental and social issues. 
The security theory of liberal institutionalism supports this singular focus on 
development and economic growth, suggesting that the more integrated nations 
become through multilateral cooperation and economic integration, the more likely 
they are to avoid armed conflict given the costs involved.562  
Unfortunately, in the case of the MRB, although there is much to gain from 
cooperation at a certain level, the costs of non-cooperation are negligible. This kind 
of attitude is made clear in the decision of Laos to move ahead with the construction 
of two Mekong mainstream hydropower projects against all reputable scientific 
advice and the clear recommendations from the MRC requisitioned SEA. The MRC’s 
PNPCA requirements are so unrestrictive that although prior notification is required 
under the Mekong Agreement, fellow signatories have no recourse or even 
mechanism to dispute the decision. This effectively makes the MRC a largely 
irrelevant and impotent institution with little, if any, impact on the policy decisions of 
MRB riparians. Even GMS projects only need agreement between two of the 
signatories to move forward with a project (such as the Xayaburi) with no recourse or 
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conflict resolution mechanism available. This is not so much peaceful liberal 
institutional behaviour as it is a Wild West ‘first in – first served’ attitude to resources 
with a blatant disregard for the lives of those who are affected by hydropower 
development.563 
What this all demonstrates is that although hydropower construction in the MRB is 
clearly having an impact on the ecological integrity and ecosystem services of the 
region, threatening to devastate the livelihoods and subsistence of millions of the 
Mekong’s residents, as far as the traditional security theories of realism and liberal 
institutionalism are concerned, there is no security issue. This is not to suggest that 
realists or liberal institutionalists are necessarily callous or unsympathetic to the 
plight of those affected by hydropower construction on the Mekong and its 
tributaries, but merely that these traditional theories are unable to grasp and deal 
with the complexity arising from an ecological system where regional, national and 
sub-national interests interplay in complex and evolving ways. Both theories place 
states as the primary actors and the referent object of security: realism emphasising 
the anarchic international system and the operation of power, and liberal 
institutionalism focusing on the way that institutions can encourage normative 
behaviour and moderate anarchy. Totally absent from this discourse is the plight of 
those impacted by ongoing hydropower development. 
It would be foolish to ‘throw out the baby with the bathwater’ so to speak, by 
suggesting that an understanding of states and institutions is not required or 
important in the context of hydropower in the Mekong River Basin. The sections 
above clearly indicate that states and institutions are both part of the problem and 
potential solutions to the complex challenges of balancing development and 
environment. But the generally macro, or state/international, approach of both 
realism and liberal institutionalism fail to grasp the micro level problems that are 
occurring at the level of the community and individual as a result of hydropower. 
There may be no conflict between states, and this may be partially attributable to the 
growing economic cooperation due to institutional linkages in the region, but this 
gives no insight into the suffering and deprivation that is occurring as a result of 
hydropower development. Clearly a more nuanced and specific understanding of the 
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consequences of hydropower in the MRB is needed in order to gain clarity on the 
potential environmental security implications of these activities. The next chapter will 
attempt to understand the micro level issues that are resulting from hydropower 
construction by focusing on a single hydropower project, the Nam Theun 2 Dam in 
central Laos. 
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Section 3: Case Study Section – The Micro Perspective 
Chapter Five: The Nam Theun 2 Dam 
– Human Security Perspectives 
Thinking in terms of human security shifts the scale of analysis away from 
nations to the local level. It focuses on the immediate vulnerability of most of 
the world’s population, as opposed to hypothetical threats to nation-states. It 
provides a referent object which, when combined with environmental 
concerns, forms the basis for a new approach to environmental security. 
Jon Barnett: The Meaning of Environmental Security.564 
 
Introduction 
This chapter narrows the focus of analysis from the macro, which considered the 
Lancang Cascade and mainstream dams and their impact on the Mekong River 
Basin (MRB) as a whole, to a micro perspective – encompassing only one dam and 
its much more localised impacts.565 This is necessary in order to understand the way 
that hydropower in the MRB impacts at the level of human security – the other key 
element for environmental security studies. The chapter is structured to initially 
provide an outline of the national, Laotian context of the Nam Theun 2 Dam (NT2). It 
then overviews the project itself, providing a summary of the relevant technical 
aspects of the dam. As with all dams, there are upstream and downstream issues, 
and the chapter will divide its attention between each of these. Above the dam, the 
most significant impacts have been created by the infilling of the NT2 reservoir 
behind the dam wall, inundating villages, rice cropping areas and grazing area for 
buffalo, forcing the relocation of thousands of villagers. Downstream, the impacts 
have mostly been felt around the Xe Bang River, known locally as Xe Bang Fai 
(XBF). These are qualitatively similar to those that have been caused by the 
Lancang Cascade and other dams, such as irregular water flows, increased flooding, 
                                                          
564
 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security.  
565
 Micro is a relative word of course, and from a biological perspective could refer to a single organism. 
However, studying a single dam and its impacts on local ecosystems, communities and individuals is certainly a 
micro perspective in the context of the entire MRB, broader Asia, the global environment and the perspective 
of international security studies. 
 
 
163 | P a g e  
 
sediment capture, erosion and impacts on food and water supply. Following the 
details of the environmental and social impacts of the NT2, consideration will be 
given to the security implications, taking into account the dearth of security discourse 
on the issue. Particular attention will be paid to the human security implications of 
the NT2. 
A brief justification is needed here as to the reasoning behind the choice to use the 
NT2 as the micro component of this thesis. It could be argued, for example, that 
given the focus of the previous chapter on the Chinese dams, the localised impacts 
of the Lancang Cascade should be studied. Unfortunately, the paucity of data on the 
livelihood impacts of these dams at the local level in Yunnan Province and difficulties 
surrounding access, prevents such an examination (any refs for this?). Additionally, 
the very high dams and relatively small population affected means that the impacts 
in the vicinity of the Chinese dams is qualitatively and quantitatively different to those 
that will affect the millions who live in the Mekong Delta or Tonle Sap. A related 
argument could also be made that, given that the main impacts of the Lancang 
Cascade are being felt on the mainstream and further downstream – particularly in 
the Delta or Tonle Sap, the micro focus should be on these areas. This, however, 
would defeat the purpose of a micro analysis, and would also result in the specificity 
of this chapter being lost. Indeed, even a micro study of the hydrological impacts in 
either of these areas, for example examining a single village or town in the Delta or 
Tonle Sap, would still present significant difficulties in identifying the role of the 
Lancang Cascade. This is due to the role that human activity is already having in 
these areas through activities such as overfishing, water extraction, sand dredging, 
channel diversion and other non-Lancang Cascade induced changes – as briefly 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
On the other hand, the case of the NT2 presents a unique opportunity to examine 
the impacts on human security brought about by the environmental changes caused 
by a large dam, without the influence of other significant anthropogenic processes.566 
Before the flooding of the Nakai Plateau by the NT2’s reservoir and the significant 
impacts downstream on the XBF – both the Nakai Plateau and the XBF basin were 
fundamentally agricultural regions, with little industrialisation, virtually no 
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groundwater extraction, using agricultural techniques and pursuing livelihood options 
that had been in place for centuries.567 This means that the changes to the security 
and livelihoods of those in this region following the construction and subsequent 
operation of the NT2 can be much more easily attributed to hydropower than any 
study that may take place in the Tonle Sap or Delta. Furthermore, the richness of the 
data surrounding the construction and operation of the NT2 provides fertile ground 
for an investigation into the human security aspects of dams. This specific context is 
crucial, given this thesis is investigating Systemic Environmental Security and that 
human security aspects are an important piece of the puzzle.  
Section One: The Nam Theun 2, Ecological Destruction and 
Livelihood Losses 
The Laotian Context 
The main contribution of political ecology to environmental security is to encourage 
an approach that gives more direct attention to a phenomenon’s specific temporal 
and spatial context. With this in mind, a brief overview of the context of the 
construction and operation of the NT2 is provided here. The NT2 is just one project 
within the massive drive for hydropower in the Mekong River Basin (MRB) as 
discussed in the previous chapter. More specifically, it has been built as part of the 
Laotian Government’s (GoL) desire to become the ‘battery of Southeast Asia’ or 
‘Southeast Asia’s Kuwait’.568 The GoL intends to capture as much of the vast 
hydropower potential (18-20,000 MW) within its borders as it can, so as to provide 
energy to its own people but, more importantly, to export the energy within the region 
in order to build up its reserves of foreign income.569 As of 2013 there were 16 
hydropower projects operational in Laos, with another 14 under construction, 24 in 
the planning (Project Development Agreement) stage and a further 32 in the 
feasibility (Memorandum of Understanding) stage.570  
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Economic development is of crucial relevance to Laos given that it is landlocked, one 
of the world’s least developed countries (LDCs), and relies heavily on foreign aid for 
much of its development. Years of warfare against the Thais in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, French colonisation in the 19th century, and the Indochinese wars of the 
20th century, have left the country impoverished and covered in unexploded 
ordnance (UXO).571 During the American/Vietnam war two million tonnes of 
ordnance was dropped on Laos in an attempt to interdict North Vietnamese troops 
and equipment travelling through Laos and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Up to a third 
of these did not explode and remain in the fields and forests of Laos creating serious 
health risks and development challenges.572 The U.S. bombing of Laos was also an 
attempt to support Royal forces against the communist Pathet Lao who went on to 
take over control of the country in 1975. A decade or more of poor economic 
decisions combined with the legacies of war meant that Laos’ LDC status was firmly 
entrenched. 
Throughout the 1990s, a series of decisions to move towards regional integration 
and economic reform led to a normalisation of trade relations with the U.S. and 
others throughout the 2000s, including finance for the NT2 project from both the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).573 On the back of the rapid 
investment in the hydropower and mining sectors, Laos has witnessed annual 
economic growth of over 7% since 2005, seeing its GDP per capita grow from 
US$472 in 2005, to just over $US1,645 in 2013.574 Hydropower is an important part 
of the GoL’s plans to continue this growth and ‘graduate’ from the list of LDCs – a 
goal it has set itself to achieve by 2020.575  
This growth is uneven, however, given that an increasing number of households are 
involved in agricultural production, yet agriculture is playing a diminishing role in the 
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Lao economy, reducing from 53% of GDP in 1996 to 28% in 2013,576 Given that 77% 
of all households in Laos continue to earn their living from agricultural production, 
and that the number of households involved in agriculture is on the increase, it is 
clear that economic growth is being led by the industry and services sectors.577 This 
further indicates the uneven distribution of the benefits of Laos’s rapid economy 
growth. GoL official statistics support this. For example, even with the rapid growth in 
energy production, only 48% of rural villages are connected to the electricity grid and 
only 39% have a safe water supply. Just 2% of rural households have access to 
irrigation pumps or veterinary services. Food security is a serious concern with 
between 44 - 50% of all children under five years of age being stunted as a result of 
a poor diet; 31% are underweight.578 Lack of health services and poor nutrition has 
led to persistently high infant mortality rates.579 One of the most common arguments 
in support of the rapid hydropower development in Laos is that it will increase the 
foreign currency reserves of the GoL and this can then be used for poverty 
alleviation. 
There are serious concerns surrounding Laos’ relatively rapid economic growth due 
to the observed corruption throughout the government and its institutions. Laos ranks 
140th of 177 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 
for 2013 and 165th of 179 in the Press Freedom Index.580 There is a great deal of 
evidence in regards to corrupt land and industry deals that put government 
members’ family interests above the nation and its citizens.581 On top of this, those 
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who stand up against government corruption are frequently ‘disappeared’.582 The 
concern is that, given the GoL’s poor transparency and levels of corruption, the 
economic and social benefits of Laos’ rapid economic growth are unlikely to be 
distributed evenly. 
The above overview helps to provide a better understanding of the national context 
of the decision to construct the NT2 dam. The legacies of war, underdevelopment, 
rapid but inequitable economic growth, a single party government beset by 
corruption, and assistance from international financial institutions have all played a 
role in the decision to construct the NT2, but also continue to play a role in the 
political and social context of its operation. The next section will overview the NT2 
project itself.  
Overview of the Nam Theun 2 Dam 
The NT2 is one of the most studied hydropower projects in the world. This is 
because it is considered to be a ‘best practice’ or ‘model’ dam, with funding from a 
total of 27 different parties, including both the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank.583 The developer for the US$1.45 billion project is the Nam 
Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC), which includes a conglomeration of Electricité de 
France Internationale (35%), the Electricity Generating Company of Thailand (EGAT) 
(25%), Italian – Thai Development Company (15%) and the GoL (25%).584 Argued to 
be “the most complex public-private partnerships in the history of dam 
development”585, the NT2 has been constructed as a build, own, operate, transfer 
(BOOT) project with a concession period of 25 years, following which, the NTPC 
must hand complete control of the dam over to the GoL. Of a total of 1,070 MW 
generated by the project, 95% is exported to Thailand and the remainder is fed into 
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the local grid.586 It is expected that the GoL will earn a total of around US $2 billion 
over the concession period, or on average US $80 million per year.587  
In regards to the dam itself, the relatively modest 39m high dam wall blocks the Nam 
Theun River on the Nakai Plateau. Impoundment of the river began in April 2008 and 
hydropower operations began in March, 2010. Rather than place the hydropower 
generators at the site of the dam – as is usual for most hydropower dams – the NT2 
project captures 93% of the flow of the Nam Theun River – estimated at 7,000 million 
cubic metres annually (7 km3)588 – impounding it in the 450 km2 reservoir, and 
diverting it down a 350m vertical surge shaft, into the power station below (see figure 
14). 
 
Figure 14: Schematic of the NT2 Hydropower Project  
This increases the energy potential immensely but results in the majority of the Nam 
Theun River’s flow being diverted into the Xe Bang Fai (XBF), a major Mekong 
tributary, after transferring the discharged water along a 27km manmade 
‘downstream channel’.589 This has serious consequences for both the Nam Theun 
River, which subsequently receives only a very small portion of its original flow, and 
the XBF, which now acts as a conduit for the majority of the waters of both the Nam 
Theun River (via the hydropower pump station) and its own natural flow.  
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Figure 15: Map of NT2 Hydropower Project and XBF 
 
One of the more unique aspects of the project, and in many respects an important 
source of evidence in regards to the impact on livelihoods of the NT2, is the built-in 
compensation and oversight for relocated villagers on the Nakai Plateau and for 
those living on and around the XBF, downstream from the reservoir. Both the World 
and the Asian Development Bank’s support and funding of the project are based on 
“ensuring that social and environmental impacts of the project are addressed through 
a detailed program of mitigation, compensation and offset measures”590. An 
international Panel of Experts (PoE) was appointed to provide oversight of the social 
and environmental mitigation efforts, and their frequent reports provide excellent 
insights and evidence of the impacts of the NT2.  
At least 6,200 Laotians on the Nakai Plateau have been relocated to make way for 
the reservoir, with another 10,000 impacted by the 27km channel from the power 
station to the XBF (picture of the channel?) and the new electricity lines that have 
been put in place to supply power to Thailand. Downstream on the XBF, another 
120,000 villagers have been impacted by the significant changes brought about by 
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the dam. As will become evident, the impacts from the NT2 are similar to those of 
other hydropower projects in that there is an immediate impact in the area 
surrounding the dam and the reservoir, but also a downstream impact from the 
hydrological changes to the river. As with the Lancang Cascade, the downstream 
changes impact on a larger population who must attempt to adapt. The following 
sections will look first at the more localised changes on the Nakai Plateau as a result 
of the reservoir, followed by an examination of the way the XBF has been affected by 
the significant alterations to its flow.  
The Nakai Plateau 
The main driver of environmental change and insecurity on the Nakai Plateau is the 
450km2 reservoir that has flooded a large part of the plateau. According to the 
NTPC, 1,310 families, 6,289 persons, from 17 villages were removed from their 
traditional lands and resettled in 15 different areas.591 Resettlers were provided with 
new houses – including sanitation, rainwater tanks and connection to the electricity 
grid – in addition to the construction of new wells, roads, schools, community 
meeting halls and health centres. Each family was compensated with 0.66 hectares 
of agricultural land which was cleared of UXO. Although obviously a significant 
disruption to their lives, generally speaking, resettlement led to an immediate 
improvement in living conditions. Without fail, villagers interviewed on the Nakai 
Plateau pointed to superior quality housing, connection to the electricity grid, 
improved sanitation and better access to water as evidence that their living 
conditions had improved from their traditional villages.592 The NTPC and World Bank 
understandably point to the improvement in living conditions on the Nakai Plateau as 
evidence that hydropower projects need not bring with it negative outcomes for 
resettlers.593 In regards to living conditions, this is clearly true of the NT2.  
What is much less clear is the sustainability of these living conditions and the 
prospect for resettlers of long term improvements in livelihoods options. Such a 
significant change to the local environment brought about by the blocking of the river 
and the infilling of the reservoir has had a profound impact on their livelihood options. 
Prior to the construction of the NT2, residents of the Nakai Plateau lived in relative 
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accord with their local environment which provided them with both the means of 
subsistence and ‘employment’. Villagers were able to provide for their own food 
security through traditional agricultural practices such as rain fed rice cropping, 
raising of livestock such as buffalo and chicken, and catching a variety of fish 
species from the river. It is important that life before the NT2 and reservoir on the 
Nakai Plateau is not romanticised.594 Villagers are adamant that living conditions are 
better now; nevertheless it is important to keep in mind that their previous lifestyle 
was self-sustaining – the local environment provided them with sustainable, if poor, 
livelihoods.  
In recognition of the role that the local ecosystem plays in the livelihoods of Nakai 
Plateau residents, the World Bank and ADB established a program designed to 
ensure the sustainability of the “five livelihood pillars”: agriculture, fisheries, forestry, 
livestock and off-farm employment.595 From an environmental security and 
renewable resource perspective, the first four pillars are of particular interest and will 
be discussed below. 
Livestock 
The raising of livestock is an important part of the livelihood mix in Laos.596 Owning 
buffalo in particular is considered a way of storing wealth, as buffalo can be sold in 
times of need in order to purchase essentials such as rice. On the Nakai Plateau this 
is also a normal practice.597 The great change in the local environment brought about 
by the infilling of the 450km2 reservoir resulted in a large proportion of the grazing 
land on the plateau being inundated. This meant that 50% of the buffalo on the 
plateau had to be sold or culled before the reservoir was full. Due to the fact that so 
much stock needed to be sold simultaneously, the price plummeted and as a 
consequence, many villagers lost a large part of their ‘savings’ in the process.598 
Many other buffalo that were not able to be sold became emaciated or starved to 
death.  
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As an alternative, resettlers were encouraged to experiment with poultry, pigs and 
cows, often borrowing money to do so. Due to a lack of technical knowledge and 
vocational training, these experiments have often failed and villagers have been left 
with a debt but with little ability to repay it.599 Nevertheless, the mix of livestock on 
the plateau is diversifying with up to 50% of resettlers now owning poultry and 15% 
owning pigs.600 The POE reports large numbers of dead and sick buffalo and cattle 
due to disease, and have made strong recommendations that a round of 
vaccinations be implemented across the plateau. This had not been implemented by 
mid-2014 and it is unknown whether the livestock pillar will be sustainable in the long 
run.601  
Agriculture 
Most residents of the Nakai Plateau are subsistence farmers and fishers and the 
NTPC was mandated to provide compensation for land as well as training and 
assistance in other livelihood options.602 Although each household has been 
compensated, there have been a range of issues that have arisen surrounding the 
adequacy of this land. The most important of these are, firstly, the amount of land 
given as compensation, secondly, the quality of the land for agriculture, and finally, 
the proximity of that land to villages.  
The amount of land distributed as compensation for the loss of their traditional farms 
inundated by the reservoir was 0.66 hectares, and this amount was equal for all 
families. While 0.66 hectares is considered sufficient for a family of four, for larger 
families this amount is not adequate to produce enough rice.603 Additionally, 
residents are concerned about what they are to do when their children marry and 
how they should divide their allocated land. This issue is referred to by the 
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international panel of experts (POE) as the “second generation problem”604. As 
children of resettlers grow-up and marry, the apportioned plots of land must either be 
broken into ever smaller plots, new land provided, or off-farm opportunities created. 
Previously, new couples were able to move to land close to their own village, land 
that is now submerged under the NT2’s reservoir. The GoL and the NTPC have 
consistently obfuscated on this issue and progress has been slow.605 This continues 
to be a significant challenge to the long-term sustainability of life on the Nakai 
Plateau and the more time progresses, the deeper the issue becomes. The POE 
report delivered in late 2013, for example, discovered an increasing trend of houses 
of second generation families without latrines or water, and an increasing number of 
widows or female divorcees in vulnerable situations in regards to their access to 
land.606 
The quality of the compensated land is also important. One of the most significant 
issues for those who are relocated because of dams is that the reservoir floods the 
most productive and fertile land close to the river. On the Nakai Plateau, the quality 
of the reallocated land varies with some productive and others in unproductive rocky 
upland slopes. One village elder interviewed explained that the land he was given 
was so rocky it was too difficult to grow rice on. He provided for himself by fishing 
instead, and selling the fish to by rice.607 This is a familiar story across the plateau. 
The POE reports that the majority of compensated land is “of poor quality and on 
erodible slopes”608. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that villagers are used to 
a swidden style of agriculture that leaves fields fallow for long periods of time 
between crops. The limited amount of land compensated means that land must now 
be used annually, without fallow time. Due to a combination of poor soil, 
inappropriate agricultural techniques, inadequate irrigation, and a lack of vocational 
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training, the sustainability of agricultural production on compensated lands is 
dubious.609  
Additionally, the remote location can also be a challenge. Some villagers must travel 
several hours in order to access suitable land for farming.610 One affected family 
explained that their compensated plot of land was so far from their home that, 
because of the petrol bill involved to access it, it was more cost effective to let their 
plot sit fallow and put the money that would otherwise be used for the petrol bill into 
the purchasing of rice.611 This changed their livelihood options significantly, meaning 
that instead of growing rice, they had to purchase it. The only legal option left to 
them was to catch and then sell fish in order to be able to afford to buy rice needed 
for their family.612 The situation was simply put: “If we cannot catch fish, we cannot 
eat rice”613.  
Fisheries 
The many resettled villagers who are not able to meet their daily demands for rice 
have turned to fishing in the reservoir with the caught fish either being consumed, 
preserved or sold. Fisheries is the main source of both protein and income for those 
living on the Plateau and the NTPC figures suggest that a sizeable 38% of 
household income on the Nakai Plateau is from fishing activities.614 Even so, there 
are serious concerns regarding the impacts of the reservoir on fish health and 
populations. The blocking of migration routes that occur when a dam is built results 
in extinction in the local area of these migratory fishes, and it was estimated that 33-
55% of the Nam Theun’s fish were migratory before the closing of the dam.615 The 
conditions within a reservoir favour large predatory fish such as carp, and as a result, 
smaller fish populations tend to be wiped out. This is particularly concerning because 
a large amount of vital micronutrients in the Laotian diet come from these small fish 
that are eaten whole – leading to these small, wild fish being referred to as the “milk 
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of Southeast Asia”616. There are other concerns regarding the health of the fish in the 
reservoir and the impact on residents of the Nakai Plateau, such as the potential for 
toxic chemicals like mercury and DDT deposits to work their way into the food 
chain.617  
These issues aside, following the closure of the dam the amount of fish available to 
villagers of the Nakai Plateau increased greatly due to what is referred to as the 
‘windfall fishery’, where “large amounts of biological material create nutrient-rich 
water, favourable for plankton feeding fish, as well as large areas for spawning and a 
low density of predators”618. This was expected to last between 5-10 years, but 
instead the fishery rapidly declined in 2009, only two years after enclosure.619 In late 
2011, villagers reported that fishing stocks had decreased greatly over the previous 
years with some estimating decreases in catches of 50-90% since the windfall 
period. They also reported declines in the value of fish.620 The POE consistently 
reported illegal fishing in the reservoir by outsiders with greater fishing and business 
skills, giving them an advantage over the resettlers.621 The competition for fish 
between skilled fisherman and unskilled villagers may help to explain why villagers 
have reported lower prices for their fish even as their own catch decreases.  
In addition to competition, one of the largest strains on the fishery in the reservoir is 
the decomposing biomass that washes in and is captured behind the dam wall, as 
well as the rotting vegetation on the floor of the reservoir. Before the infilling of the 
reservoir, independent research indicated a likelihood of anoxic conditions following 
impoundment, leading to fish kills and prohibiting the reproductive cycle of fish. The 
large amount of rotting biomass in the Nam Leuk reservoir was used as an example 
of the way anoxic conditions can lead to fish kills in dam reservoirs and downstream 
from it.622 A separate report found that the anoxic conditions could lead to “(a)t best, 
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a relatively simple ecosystem…with a small number of species present. At worst, the 
reservoir will become largely devoid of life, except for invasive aquatic weeds and 
small islands of survivor fish species…”623 
These risks were well known by the NTPC and this was demonstrated in their Water 
Quality Monitoring document (WQM) which indicated that the lower 6-8 metres of the 
reservoir would be anoxic which, according to the NTPC, would only impact on 3% of 
the reservoir.624 This inexplicably ignores the fact that the majority of the reservoir is 
less than 10 metres deep, meaning that the portion of the reservoir affected by 
anoxia is far greater.625 The understanding of the risks associated with anoxia were 
also demonstrated in the NTPC’s duty to clear biomass before the infilling of the 
reservoir.626 Instead of a comprehensive clearing program, what occurred was ad-
hoc removal of the biomass that was, at times, used as a cover to remove the highly 
valuable rosewood.627 The delay was so significant that shortly before the closing of 
the dam, the plan to clear 3,000 hectares of land was abandoned with only half that 
amount being considered possible.628 Although additional funds were allocated for 
the task, the effort was too little and too late. An elder in a village on the Nakai 
Plateau witnessed what occurred when the contractors came to clear the biomass 
near his own village, claiming that instead of clearing all the biomass, they simply 
removed the valuable rosewood and left the rest.629 When he requested permission 
from the NTPC to remove the remainder of less valuable trees in order to supply his 
village with timber, he was refused. He pointed out the rotting trees he was referring 
to, standing in the flooded area of the reservoir (figure 16).630 
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Figure 16: Dead trees in the reservoir of the Nam Theun 2 dam (author photo) 
The delay in removing the biomass on the Nakai Plateau extends greatly the anoxic 
potential of the reservoir and has resulted in serious negative consequences for 
fisheries both within the reservoir and downstream on the XBF, as well as the health 
of villagers downstream.  
Forestry 
The fourth livelihood pillar according to the World and Asian Development Banks is 
forestry. The lack of biomass clearance for fisheries above is strongly related to the 
forestry sector. The rosewood, or what locals sometimes refer to as teak, is a highly 
valuable commodity on the Nakai Plateau. As a result, it was more profitable for 
NTPC contractors tasked to clear the entire biomass from the reservoir area to clear 
only this valuable commodity from the impoundment area and leave the rest, than to 
harvest the other less valuable wood at the same time. This practice is not 
uncommon and there are now many illegal forestry operations underway with many 
villagers participating as a way of making ends meet.  
This, of course, was not what the livelihood pillar of forestry was designed to be. In 
2003, the Village Forestry Association (VFA) was established with a concession of 
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23,000 hectares of forest to be managed over a period of 70 years.631 The VFA was 
designed to ensure that all profits from forestry in the concession area are shared 
amongst resettlers, providing a significant long term income for villagers. Cash 
dividends from forestry activity – regardless of whether they are involved in forestry 
or not – are paid to villagers, at the same time as providing employment 
opportunities. Irregular dividends have been paid, as high as US$150 per villager in 
2010.632 It was originally hoped that the forestry pillar would provide a third of the 
resettler’s income.633 
A combination of poor management, poor planning, excessive taxation and a loss of 
trust between management of the VFA and resettlers has resulted in an almost 
totally ineffective VFA.634 The POE reports contain a litany of concerns and 
complaints regarding the illegal cutting and collection of rosewood, with consistent 
calls to curb the practice. This “epidemic of illegal rosewood cutting”635 has been 
enabled by the development of new roads and tracks across the plateau connecting 
this remote area more effectively with neighbouring Vietnam. It was apparently well-
known, and explained to me, that the many silver Hyundai vans trudging in and out 
of the newly built villages were transporting this valuable cargo.636  
It seems that many villagers find it more profitable to participate in the highly 
lucrative illegal logging that is occurring.637 One villager was happy to show me the 
family’s stash of rosewood sitting under the house under a blue tarpaulin, waiting to 
be picked up by one of the silver vans. She informed me that her husband was out 
collecting wood, and that it helped to pay for things like petrol and rice.638 The 
willingness to participate in these activities may stem from the perceived corruption 
surrounding the logging industry on the Nakai Plateau.639 Selling wood may also be 
a reflection of the lack of livelihood options on the plateau. As one villager explained: 
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“For now, selling the wood from here is the only way we can earn money to eat; how 
else do we make a living? We can sell to buyers from Vietnam, Thailand and also 
Lao people. There is no land for farming here, so we cannot earn money that way. 
As for fishing, we can usually only make a little money because the price of fish is 
set so low by the fish buyers [middlemen] from Lak Sao.”640 The illegal logging has 
been overlooked by local government and has received no sustained attention from 
the provincial or national governments.641 Enforcement of the law on this matter 
rarely occurs as local authorities tend to look the other way or are actively 
participating in it. This is hardly surprising given that local authorities can earn more 
in a week in bribes to look the other way than the Lao government pays them in a 
year.642  
Although the short-term profits have been high, the long-term consequence of this 
well-organised rapine of the forests of the Nakai Plateau is the removal of a 
sustainable form of income for resettlers. The POE deem the sustainability of the 
pillar a “remote prospect”643 and by as late as 2013 a full forestry inventory had yet to 
be completed.644 The forest inventory may be a moot point given that there are 
strong indicators that the resource is in rapid decline. Many who were involved in the 
practice now report no new income or purchases from this income in several years. 
Traders reported in 2013 that rosewood is so scarce on the plateau that harvesters 
are now collecting the roots and branches of trees.645 This completes the cycle of 
unsustainability, the removal of roots meaning that no substantial new growth of 
rosewood can be expected for decades, if at all. In under ten years, the forestry of 
the Nakai plateau has gone from a potentially renewable, long-term source of 
income, to a low yielding, poor and unproductive forestry. It is undoubtedly not a 
pillar of sustainability on the Nakai Plateau and has no prospect of providing a third 
of ressetler’s income in the long term.  
                                                          
640
 Tanya Lee, "Nam Theun 2 Affected Villagers Put Illusions of the ‘Model Project’ in Doubt," International 
Rivers, 12 March, 2014: http://www.internationalrivers.org/blogs/294-0. 
641
 McDowell, Scudder, and Talbot, "22nd PoE Report", 17-20. 
642
 Author interview, Villager: Village 8, Nakai Plateau, Khammouane  Province, Lao PDR (October 2011). 
643
 McDowell, Scudder, and Talbot, "22nd PoE Report", 18. 
644
 "Nam Theun 2 Annual Update 2013". 
645
 McDowell, Scudder, and Talbot, "22nd PoE Report", Appendix 2. 
 
 
180 | P a g e  
 
Environmental changes and sustainable livelihoods on the Nakai Plateau 
The living conditions of many of those who have been resettled on the Nakai Plateau 
have improved. Livelihood options have changed significantly, and villagers are 
engaging in what appear to be unsustainable practices to make ends meet. The 
NTPC is contractually obligated to ensure that all resettlers have an income of 
roughly double what it was before relocation, that is, above the national poverty line 
of 186,000 kip per month (around US$ 23).646 Although the NTPC claim that the 
average income (measured as consumption) is more than triple the established 
poverty line value, it is clear that this consumption has been driven by the windfall in 
fisheries and income from legal and illegal rosewood collection, both of which are 
now in sharp decline.647 At the same time, an increase in debt – 25% of all 
households on the plateau – and a failure of the ‘off-farm pillar’ designed to provide 
vocational training and skills for non-renewable resource based livelihood options, 
means that human development and security are far from assured on the Nakai 
Plateau. For this reason, the resettlement program, with all its checks and balances, 
is not nearly ready to be declared a success. At this stage, the prospects of long-
term success appears slim, but more time will be needed to assess whether this 
‘model dam’ can provide long term livelihood options for resettled villagers around 
the dam site.  
The Xe Bang Fai 
The biggest environmental and social concerns before construction commenced on 
the NT2 were those downstream, along the Xe Bang Fai (XBF).648 This is because 
the project is what is referred to as a trans-basin hydropower project, diverting the 
majority of water from one river into another. In the case of the NT2, 93 of the flow of 
the Nam Theun River is diverted into the XBF. It was known well before the dam 
commenced operation that this would mean “the hydrological and geomorphological 
characteristics of the Xe Bang Fai (would) totally change”649. In essence, the XBF is 
no longer the same river. This brings with it immense pressure on the ecosystem of 
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the XBF and since operations began, has fundamentally changed the nature of the 
river. This in turn has created immense challenges to the 120-150,000 villagers who 
live in close proximity to the river, as they are forced to adapt to these changes.  
The changes to the ecosystem of the XBF has brought with it severe consequences 
in terms of food and water security – that is the quality, quantity and access to these 
resources. It is somewhat artificial to divide these two issues – due to the complex 
and multi-faceted ways in which they interact – but for clarity they will be discussed 
in separate sections below. In terms of water security there are two main issues: the 
change in the flow regime of the river, and the negative impacts on potable water. In 
regards to food security, the total loss of riverside gardens, the negative impacts on 
rice production and the destruction of fisheries are the most serious concerns. It was 
well known before the dam began operation that there would be serious issues on 
the XBF, and that these would impact a much larger number of people. However,  
the compensation for affected villages on the XBF was much less than that given to 
resettlers on the Nakai Plateau. As a result of inadequate compensation and in the 
absence of mitigation, the sustainability of livelihoods on the XBF is in even greater 
jeopardy than those of the Nakai Plateau.  
Water Security 
Although the NTPC have provided sanitation such as communal toilets and access 
to drinking water through wells, the people of the XBF are experiencing very serious 
hardships. The quality of the water of the XBF has changed significantly. From being 
a clear, slow running river in the dry months, it is now turbid and fast flowing.650 
Whereas previously, residents of the XBF were able to draw water from the river for 
drinking and bathing, this is no longer an option. The water of the XBF is now full of 
sediment and other elements from the Nakai Plateau. The heavy sedimentation 
decreases light penetration into the water which in turn results in lowered oxygen 
levels which can be fatal for fish. This adds to the already low oxygen levels that 
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have resulted from the anaerobic conditions in the reservoir, as well as the additional 
mercury, ammonia, methane and hydrogen sulphide pollution.651  
As a result of the poor quality of the water, it is unsuitable for washing and contact 
more generally. In each village visited on the XBF, villagers complained about skin 
rashes that had begun since the commencement of hydropower operations which 
occur whenever they come into contact with the water. This is particularly 
problematic when planting rice and fishing – both activities that generally require 
long exposure to the water. Villagers have no knowledge on the actual cause of the 
rash, but all villagers have come to understand that exposure to the waters of the 
XBF now has negative consequences. Although the rash coincided with the 
beginning of hydropower operations, the NTPC make the doubtful claim that the rash 
is not linked. Nevertheless, the fact that almost the entire dry season flow now 
comes from the Nakai reservoir strongly suggests that the root cause of these water 
issues stems from there. 
Obviously the changes in the quality of the water means that it is no longer suitable 
for drinking either. This was a known consequence before commencement of 
hydropower operations and as a result, one of the downstream compensation 
measures was the digging of wells for villages that used to rely on the waters of the 
XBF for their potable water. Unfortunately, the well program has been less than 
successful. In many villages only a fraction of the wells are useable. Villagers 
complain about ‘bitter water’ that is undrinkable and, as a result, many are forced to 
travel considerable distances to access safe water. Some villagers have resorted to 
other means such as boiling water, storing rainwater in large jars during the wet 
season or purchasing water for drinking.652  
Prior to the NT2, villagers along the XBF were able to supply themselves with water 
year round by collecting rainwater in the wet season and digging small wells along 
the banks of the river during the dry season. Since the start of operations, the 
possibility of using the riverbanks for this purpose has gone. The summer flow of the 
XBF has increased by a factor of ten, raising the river by over five metres (ADB 
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March 2005 p.58 (appendix 4) and bringing with it severe erosion.653 Although part of 
the mitigation plan for the XBF was to provide anti-erosion measures such as 
reinforcing riverbanks, this did not eventuate, due in large part to the delayed and 
then slow roll-out of compensation and mitigation measures downstream.654  
The changed flow brings with it less measurable effects such as a growing fear of 
the river. Many villagers now report being too afraid to fish due to the fast flowing 
deep water. Of even more concern to some is the irregular flow. Although the 
average flow has increased by 220 cubic metres per second (m3/s) hydropower 
generation is regularly ceased on a Sunday, dropping the flow to only 80 m3/s, 
significantly lowering the level of the river, until it rises again suddenly on Monday. 
This sudden change in the levels of the XBF is scheduled to coincide with the low 
demand for electricity on a Sunday in Thailand, where the majority of the NT2’s 
energy is sold. This great fluctuation comes with serious implications to those who 
live downstream, including damage to irrigation pumps, boats and potential loss of 
life, and also demonstrates the prioritisation of the river as a source of energy rather 
than a provider of livelihoods for the tens of thousands of people who live by the 
river.  
Food security 
By far the most serious consequence to human security as a result of the 
construction of the NT2 is the tenuous situation residents of the XBF find themselves 
in relation to food. The massive changes to the ecosystem of the XBF has led to the 
annihilation of riverside gardens along the length of the XBF. As is the case 
throughout the entire Mekong River Basin, during the dry season, villagers grow 
vegetables in riverbank gardens in the rich soil beside the river. But the addition of 
virtually the entire flow of the Nam Theun River into the XBF has meant that the river 
banks have disappeared completely along much of its length.  
The Asian Development Bank predicted that the XBF would widen on average 
between 10.7 and 15.9 metres and that the erosion would be “slow and obvious, 
giving communities time to adjust”655. No scientific evidence or precedent was given 
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for these figures. The NTPC estimated that as a result of this erosion, 30-70% of 
these gardens would initially be lost but it was “expected that these losses (would) 
be quickly recovered by moving gardens higher up the banks”656. They also believed 
that the erosion would become less noticeable in the lower reaches of the XBF, 
closer to the Mekong, suggesting that “by the time the river reaches the bridge on 
Road 13 the loss of land is predicted to be negligible”657. As it turned out, these 
assessments were hopelessly optimistic. The first place I visited on the XBF was the 
village of Sok Bo, some 30 kilometres towards the Mekong from the bridge on Road 
13. The erosion this far away from the confluence of the downstream channel and 
the XBF was severe (see figure 17).  
 
Figure 17: Severe Erosion at Sok Bo Village (author photo) 
From Sok Bo, all the way up to Mahaxai – the first major town on the XBF after its 
confluence with the downstream channel – the riverbank erosion is severe. Instead 
of gently sloping banks leading down to the river, as has been the case for 
generations, all that is left is sheer walls of earth that frequently collapse. Villagers 
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who have been able to move their gardens further up what riverbanks remain, find 
that the costs can be prohibitive because they now need expensive fertiliser and 
watering is either labour intensive or expensive due to the costs of energy for 
pumping.658 But the majority of villagers have been unable to shift their riverside 
gardens due to the absence of appropriate land. The option of riverbank gardens has  
therefore effectively been wiped out in many places, taking with it a vital source of 
generational food security and income.  
Although the NTPC was encouraged to consider providing villagers with alternatives 
such as inland gardens with irrigation – as was the case for the downstream areas of 
the Theun-Hinboun project – this did not occur. Instead, as compensation, the NTPC 
gave a one-time payment of 5,000 kip (about US$0.65) per square metre for 
riverbank garden losses. Many missed out on compensation because they were not 
utilising their gardens at the time the NTPC was assessing who should be 
covered.659 Those who were given money complain that this one-time payment does 
not come close to compensating what were generational sources of food security. 
The payments were generally the equivalent of one or two years-worth of produce, 
yet the impacts will continue for at least the 25 years of the concession period.  
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Figure 18: Destruction of riverside gardens near Mahaxai (author photo) 
The loss of riverbank gardens removes an important source of food security for the 
tens of thousands of villagers who live along the banks of the XBF. The losses are 
complete and indefinite, meaning that villagers have lost the ability to grow seasonal 
fruit and vegetables in the fertile soils of the riverbank during the low-water, dry 
season. This removes an important source of vitamins and minerals and effectively 
brings to an end what has been a key part of the food security mix in the XBF for 
many generations.  
The second major impact on food security is the negative affects on rice production. 
This has two main components to it. Firstly, the decrease in production due to the 
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quality of the water and the fluctuating water levels, and secondly, the impacts from 
flooding. Many villagers along the XBF complain that the water from the river is ‘dirty 
water’ or in other words, polluted.660 Up and down the river there are complaints that 
rice yields are down since the start of operations. Rice has also been impacted with 
yields decreasing since the dam began operation. One of the promised benefits of 
the dam was higher low season flows that would make irrigating easier.661 The 
erratic flows of the river mean that many irrigation pumps have broken or have to be 
shifted frequently.662 Large fluctuations in the water level damages pumps if they are 
not moved, and in some cases it takes up to ten men to adjust the pump each time 
the river changes level. This makes the low flow on Sundays particularly problematic. 
Previously, with a regular wet and dry season, this was not a problem. The promised 
benefits of easier and cheaper irrigation have therefore not eventuated. Villagers are 
left with the cost of regularly moving and fixing pumps that would normally only need 
moving and maintaining a few times a year. Additionally, the cheaper electricity 
prices that were promised as a means of decreasing the cost of irrigation have not 
eventuated. All villagers interviewed around both the XBF and the Nakai plateau 
complained that the price of electricity has increased significantly since the dam was 
built. 
The exceptionally high levels of rain in the 2011 wet season exacerbated an already 
challenging set of environmental circumstances for the XBF and those whose 
livelihoods depend on it. As anticipated, flooding on the upper and lower XBF 
increased significantly once the dam started operation.663 The flooding in 2011 was 
the worst in living memory.664 The rice crop has been devastated along the length of 
the river. In many villages, including the upper XBF town of Mahaxai, the entire 
annual rice crop was destroyed. In one lower XBF village, of 450 hectares, only 10 
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hectares were harvestable.665 The pattern is repeated throughout the region, with 
many dam overflows occurring, impacting on rice stocks throughout Laos.666 The 
food security impacts from the floods were more than just losses of rice. All villages 
experienced losses of livestock including cattle, buffalo, goats, chickens and ducks. 
Even wild options such as stocks of frogs were destroyed.667 
 
Figure 19: Villager in Mahaxai showing the level of flooding in 2011 (author photo) 
The increased flow has created another food security dilemma. All the villages along 
the XBF are involved in fishing. With an increase of 5.8 metres due to the increased 
summer flow, fish are now difficult to catch as fishers are not equipped for these 
conditions.668 Villagers also report being afraid of the river due to the high flows. 
Instead of fishing in the main river, villagers now try to catch fish in smaller streams 
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or ponds, although the sustainability of this is in question. Other aquatic products 
such as “shellfish, edible seaweed and small aquatic animals that once lived in the 
shallow water along the river banks have (also) disappeared” 669 taking with them yet 
another source of food. 
 
 
Figure 20: Flooding in the town of Mahaxai on the XBF, July, 2011.Photo from: 
https://ssl.panoramio.com/photo/106585509 
 
Attempts to shift the source of fish from wild catch to aquaculture and fish ponds 
have been largely unsuccessful, with many villagers ending up in debt due to the 
high costs and risks involved.670 Building and maintaining a fish pond is an 
expensive exercise as it requires inputs such as fish food and antibiotics and 
requires a level of technical knowledge that villagers currently do not possess. 
Although the NTPC provides a micro-lending system known as a ‘community bank’, 
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the lack of livelihood reskilling to accompany this, has resulted in the failure of fish 
farms and left many villagers in debt with an uncertain financial future.  
To cope with the losses, villagers sell buffalo if they have them, or else borrow from 
the community fund set up by the NTPC giving loans of around US$100 at low 
interest repayments. Villagers who borrowed for rice that has been washed away or 
fish ponds that did not work, or pig farms that failed, are now in debt and must try to 
find ways to pay their debts with meagre means. Their future is uncertain and many 
now rely on government subsidies for rice and electricity. In fact the future for all of 
those who live along the XBF is uncertain. With losses to rice, fisheries, fresh water 
and livestock, the villages around the XBF are potentially sitting on a food security 
disaster. As one village headman put so succinctly: “I cannot talk about (the NTPC), 
but if they build more dams we will die”671.  
The NT2 is meant to be a ‘best practice’ dam, with careful planning, preparation, 
funding and villager compensation. The NT2 and the NTPC even won an award for 
“Hydroelectric Power Project of the Year” from Global Energy Magazine.672 Some 
villages of the XBF are better off than others, but the worst are destitute with few 
livelihood options. The argument that dams are decreasing poverty in Laos is 
evidently untrue for those that live downstream of the dam. If the negative impacts 
described above are the results of a ‘model’ dam, then there is no reason to expect 
that the impacts of a worst practice, poorly researched dam, such as the Xayaburi, 
will not be even more disastrous.  
Section Two: Human Security and the Nan Theun 2 
Summary of Impacts 
The evidence above demonstrates that the challenges facing those affected by the 
NT2 are human security issues – both from the narrower environmental security 
perspective and a broader point of view. It is important, therefore, to bring these 
issues to light in respect to the way that environmental security and human security 
concerns interact. The benchmark for human security used here are those aspects 
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identified by Barnett as most crucial to human security, that is, the ability for people 
to satisfy their most basic health needs through access to nutritious food, clean air 
and water, and shelter. That being the case, the human security outcomes for those 
on the Nakai Plateau are mixed. Locals report that their housing situation is better 
than what it was in their previous villages. The POE draws the conclusion that the 
housing infrastructure on the plateau is sustainable in the long-term and most 
villagers report that they have adequate access to a supply of clean drinking 
water.673 These are undoubtedly positive outcomes as far as human security is 
concerned – although it must be kept in mind that these achievements have come 
about after they have been forcibly removed from their ancestral lands.  
As far as food is concerned, the long term prospects of sustaining their own food 
security is deeply uncertain. Villagers are now competing with commercial interests 
for their fish supply from the reservoir. There is also doubt about the quality of the 
fish now available as well as the degree of mercury poisoning that may be occurring. 
Furthermore, the lack of biomass clearance before the infilling of the reservoir has 
resulted in anoxic conditions that may hamper fish production for many years to 
come.674 Also of great concern is the rice supply. Plots given to villagers as 
compensation for the lands lost to the reservoir are frequently inappropriate for rice 
cultivation, too small to support entire families, difficult to irrigate and not in close 
enough proximity to the new villages. Locals are still reliant on the government for 
rice or are forced to buy it with the proceeds of other livelihood activities such as 
fishing, animal husbandry and forestry.  
These other livelihood options are far from sustainable, however, and this is already 
evident with the increasing competition for fish. Furthermore, many villagers were 
forced to sell their buffalo – essentially their savings plan – in order to be relocated, 
and the lack of veterinary services has meant that many other animals have died 
since relocation. In the years immediately following the construction of the dam and 
infilling of the reservoir, forestry – namely the collection and harvesting of the 
valuable teak or rosewood – appeared to provide an alternative form of income. This 
most lucrative of livelihood alternatives has now come to a halt and the future of 
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those on the Plateau looks bleak given the lack of training for alternative livelihood 
options.   
The outcomes in terms of human security are much worse in the downstream area 
along the XBF. It is unreasonable to think that the majority of water from one river 
can be diverted into another of similar size and for there to be minimal 
consequences. Even so, assessments of the downstream impacts before the dam 
construction and river diversion were generally optimistic about the outcomes. In 
terms of food security, the increased water flow was destined to lead to a benefit for 
agriculture by way of increased rice cultivation and lower costs for irrigation pumping 
totalling US$ 5-7 million.675 According to World Bank estimates, a maximum of only 
19 irrigation systems across the entire XBF system would be impacted by the 
changes in water levels, easily compensated by the $50,000 allocated for the task.676 
Fisheries losses (initially estimated at around US $4 million) were expected to be 
fully mitigated through aquaculture, and a combination of rice and fish farming.677  
Instead, the food security outcomes have been overwhelmingly negative. The 
irregular water flows have destroyed irrigation pumps up and down the XBF, 
hindering the pumping of water and requiring extra labour to adjust the intact 
irrigation systems to the irregular levels of the river. Furthermore, the polluted water 
from the reservoir is actually killing crops rather than growing them, in addition to 
irritating the skin of those who come in contact with it. The irregular and constantly 
fast flowing water of the river has had a devastating impact on fisheries with some 
estimates of loss at 85%. Fishers report that they are afraid of the fast flowing water 
and are unwilling or unable to carry out traditional fishing activities. Although 
suggestions that aquaculture would go a long way to mitigating the loss in fisheries, 
there are few examples of working fish farms along the length of the XBF and 
certainly nothing approaching the amount needed to replace these losses.   
Given the importance of fish and rice to the diets of Laotians in general and locals of 
the XBF in particular, the losses in rice and fish are serious long-term human 
security concerns. This is compounded by the almost total loss of generational 
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riverside gardens that have also been inadequately compensated. Additionally, there 
have been losses of other food options such as frogs and poultry that have been 
destroyed by the severity of the flooding that has followed the commencement of 
operations. Whether the particularly severe flooding of 2011 was as a result of the 
operation of the NT2 or natural variations occurring as part of a changing climate is 
largely irrelevant.678 What is clear is that the impacts of the NT2 have left locals of 
the XBF highly vulnerable to such perturbations.  
In addition to impacts on food security, the change in the water quality of the XBF 
bring with it additional problems. Although the digging of wells by the NTPC was 
designed to mitigate the new unsuitability of XBF water as a potable source, the 
evidence shows that the majority of villagers and villages of the XBF downstream of 
the NT2 are certainly not better off. Many of the wells have failed or are unused due 
to ‘bitter water’ that is unsuitable for drinking. In some villages less than 40% of the 
wells dug by the NTPC are in working order. Some locals have resorted to using 
water from the XBF for washing and buying potable water from the NTPC. From 
relying on the river for a great majority of their livelihoods – fishing, irrigation, potable 
water, transport, gardens etc. – to now having a sense of unease or fear due to the 
fast flowing, polluted, damaging and destructive river, the relationship between the 
residents of the XBF and the river has fundamentally and irrevocably changed. How 
this can be quantified, measured or compensated for is unclear. What is clear is that 
the ecological destruction that has been wrought by the NT2 has created serious 
negative impacts in terms of human security on the XBF. 
Vulnerability, Resilience and Agency 
It is worth noting at this juncture the notions of vulnerability and resilience forwarded 
by Barnett and others as relevant to environmental security. If we are to consider 
one as a function of the other – that is to say that as resilience increases, so 
vulnerability decreases (and vice-versa), we are able to more quickly grasp the 
human security outcomes of the NT2.679 This can be achieved simply by asking the 
question: “Has the construction of the NT2 increased vulnerability or increased 
resilience?” It is abundantly clear that the environmental changes wrought by the 
NT2 have brought with them increased vulnerability: increased vulnerability to 
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economic perturbations due to livelihood losses; increased vulnerability to global 
climate change and localised severe weather events; and increased vulnerability to 
further unforeseen negative impacts of the NT2. The factors that tend to increase 
resilience have greatly diminished or disappeared on the Nakai Plateau and around 
the XBF including: a range of diverse and sustainable livelihood options; a healthy 
and functioning local ecosystem that provides the basics of subsistence; the ability to 
earn a sufficient income to pay for essentials and meet debt repayments; and the 
ability to participate in activities that decrease one’s own vulnerability.  
We can extend this idea further to the Global Environmental and Human Security 
(GECHS) program’s conception of environmental insecurity that posits that when 
“people do not have enough options to avoid, or to adapt to environmental change 
such that their needs, rights and values are likely to be undermined, then they can 
be said to be environmentally insecure”680. This definition gives greater agency to 
individuals and communities affected by the NT2 to adapt to or avoid the harmful 
impacts of the NT2. The idea of the compensation measures and livelihood 
programs were, in a sense, designed to enable this and to assist residents of the 
Nakai Plateau and XBF to pursue other livelihood options that would assist them to 
adapt and thrive. This is as an alternative to having them simply rely on government 
welfare such as rice handouts. The failure of the livelihood and adaptation programs 
means that according to the GECHS definition, these individuals and communities 
are now environmentally insecure. When this perspective is combined with the ideas 
of vulnerability and resilience, the human security outcomes of the NT2 are clearly 
negative. 
Civil Society and Human Security 
There are no substantial studies of the NT2 from a human security perspective, 
engaging with the broader human security literature, drawing the links directly 
between the theory of human security and the construction of the NT2.681 In fact, just 
as with the environmental security literature more generally, there is a dearth of 
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human security research into the impacts of hydropower in the Mekong. This is 
hopefully an omission that will be corrected in coming years. Yet, in a general sense, 
there is a broad normative discourse surrounding the rights of, and wrongs against, 
Laotians impacted by the NT2 and a raft of other hydropower dams in the region. 
This discourse is dominated by the many local, regional and international non-
government organisations (NGOs) who have a long track-record of bringing to light 
the plight of those impacted by the negative effects of hydropower and other 
industrial developments in the MRB.  
A range of local and international NGOs have been specifically involved with the NT2 
including the Foundation for Ecological Recovery (Terraper), the Save the Mekong 
Coalition, WWF, Oxfam, Probe International and International Rivers.682 Although not 
specifically involved with the NT2, a number of local NGOs are also involved in 
hydropower issues in the MRB more generally.683 Much of the literature produced by 
these NGOs revolves around the impacts of the dam in terms of the destruction to 
the local ecosystem, including the loss of fisheries, riverside gardens, and losses to 
food production capability. Alongside this is the harm that it has brought to the 
people of the Nakai Plateau and the XBF regarding loss of livelihoods and 
inadequate compensation. The focus of attention is either on the Laotian government 
(GoL) or the international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank who have financed the project. The corruption of the GoL 
is frequently highlighted as well as the opaqueness of the agreement signed with the 
NTPC. In regards to the IFIs, the often large difference between their words and 
actions, or their intent and the observed outcomes is emphasised in an attempt to 
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ensure their ongoing commitment to the project and in the hope that they can 
influence either the NTPC or the GoL to provide better human security outcomes.  
What is missing from the NGO arguments is any real connection with the human or 
environmental security literature. Although implicit within the discourse, there is no 
explicit reference to human rights, human development or emancipation, nor are 
linkages made between the issues arising from the construction of the NT2 and the 
plethora of United Nations literature on the subject. The same can be said of the 
wider discourse that focuses on the Mekong Basin as a whole, although recently a 
consortium of local and international NGOs have taken Malaysia’s Mega First 
Corporation – charged with the construction of the Mekong mainstream dam at Don 
Sahong – to Malaysia’s Human Rights Commission.684 
Rather than a new engagement with the human security literature, this move 
appears more in line with NGO tactics of raising awareness of these issues at the 
local, regional and international levels, in a variety of different settings. These are 
outsider tactics, designed to draw regional and international attention to the plight of 
hundreds of thousands of Mekong citizens who are affected by hydropower 
construction and the millions who will be, if the dam-building frenzy continues at its 
rapid pace. The tactics employed by the Mekong NGOs result from and are reflective 
of the almost total lack of transparency surrounding the construction of hydropower 
dams in the region and the almost total absence of community consultation with local 
stakeholders who will bear the majority of the costs of construction in terms of lost 
environmental services, livelihoods and ancestral land.685  
It is unsurprising that these civil society groups do not engage with the idea of 
security more generally – apart from regular references to food security. It is 
somewhat surprising, however, that rather than consistently approaching 
hydropower issues from the perspective of rights, norms, and human security - as 
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may be expected of civil society – the discourse is often technical in nature, 
frequently arguing from an economic perspective.686 The arguments are varied. 
Some argue that the projected demand for energy in the region, and the likelihood of 
a glut of energy makes the NT2 – and continued dam construction throughout the 
region – unviable economically.687 Others argue that due to the high costs of 
construction, the price per kilowatt negotiated by the GoL (4.15 US cents per kilowatt 
hour) is not enough to cover costs and make a profit (estimated at 5.75 US cents per 
kilowatt hour).688 And yet others argue that the technical capabilities and oversight of 
the GoL are not adequate to ensure that the proceeds of the NT2 are distributed 
evenly.689 In something of a major contradiction, WWF actually forwards the NT2 and 
the controversial Se San cascade as reasonable alternatives to mainstream dams, 
due to the major disruption to the connectivity of the Mekong’s ecosystem caused by 
mainstream dams.690 They fail to highlight that in regards to human security 
concerns, this may be the lesser of two evils.  
The question arises as to why more positivist economic and technical arguments are 
used instead of a normative human security discourse. It is reasonable to assume 
that these arguments are used in order to gain attention at the policy level and to 
demonstrate that civil society is knowledgeable on the issues and can present an 
alternative expertise to those offered by hydropower companies and IFIs. Indeed, the 
technical and economic arguments by no means demonstrate bias in their views, 
apart from the bias that human issues should come before economic interests. 
Reports take the available information from the NTPC, ADB and World Bank, 
analyse it and draw their own conclusions based on their own independent research 
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and the wider academic knowledge on the subject. Yet the efficacy of this approach 
is questionable.  
Rather than carving out a separate space in which human security is valued in and 
of itself in terms of human needs, rights and values, this approach appears to play 
into the hands of the national security discourse, particularly the economic 
imperative argument as explored in the previous chapter. This nationalistic argument 
revolves around the collective good versus the individual good, or the national 
versus the local, suggesting that individual and local sacrifices must be made in 
order to further national development.691 As Mitchell has argued, however, “the 
discourse of what is ‘local interest’ (by implication parochial) and what is ‘national 
interest’ (by implication public good) is itself part of the politics of legitimation that 
reflect dominant power structures”692. The NTPC and GoL’s claims of the adequacy 
of compensation measures to villagers of the Nakai Plateau and the XBF is part of 
this economic legitimisation. Arguments against the adequacy of compensation – 
that argue from a technical and economic perspective – risk playing a role in 
legitimising the economic argument.  
The challenge for NGOs in this sense is the almost total absence of human security 
discourse related to hydropower at the national and regional levels that they can 
engage with. From a national perspective, and with the lessons of the previous 
chapter in mind, it is unsurprising that MRB riparians have no interest in the issue of 
human security. While this does not preclude other civil society organisations from 
pursuing the human security agenda, there is yet little to speak of. For example, the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is an ASEAN track two 
organisation designed “to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence 
building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and 
cooperation”693. Although it is intended “to provide an informal mechanism by which 
political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in 
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their private capacities”,694 the issue of human security barely rates a mention. In its 
recent study group of Water Resources Security in Mainland Southeast Asia, the 
issues of hydropower construction and the negative impacts on individuals and 
communities was raised.695 Representatives from Laos and China were the focus of 
sustained attention in regards to Mekong mainstream dams. When the issue of 
negative human security outcomes from hydropower construction was raised and the 
argument became heated, the chair of the meeting reminded participants that they 
must follow “the ASEAN Way” of non-interference in other country’s internal affairs, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, and consensus decision-making.696 The implication 
of this is that issues that may be controversial or potentially confrontational, such as 
human security issues related to hydropower, are effectively taken off the negotiating 
table.  
Evidence of this side-stepping of the issue abounds. The Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS) – discussed in the previous chapter – demonstrated the way that human 
security and environmental issues are swept aside in the name of development. The 
Mekong River Commission (MRC), which does not have an economic imperative, 
nevertheless demonstrates its adoption of the ASEAN Way. This chapter and the 
one preceding it clearly demonstrate the issues at stake for the greater MRB and its 
people due to hydropower construction. Yet in the MRC’s latest iteration of its online 
presence, the tensions over hydropower, and their current and assessed impact on 
the people of the MRB, are completely absent.697 Although the importance of 
fisheries to the basin’s population is highlighted, hydropower is not mentioned in the 
“Threats to Fisheries” section, even though the continued construction of hydropower 
dams is the largest threat to fisheries across the entire basin.698 On another front, the 
negative impact of hydropower on human populations is also notably absent from the 
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ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights – an institution that one 
would expect would have serious concerns for such outcomes.699  
Furthermore, there is no reference to human security in the ASEAN Charter and, 
unsurprisingly, the ASEAN secretariat itself avoids these issues.700 Its Lower 
Mekong Initiative (LMI) divides its attention between ‘six pillars’ focused on: 
agriculture and food security; connectivity; education; energy security; environment 
and water; and health.701 It is worth pointing out the artificial separation of these 
issues that are in fact inextricably linked; food, agriculture, environment, water and 
energy security are all part and parcel of the same thing in the Mekong – and all 
have an impact on health. The economic imperative once again comes to the 
foreground given that the “goal of the (environment and water) pillar is to advance 
economic growth and sustainable development through transnational policy”702. 
Essentially, there is no regional discourse on the matter of human security in the 
MRB generally and Laos more specifically in relation to hydropower. As Elliot has 
observed: “The primary security problematic remains one that focuses on the 
maintenance of regional order and stability and the protection (or securing) of those 
values that are associated with statehood”703. As a result of this and the ASEAN 
Way, “resistance to ‘human security’ arises because of concerns that it will open a 
Pandora’s Box of human rights issues, or authorize commentary on the internal 
affairs of countries in the region”704. It would appear, therefore, that the ASEAN Way 
and human security are incompatible in many important ways – especially through 
the lens of hydropower development in the Mekong.705  
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Conclusion: Human Security and the NT2 
This chapter has focused on the human security aspects of environmental security. 
In contrast to the macro approach of the previous chapter, it has taken a micro 
approach, examining a single hydropower project, the NT2 in Laos. It has 
demonstrated that at the micro-level, the construction of hydropower projects creates 
significant human security concerns – even when mitigation measures are of a high 
standard with multiple layers of accountability built in. The most serious issues are 
those downstream of the dam, due to both the much larger population affected as 
well as the magnitude of the changes. Far from being a panacea for the negative 
impacts of hydropower development, the mitigation measures for livelihood options 
that were adopted by the NTPC at the behest of IFIs have had mixed outcomes at 
best.  
The outcomes are disheartening from a human security perspective because this is 
essentially a best case scenario of a ‘model dam’. The majority of dams in the region 
have limited resettlement programs and very little, if anything, by way of livelihood 
programs – let alone the checks and balances that the NTPC has submitted to as 
part of the construction and operation of the dam.706 The next chapter will consider 
the broader implications of the findings of this chapter and how these interact with 
the macro perspective of the Lancang Cascade explored in the previous chapter. 
The links between state security and human security perspectives through the lens 
of the environment will be explored, with particular reference to hydropower 
construction in the MRB. These considerations will bring a more detailed 
understanding of both Systemic Environmental Security and its potential contribution 
to security literature more generally.  
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Section 4: Conclusions Section 
Chapter Six: Deploying Systemic 
Environmental Security – Case Study 
Findings  
Economic advance is not the same thing as human progress. 
 
John Clapham: A Concise Economic History of Britain.707 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters provided a macro and a micro view of the effects of 
hydropower in the Mekong River Basin (MRB). The main purpose of this chapter is 
to understand and analyse the findings of the case study section from the 
perspective of Systemic Environmental Security. The first section will initially review 
Chapter’s Four and Five in order to distil the main positions of both traditional and 
human security in regards to hydropower construction in the Mekong. Following this, 
the other two leading environmental security paradigms – the Environmental 
Scarcities and Violent Conflict (ESVC) framework, and critical ecology – will be used 
to focus on the case study material in order to discover what insights they bring to 
the case. Section Two will explore what unique perspectives Systemic 
Environmental Security provides to the case study of the Mekong. This analysis will 
be split into two, initially focusing on the macro and the Lancang Cascade, and then 
the micro and the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydropower dam. Finally, the two case-study 
chapters will be drawn together to understand them in the context of the whole. That 
is to say, we must return to seeing the MRB as a single, interactive, complex system. 
From this position, we are able to grasp the widespread impacts of hydropower 
throughout the region and come to some understanding of the challenges facing 
Mekong citizens.  
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Section 1: Mekong Hydropower and Security Perspectives 
The case study chapters were designed to demonstrate both ends of the security 
spectrum in the MRB. The first chapter focused on the Lancang Cascade and 
provided an opportunity to investigate the traditional approaches to security related 
to hydropower. The second chapter focused on the NT2 dam and its more localised 
impacts on human security. This section briefly summarises the findings of the case 
study chapters, firstly in relation to traditional security, and secondly in relation to 
human security. After this, some important contributions from both the ESVC 
framework and critical ecology will be highlighted in order link the chapter more 
strongly with the environmental security discourse. 
Traditional Security 
Chapter four initially outlined the considerable and harmful environmental impacts 
from the construction of the Lancang Cascade. It demonstrated that there are 
serious, economic, social, and environmental consequences as a result of the 
Chinese dams. Irregular water flows, silt capture, disruption to fisheries and changes 
in water quality are the most significant concerns, and these effects are felt as far 
south as the Vietnam Delta and Tonle Sap. Although there is a large body of 
scientific evidence demonstrating these ecological changes, the current traditional 
security analyses of the situation fail to grasp the nature of the security issues in the 
MRB. 
It is clear that at the local level there is a great deal of consternation about the 
impacts of the Chinese dams. Locals in Thailand and in Vietnam have expressed 
ongoing concerns about the impacts on local economies and livelihoods. Local 
media has given voice to these concerns and the blame is usually placed squarely 
on China. On the back of these concerns international commentators have raised the 
prospect of violent conflict over the Lancang Cascade. Realist analyses usually 
revolve around China’s rise, whether it is peaceful or revisionist, and how its regional 
hegemonic status plays a role in the control of resources. Great power politics are 
also a factor to some degree, with the Lancang Cascade appearing in the mix of 
discourse relevant to the US ‘pivot’ to Asia. On closer inspection however, 
environmental concerns fade well into the background in these realist analyses. At 
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the forefront are political machinations, and the environmental challenges in the 
MRB awkwardly support a realist world view.  
What we find when we look more carefully is that all Mekong riparians are involved in 
the capture of the hydropower resources of the Mekong and its tributaries. This is 
driven by the other traditional security paradigm of liberal institutionalism which 
fosters economic integration and cooperation. As the latter part of Chapter Four 
demonstrates, this cooperation only goes so far in that it revolves around economic, 
rather than environmental and human security. The two main institutions tasked with 
enhancing cooperation in the Mekong, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), are far from equal in their effectiveness. The 
“toothless tiger” of the MRC struggles to draw attention to the negative 
environmental impacts of hydropower construction. It has only an informational 
mandate and although it has produced a raft of reports outlining the long-term 
negative impacts of hydropower on the environment and the people of the Mekong, it 
is effectively sidelined in favour of the economic benefits to be gained from GMS 
cooperation. 
The GMS, on the other hand, and its economic priorities find widespread popularity 
and support throughout the region. What we find then, is that there are essentially no 
traditional security concerns in regards to hydropower construction in the MRB. 
Deeper investigation indicates a low likelihood of conflict between states over 
hydropower, and the growing economic integration and combined exploitation of the 
Mekong’s hydropower potential is apparently ameliorating the political differences 
between Mekong riparians. The strengthening of economic ties and greater 
economic development in a region that has been war-torn and economically 
backward for decades is no doubt a welcome idea. Yet, when we give context to 
Chapter Four by considering the implications of Chapter Five, what Chapter Four 
demonstrates is that the two dominant security paradigms in the MRB – realism and 
institutional liberalism – fail to come to terms in any meaningful way with the 
immediate and growing problem of the degradation of human security that is arising 
due to the negative environmental impacts of hydropower construction. Individuals 
and communities are effectively invisible within the traditional discourse. Chapter 
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Five demonstrates, however, that there is much more to the story, and that these 
traditional views greatly limit the discussion and our understanding of security. 
Human security 
Chapter Five provides an opportunity to examine the human security aspects of 
hydropower construction in the MRB from a micro perspective. The science and 
hydrological data in Chapter Five are in many ways similar to that of Chapter Four. 
However, they enable a better understanding of how these impact particular 
communities and individuals at a more local level. The impacts of the NT2 have been 
felt both upstream of the dam around the Nakai Plateau, and downstream of the dam 
around the Xe Bang Fai (XBF).  
When examined from a human security perspective it is clear that the ability of 
people to satisfy their most basic health needs through access to nutritious food, 
clean air and water, and shelter have been compromised as a result of the building 
of the NT2. This means the most basic fundamentals of human security are being 
undermined. If we extend our understanding of human security to incorporate ideas 
described by Barnett and others, we find that the construction of the NT2 and its 
deleterious effects have increased vulnerability and decreased resilience for the 
people impacted by the dam. Their options have been severely limited in terms of 
being able to adapt in ways that suit them best. 
International and local NGOs are involved in challenging the claims made by the 
NTPC, World Bank and Asian Development Bank that the development of the NT2 
has been fairly compensated and is a win for Laotians in general. They highlight the 
destruction of livelihoods and the changes to the local ecosystem, but tend to base 
their arguments around positivist and economic claims. This is somewhat surprising 
given the broad human security and human rights literature from which they can 
possibly draw in order to make more normative claims.  
Yet on closer inspection, apart from the work of NGOs, it appears that there is an 
almost total absence of human security discourse in regards to hydropower 
construction in Southeast Asia. Although it would seem appropriate to discuss the 
importance of human security and hydropower in a variety of settings – given the 
scale of hydropower and its impacts throughout the region – no such discursive 
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framework is evident. A range of possible forums for such a discussion exist in 
Southeast Asia such as ASEAN, the ARF, the ADB, CSCAP, the MRC, the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and possibly even the 
GMS, yet even though the stakes appear so high and the numbers of people likely to 
be impacted by Mekong mainstream dams run into the millions, there is no evidence 
of a formal discussion of the relationship between human security and hydropower.  
Furthermore, the ‘ASEAN Way’ effectively precludes any discussion of human 
security because the negative human security outcomes are either due to the 
activities of one nation affecting the citizens of another nation – such as the Lancang 
Cascade, or an activity in one nation impacting upon its own citizens – for example 
the NT2. As a result of the ASEAN Way, hydropower construction is seen as a 
national economic activity. It is therefore not the right of one nation to question the 
activities of another given the principles of non-interference, peaceful settlement of 
disputes, and consensus decision-making. 
The first important finding in regards to security, the environment and hydropower 
dams in the MRB is that the relationship between traditional security and human 
security can be framed as the total dominance of one over the other. A series of 
structures including the ASEAN Way, the supremacy of the national security 
mindset, and the importance placed on the economic imperative of development, 
mean that individuals and communities are almost invisible at a political level. 
Despite there being abundant evidence of an evolving human security disaster as a 
result of hydropower construction in the MRB, there appears to be virtually no room 
for human security discourse.  
Homer-Dixon’s Methodological Framework 
Clearly the current understanding of the situation in regards to environmental 
security and Mekong hydropower is unsatisfactory. Given that Homer-Dixon’s 
framework focuses on the security implications of falls in the quality and quantity of 
renewable resources such as water, soil, fish and forests, it would be remiss of this 
thesis not to consider what insights it may provide. When discussing various types of 
environmental scarcity, Homer Dixon found two common patterns, “resource 
capture” and “ecological marginalisation”: 
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A fall in the quality and quantity of resources can combine with population growth to 
encourage powerful groups within society to shift resource distribution in their favour. 
This can produce dire environmental scarcity for poorer and weaker groups whose 
claims to resources are opposed by these powerful elites. I call this type of 
interaction ‘resource capture.’ Unequal resource access can combine with population 
growth to cause migrations to regions that are ecologically fragile, such as upland 
slopes, areas at risk of desertification, and tropical rainforests. High population 
densities in these areas, combined with a lack of knowledge and capital to protect 
local resources, causes severe environmental damage and chronic poverty. This 
process is often called ‘ecological marginalization.’708 
 
Figure 21:Homer-Dixon's Resource Capture and Ecological Marginalization 
If we consider these ideas in relation to the NT2, we can see that the Government of 
Laos (GoL) in association with the NTPC, has captured the resource of the Nam 
Theun River, and destroyed the ecosystem of the XBF, creating environmental 
scarcity for those who live in the XBF Basin. Losses have occurred in fisheries, 
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agricultural productivity and water quality. Upstream, citizens of the Nakai Plateau 
have been forced to move into what are ecologically fragile areas, unsuitable for 
agriculture which are having even more pressure put on them from continued 
population growth. The lack of knowledge and capital required to protect local 
resources has caused severe environmental damage to the surrounding 
conservation area, especially in terms of forestry, and this threatens chronic poverty 
through the lack of sustainable livelihoods.  
In relation to Mekong mainstream dams, the construction of dams is no doubt a form 
of resource capture. Both the waters and the sediment of the Mekong are being 
captured behind the many dam walls that have been and are currently being erected. 
The resource capture of the Mekong’s silt is a considerable challenge. This is 
particularly problematic for the Delta, in terms of its natural fertility as well as the 
potential increase in apparent sea-level rise. There is no doubt that this will have 
long term consequences on the productivity and habitability of the Delta and Tonle 
Sap, but these impacts are difficult to quantify and almost impossible to separate out 
from other ecological disruptions with local causes.  
Clearly there are synergies between Homer Dixon’s framework and the 
consequences of the construction of hydropower dams. There are two serious 
challenges, however. The first is that in Homer-Dixon’s model, resource capture and 
ecological marginalisation occur after a fall in the quality and quantity of a renewable 
resource – that is to say, after resource scarcity has occurred. The challenge here is 
that – in Laos at least – water is not a scarce resource. In fact it is the abundance of 
water that appears to be motivating Laotian elites and resource companies to 
capture this valuable resource and transform it into energy. This is why de Soysa 
counter’s the ‘resource scarcity’ thesis with the ‘resource abundance’ theory.709 He 
claims that it is resource abundance that is at the heart of most conflicts over 
resources. As Deligiannis points out, however, “(t)his is a false dichotomy”710. It is 
the fact that resources are scarce elsewhere that creates the demand for the 
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abundant resources. In the case of the MRB, it is the growing demand for energy, 
particularly in China and Vietnam that is driving the all-out push to capture the hydro-
resources of the Mekong. So despite de Soysa’s ‘honey-pot’ assertions, the theory of 
resource scarcity appears to have some validity in the MRB.   
The most obvious problem for Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity and violent 
conflict (ESVC) framework as far as the MRB is concerned, is the absence of violent 
conflict. This was pointed out in the methodology section of this thesis, highlighting 
that in regards to the ESVC framework, the case of the Mekong is a negative one. 
As the evidence above suggests, there are strong links between Homer-Dixon’s 
theory of resource scarcity, resource capture and ecological marginalisation. 
However, the dependant variable of violent conflict is not evident. In many respects, 
it is the lack of violent conflict in the face of these pressures that makes the case 
interesting – although this is far from the only important point of investigation. It must 
be noted that it is possible that the growing ecological and social crisis occurring as a 
result of the scarcities caused by hydropower construction in the MRB is in fact the 
precursor to a wave of large-scale migrations, state-instability and civil-strife that 
may lead to widespread violent conflict.711 If so, the case study of the Mekong will 
provide some powerful qualitative data for future ESVC researchers. Whether this 
occurs or not, as it currently stands, there is no violent conflict which leads to the 
conclusion that we need better ways of understanding the relationship between the 
environment and security in the MRB. 
Dalby and Critical Ecology 
Before moving on to examine what light Systemic Environmental Security sheds on 
our understanding of security in the Mekong, we must also consider the approach of 
Dalby’s critical ecology. In general, Dalby’s approach to environmental security is at 
the macro level and he is particularly interested in how the global economy impacts 
upon biospherical processes. His theoretical concepts, in particular, the concepts of 
the Anthropocene and Empire, provide insight into the security situation in the MRB.  
Clearly, both hydropower construction in general and, from the point of view of this 
thesis, hydropower construction in the MRB, are contributing to the global changes 
that are occurring as part of the Anthropocene. As Dalby suggests, “civilisation does 
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things to nature in the process of doing things to itself”712. The massive structures of 
the Nuozhadu and Xiaowan dams in particular, could be described as terraforming 
projects given the radical ecological changes that they cause in their immediate 
surrounds and in distant locations such as the Delta and Tonle Sap. Within a 
decade, the ecological destruction wrought by the totality of Mekong dams on both 
the mainstream and its tributaries is likely to disrupt the environmental services of 
the MRB to such an extent that it will be barely recognisable as the river system that 
existed before hydropower construction. Instead, it will be a fragmented ecosystem, 
divided into state allocated boundaries, blocked in scores of places by large 
infrastructure projects that are built by state and commercial interests, designed to 
transform water into energy. Seventy-five per cent of the Mekong’s silt will be held 
behind dam walls and the once flowing river will be reduced to a holding pond in 
many places. The destruction to the livelihoods of those who have relied on the 
Mekong’s ecosystem services for generations is difficult to comprehend. As Dalby 
suggests, living in the Anthropocene means that “we are actively shaping our 
vulnerabilities”713. 
To some extent the theory of Empire also applies, in which ecosystem people pay 
the price for the lifestyles of biosphere people. Globalised production and distribution 
networks mean that risk and harm is shifted to the periphery (ecosystem people) 
while the benefits are distributed to the core (biosphere people). In the case of this 
thesis, the NT2 is a good example of this principle in action. Indicative of this is the 
fact that only five per cent of the power from the NT2 is distributed to Laos, whereas 
the remaining ninety-five per cent is sent to Thailand. From the perspective of 
Empire, the villagers of the Nakai Plateau have been removed from their ancestral 
homes so that Thai children can charge their iPods. The fisheries of the XBF have 
been destroyed so that the many neon lights of Bangkok can continue to shine 
brightly. Furthermore, the profits from the NT2 are not redistributed to villagers from 
the Nakai Plateau and the XBF who have paid the price in terms of destruction of 
their livelihoods and permanent disruption to their lives, but are instead dispersed 
internationally to France, Italy and Thailand. The revenue that stays in Laos is held 
by the central government and it is clear from both the level of governmental 
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corruption and the conditions on the ground around the NT2 affected areas, that 
even within Laos there is little, if any, fair distribution of the profits of the NT2 to 
those who have had their vulnerability increased as a result of the dam.  
The links between the theme of Empire and the NT2 are further strengthened when 
we consider that a project such as the NT2 would never be countenanced in 
Thailand. The social and political ramifications of the disastrous Pak Mun dam are 
still being felt there, to the extent that the sluice gates of the dam are now opened for 
four months of the year and there are growing calls for its decommissioning.714 The 
strength of civil society in Thailand – in regards to Thai hydropower at least – is such 
that any new hydropower projects within the borders of Thailand are fraught with 
political risk. Yet Thai hydro companies are not only involved with the NT2, but also 
the Jinhong and Xayaburi mainstream dams.  
An insight into the mindset that drives these actions can be gained by considering 
Dalby’s suggestion that ‘environment’ is a colonial construction:  
Premised on the extraordinary modern assumption that divisions between humanity 
and the rest of the biosphere are a useful ontological starting point the term 
environment has come to encompass the definition of the part of ‘nature’ that 
provides the backdrop for human affairs.715 
The environment, therefore, is something ‘out there’ to be controlled and 
apportioned. In relation to security, this has led to “the traditional focus on control by 
dividing up the world into spaces that could be policed by actual or threatened 
violence”716. In the MRB, it is an unquestioned – and apparently unquestionable – 
assumption that states not only control their own part of the river, but have the right 
to do with it as they wish. The ASEAN Way perpetuates and reinforces such a 
mindset. The GoL’s attitude to the waters of the Nam Theun River – and their section 
of the Mekong mainstream – follows this logic. Water, like coal, is a resource waiting 
to be transformed into energy and exported for foreign currency. It is simply a matter 
of turning an external environmental resource into a quantifiable economic return.  
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Dalby’s ideas of the Anthropocene and Empire shed light on the national security, 
state-oriented mindset. This mindset dominates, not only in Laos, but throughout the 
MRB and it facilitates the state-mandated capture and sale of the natural resources 
of the Mekong. These actions clearly come with negative human security 
implications but, once again, individuals and communities appear to be invisible, or 
at least shrouded by economic priorities. On the other hand, the principle of ecology 
seems to align itself with human security concerns in the MRB and provides an 
alternative discourse of hydropower.  
Divided Perspectives of Environment and Security in the Mekong 
The four perspectives above provide an overview of the way that current security 
thinking perceives security in relation to hydropower in the MRB. The majority of the 
traditional security views described in Chapter Four do not attempt to come to grips 
with the way that the state and the environment interact, nor how negative 
environmental outcomes may impact on national and economic security in any 
meaningful way. In Southeast Asia it would appear that traditional security thinking at 
a policy level is not attempting to incorporate even a basic level of understanding in 
regards to environmental security. In a similar fashion the human security discourse 
in the MRB tends not to engage with the more theoretical notions of human security. 
Nor does it appear to be effective at gaining attention at the policy level in regards to 
the links between the environment, human security and the state or institutions 
(securitisation). In regards to 
the ESVC framework, there 
are clearly links surrounding 
environmental scarcities and 
resource capture. The obvious 
problem is that there is an 
absence of violent conflict, the 
dependent variable for the 
model. Finally, the critical 
ecology approach 
demonstrates that significant 
costs of hydropower are being 
shifted onto the poorest while Figure 22: ESS Divisions and the MRB 
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the benefits are being transferred elsewhere.  
Each of these views has its own value but when drawn together to analyse a single 
problem they help to highlight the disparate notion of environmental security studies 
(ESS) (see figure 22). Understanding the role of states in the capture and 
exploitation of hydropower in the MRB is clearly important to any security analysis, 
yet an approach that favours only state security is obviously doing more harm than 
good. Highlighting the importance of human security to the security environment in 
the MRB is of crucial importance, yet the issue continues to be ignored at a policy 
level. The ESVC framework provides valuable insights, yet its focus on violent 
conflict weakens it conceptually in cases such as the MRB where there is none. 
Critical ecology provides valuable insights in regards to state attitudes and actions 
towards the environment and human security. Yet it is unclear how this complex and 
highly theoretical conceptualisation can have an impact upon policy in a region 
where policymakers are clearly not engaged with even a basic level of environmental 
or social theory. 
It appears that environmental security has an important role to play in understanding 
the security environment in the MRB in relation to hydropower development. 
Unfortunately, the divided nature of ESS hinders a discourse that might be 
constructive in addressing the growing insecurity that is occurring as a result of 
hydropower construction. The next section takes steps towards addressing this 
situation by forwarding SES as a more united way of understanding environmental 
security. 
Section 2: Systemic Environmental Security in the MRB 
In order to put forward the argument that Systemic Environmental Security (SES) is 
a potentially valuable tool for understanding the security issues in the MRB, several 
things have needed to initially occur. Firstly, Chapter Three outlined the theoretically 
disparate nature of ESS and posited that a more coherent approach could be gained 
by conceptualising ESS in a systemic way. Instead of pitching human security 
against state security, SES proposes that the two are related when viewed through 
the lens of the environment. Secondly, in order to understand what value SES may 
have to security studies, Chapters Four and Five provided an empirical context: 
hydropower development in the MRB. Finally, the section above provided an 
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overview of what insights the main approaches to ESS afford when analysing the 
situation in the MRB.  
These three accomplishments provide a foundation from which to argue that: a) 
hydropower development in the MRB is creating – and will increasingly create – a 
range of security issues; b) due to the splintered nature of ESS and the dominant 
state-focused mindset in the MRB, environmental security issues are poorly 
understood, and; c) as a result, a more coherent understanding of the way that the 
environment interacts with security in relation to hydropower development in the 
MRB is required. This section therefore explores the unique insights provided by 
SES in relation to hydropower development in the MRB. The section is broken into 
two, initially focusing on the macro environment examining the Lancang Cascade. 
The micro examination will follow this, exploring the relevance of SES to the 
construction of the NT2.    
The Lancang Cascade and Systemic Environmental Security 
Security studies often focus on who or what is the referent of security. In Chapter 
Three it was noted that a Systemic Environmental Security perspective instead 
investigates the security relationship between the state, the environment and human 
security. An SES approach is therefore focused on how the various parts of the 
system impact upon each other to enhance or degrade security and what actions, 
attitudes and/or policies are appropriate for enhancing security and circumventing 
insecurity. In regards to the Lancang Cascade therefore, there are three main 
considerations including: the relationship between states and the environment; the 
relationships between states and other states; and the relationship between states 
and human security. 
States and the Mekong System 
As Chapter Four demonstrated, the driving force behind hydropower development in 
the MRB is the economic imperative of nation-building underpinned by the dominant 
security paradigms of realism and liberal institutionalism. This has led to a powerful 
combination of the principle of non-interference in the affairs and actions of other 
states with a mentality that views decisions over environmental matters as 
sovereign. The first consequence of this is that the transboundary, geopolitically 
connected ecological system of the Mekong River is viewed in reference to national 
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boundaries, and the exploitation of its resources is encouraged but subject to no 
oversight or consultation outside of the exploiting state.  
This attitude towards the Mekong is typical of state attitudes towards non-renewable 
resources such as mineral and hydrocarbon deposits. The geographically fixed 
nature of non-renewable resources means that international norms allow for the 
exploitation of resources such as oil, gas, coal and diamonds within the confines of a 
state’s borders. This attitude towards non-renewable resources is being applied by 
nation states (N) to the renewable and trans-boundary environmental resources (ER) 
of the MRB; resources such as water, silt and fish (see figure 23).  
 
Figure 23: State-based approach towards the environmental resources of the MRB 
What SES indicates however is that dividing the Mekong along state boundaries is 
both artificial and harmful because the MRB is a complex and interconnected 
ecosystem. The waters of the Mekong River flow from the Tibetan Plateau to the 
Vietnam Delta. The Delta’s silt flows from all of the Mekong’s tributaries as well as 
from the Tibetan Plateau. The many fish species and the multitude of fish in the 
Mekong and its tributaries often migrate hundreds of kilometres, paying no heed to 
state boundaries, but relying on the seasonal water flows to trigger spawning. 
Additionally, agriculture and livelihoods rely on the environmental processes and 
services of the system. From an SES perspective therefore, it is inappropriate to 
think of the environmental resources of the Mekong as partitioned and belonging to 
each state. Instead, the Mekong is a complex and interconnected system that is 
shared by a number of states who all benefit from it in a variety of ways. These 
benefits have been enjoyed by millions for millennia because it is a complex and 
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functioning ecosystem. This contradicts economic arguments that hydropower 
development is a positive outcome. This can only be considered the case if the 
Mekong is seen as large deposit of water, and that in transforming that water into 
electricity there are no negative externalities. A systemic view of the Mekong sees it 
as not only a Chinese water source to service the Lancang Cascade, but also as a 
source of water, silt, fish, agriculture, transport, subsistence, livelihoods and a 
foundations for economic activity for the other riparian nations.  
The capture of half of the Mekong’s silt load by the Lancang Cascade and the 
changes in water flow that are occurring as a result of the 40 km3 of water withheld 
by the dams has created a phenomenal strain on the system both immediately and 
in the long-term. The realist fiction that the resources of the MRB can be divided 
between and exploited by each individual state (see figure 23) was able to continue 
as long as the activities of one state did not impinge on the activities of another. The 
Lancang Cascade changed this dynamic by fundamentally changing the system, not 
only within the borders of China, but as far away as the Vietnamese Delta and the 
Cambodian Tonle Sap. The dominant national security mindset that resists a rules 
based governance of the MRB has no way of resolving this issue given the strong 
position taken that states should not interfere in the affairs of other states.  
Systemic Environmental Security and MRB Riparian Relations 
The result is that although states downstream of the Lancang Cascade may be 
unhappy about the effects the dams are having on the river as a whole, they are 
trapped in a mode of international relations that has no scope for dissent. SES 
provides an alternative perspective from which to understand the situation. In 
regards to the shared renewable resources of the Mekong, such as water and silt, 
where the resource is dynamic – as opposed to static – flowing through the 
sovereign borders of several nation states, the relationship between the states who 
share this resource has physical properties. Relationships between states are 
usually thought of in terms of international relations, trade, tensions, treaties and 
other non-tangible or ideational ways. These relations are managed through political, 
business, cultural and personal means. States may share borders and these can be 
secured by military or para-military forces, or they can be reasonably porous – or 
anything in between. The physical connection between states is therefore generally 
understood in terms of a shared border. However, if we think of the MRB as a single 
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interconnected ecosystem, linked from its source, through its tributaries and main 
stem all the way to the Delta, then we realise that the connection between Mekong 
riparians surpasses that of a traditionally understood shared border (see figure 24) 
Each riparian state is physically linked through the system of the Mekong with the 
other states in the system.  
MRB riparians, therefore, are directly linked – at least on Mekong related issues – 
through their relationship with the environment. A national security, state-boundary 
oriented perception of security has hindered the nations that share the resources of 
the Mekong from recognising that each has an interest in ensuring that the system is 
healthy and intact. It has also hindered states from recognising that disruption to the 
environmental services of the system in one state, has knock-on effects in other 
states. This has implications for the non-interference principle. If states are able to 
shift their understanding of their relationship to the Mekong from that of Figure 23, to 
that of Figure 24, then they are able to realise not only that they are connected to 
their riparian neighbours in a real and meaningful way, but also that severe 
disruption to one part of the system ultimately leads to disruption in other parts.717 
This means that the overexploitation of the system within the boundaries of one 
nation-state is effectively a breach of the unwritten rule that states are not to interfere 
in the affairs of another state.  
 
Figure 24: SES perspective of links between Mekong Riparians and the Mekong System 
At first glance, this is what Hardin described as a “tragedy of the commons” where a 
series of actors, all of who have access to a common resource, seek to maximise 
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 Goh, "Developing the Mekong," 57. 
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their gains from that resource.718 Hardin describes a group of herdsman who 
continue to add cattle to their herd in order to maximise the returns from a shared 
field. This, according to Hardin is a rational act, but the eventual outcome is a 
tragedy: “Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of 
the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”719. This assumption is 
grounded firmly in a Malthusian logic of diminishing resources in the face of a 
growing population.720  
                                                          
718
 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, no. 3859 (1968). 
719
 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons." 
720
 See also: Garrett Hardin, "Extensions of" The Tragedy of the Commons"," Science 280, no. 5364 (1998). 
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Figure 25: “Tragedy of the Commons” - Collapse of environmental resources over time  
Applying this logic to the Mekong’s resources we would observe that the MRB 
riparian states draw down the resources of the Mekong, maximising their own gains, 
until the point at which the resource or resources collapse (see figure 25).  
Growing populations would mean that the pressure on fisheries, for example, would 
see increased catches occurring even as the stock declines until the point at which 
the fishery or fisheries throughout the basin collapse. In general, however, this has 
not been the case, and the abundant fisheries of the Mekong have, over a long 
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period, been self-managed by those who live on and around the Mekong’s waters.721 
When fisheries have collapsed, it has almost always been in relation to the 
construction of hydropower projects.722  
But Systemic Environmental Security gives a clearer insight into this issue in regards 
to the complexity of a transboundary ecosystem like the Mekong. We know that the 
benefits and risks of the exploitation of the resources of the Mekong are unevenly 
distributed over the length of the river. What we have in reality looks more like figure 
26 because the Lancang Cascade creates non-linear impacts on the system of the 
Mekong. 
 
Figure 26: SES perspective on impacts of the Lancang Cascade 
It is not a matter of all actors seeking to maximise their own gains, but instead a 
single actor withdrawing inequitably from and putting great pressure on the larger 
ecosystem of the MRB. This is also not due to overpopulation – as per Hardin – but 
of industrial enterprise designed to benefit one nation state, doing so at the expense 
of other nations.  
Shifting the perspective from that of figure 23 to that of figure 24, enables national 
governments to understand more clearly that the Mekong works as a system and is 
better understood in terms of its ecological processes than through the division of 
national boundaries. This then enables an understanding that damage or significant 
changes to the system within the national borders of one state, literally has flow-on 
                                                          
721
 Ostrom’s Game Theory approach to Common Pool Resources demonstrate that this is not an unusual 
occurrence. See: Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
722
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effects to other parts of the system and other states. An SES perspective contradicts 
the national security rhetoric that what one nation state does within the confines of its 
own borders is strictly its own business. In the case of the Mekong generally, and 
more specific the Lancang Cascade, the national security logic is clearly flawed.  
This knowledge leads to the understanding that changes wrought on the system of 
the Mekong by the Lancang Cascade is not only inequitable, but that it is damaging 
to other nations in a variety of ways. SES therefore provides an alternative security 
framework through which MRB riparians can understand mainstream hydropower 
development. It also provides a discourse that steps outside of the simplistic national 
security mentality that dominates in the region, making ground for Mekong riparians 
to take issue with nations whose actions impact upon the system that links them all. 
In this sense it encourages and enables Mekong riparians to reimagine and rescript 
their relationships in recognition of their linkages through the Mekong system, which 
could bolster support for a move towards a more rules based governance system of 
the Mekong through minor relinquishments of autonomy. In this way, it is not a 
matter of either/or but all: security is gained not by one nation securing the resources 
of the Mekong within the confines of its own borders and at the expense of others, 
but instead by the careful and shared exploitation (or preservation) of the resources 
in an equitable fashion between all the Mekong’s riparians.  
States and Human Security 
The section above explored the relationship between states by considering the 
Mekong as a system, however one of the main concerns of this thesis surrounds the 
relationship between national or state security and human security through the lens 
of the environment (see figure 27). 
Figure 27: Links between the state, the environment, and human security 
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The disregard of national and regional policymakers for human security issues, as 
they relate to hydropower development in the Mekong, and more specifically the 
Lancang Cascade, indicates that states are either ignorant of, or indifferent to the 
relationship that exists between the state and human security. This is linked to the 
national security mindset that fails to conceptualise the relationship between states, 
the system of the Mekong, and other states. If states believe that what they do within 
the confines of their national boundaries only affects them, then any human security 
concerns they may have are only in relation to their own citizens within their own 
borders. Whether these citizens are treated with respect or disdain is up to the state 
whose actions are impacting on them due to the principle of non-interference.  
As observed in the introduction to Chapter Five, given the other pressures currently 
faced by the Delta and Tonle Sap, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what role the 
Lancang Cascade plays in these.723 What we do know, as has been detailed 
previously, is that the Lancang Cascade is withholding around ninety per cent of the 
silt load from the Chinese section of the river. We also know that the silt from China 
contributes at least fifty per cent of the silt that flows through and into the Delta. We 
know that this silt is crucial for agriculture as a natural fertiliser, for the height of the 
Delta relative to sea-level, for the health of the banks and beds of the river and the 
channels of the delta, and that the health of the banks and beds of the river is also 
crucial for fisheries. We also know that an enormously large number of people are 
reliant on the continuing services of the river for subsistence, livelihoods and other 
economic activities (see figure 28). 
Figure 28: Systemic Environmental Security and the Lancang Cascade 
                                                          
723
 A similar difficulty exists in global climate change debates about the role of climate change in severe 
weather events. It is known that climate change greatly increases the probability of severe weather events, but 
for any given event it is difficult to assign direct blame on climate change. 
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There are obviously links between the activities of Chinese state hydropower 
developers and the human security outcomes of people in the Delta and Tonle Sap. 
The Lancang Cascade is having an impact on the delta, but whether these affects 
are felt immediately or in years to come through decreasing productivity and a 
sinking delta, only time will tell. If we understand the Mekong as a system, and one 
that has been in existence for millennia, then whether the impacts are felt now or in 
the future, it still represents a driver of insecurity. In some ways this is similar to the 
threat posed by nuclear weapons, which – whether deployed or not – have the 
potential to destroy the lives of millions. It is somewhat different, however, in that 
until deployed, nuclear weapons are in most cases only a vague threat. In the case 
of the Lancang Cascade, the driver of insecurity has already been ‘deployed’ – it is 
only a matter of time until its impacts are felt.  
In a general sense then, SES provides a unique perspective on the relationship 
between states and human security. It demonstrates that the actions of a state within 
the confines of its own borders can have a significant negative impact on human 
security in another state when those actions affect a shared ecological system. How 
this operates in detail is unclear due to the macro level analysis provided in Chapter 
Four. It is also complicated by the difficulties that arise when attempting to isolate the 
impacts of the Lancang Cascade from other elements driving ecological degradation 
in the Delta and Tonle Sap. For this reason, we must now turn to the NT2 dam which 
provides a richer source of data on the links between hydropower construction and 
human security.  
The Nam Theun 2 and Systemic Environmental Security 
As with the previous section examining SES and the Lancang Cascade, this section 
is focused on the relationships between states, the environment, and human 
security. Whereas the previous section focused more significantly on the 
relationships between states and the environment, and the relationships between 
Mekong riparians states, this section – with its micro focus on the NT2 – is focused 
primarily on the actions of one state and its interactions with the environment and the 
security of its citizens. It is therefore more oriented towards human security. This 
section is therefore broken into three sections. Firstly it examines the relationship 
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between the state and the environment. Secondly it reviews the relationship between 
human security and the environment. Finally it examines the relationship between 
the state and human security, exploring what perspective SES brings on the 
intermediary effect of the environment.  
The State and the Environment: The GoL’s attitude to renewable resources  
The NT2 has been constructed in the context of the regional economic imperative of 
nation building and development as described in Chapter Four. It is, however, just 
one dam of twenty-three already constructed within the borders of Laos that are 
radically and rapidly changing the ecological make-up of its abundant waterways.724 
The GoL intends to construct or complete another thirty-one projects over the next 
decade, adding another 5,500 MW of output to the already installed capacity of 
3,200 MW. This is a significant development given that the mines and energy sector 
already attracts seventy per cent of foreign investment in Laos and makes-up 
seventy-five per cent of all exports.725   
The attitude of the GoL to its natural resources is in many ways an extension of the 
regional mindset that views nature, or the environment, as an external element to be 
managed and profited from. Water resources in particular are considered a dormant 
primary resource requiring transformation into energy in order to be exchanged for 
foreign income. The draft Policy on Sustainable Hydropower Development (PSHD) 
gives a clearer indication as to the GoL’s mindset towards hydropower development: 
“To achieve socio-economic sustainability, the government views hydropower 
development as a key export commodity which can also meet domestic electricity 
needs, contribute to national socio-economic development and national security as 
well as improve the living conditions of the people”726. This explicitly draws links 
between hydropower development, economic development and national security. As 
the Laotian Industry and Commerce Minister, Nam Viyaketh, said in 2010: “If all 
                                                          
724
 "Hydropower Major Revenue Earner for the Country " Vientiane Times, January 30, 2015: 
http://www.vientianetimes.org.la/Business/Business_Hydropower.htm. 
725
 "Hydropower Major Revenue Earner." 
726
 "Policy for Sustainable Hydropower Development Being Revised," Vientiane Times, December 31, 2013: 
http://www.vientianetimes.org.la/FreeContent/FreeConten_Policy%20for.htm. 
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sources of energy can be developed, Laos can become the battery of Southeast 
Asia…We can sell our energy to our neighbours. Laos can be rich”727.  
Arguments for hydropower that emanate from a nationalistic and economic mindset 
are based on the belief that the negative social and environmental aspects of 
hydropower can be easily compensated for and/or mitigated. This belief is not only in 
regards to Mekong tributary projects, but even extends to mainstream dams.728 The 
World Bank’s Economic Analysis of the Environmental and Social Impacts of the 
Nam Theun 2, completed in 2005, claimed that “all known potential adverse impacts 
of the project (to the XBF) will be for the most part if not completely mitigated or 
compensated for”729. The same report gave a list of six positive impacts to the lives 
of those impacted on the Nakai Plateau including poverty alleviation, health and 
education, cultural and ethnic diversity, habitat and biodiversity, medicine and 
bioprospection, and carbon resequestration. It included only one negative impact: 
increased population causing pressure on the resources of the plateau.730   
An SES perspective indicates that this purely economic mindset misunderstands or 
ignores the importance of the social and cultural context. It also highlights that this 
singular economic perspective demonstrates serious ecological ignorance as it 
grossly underestimates the complexity of the ecological systems that are impacted 
by hydropower, and the flow-on effects and downward spirals that can occur when 
resources are stressed or depleted.731 Nevertheless, the pre-construction literature 
by international financial institutions (IFIs) consistently used economic figures that 
estimated damage and amounts to be compensated for using quantitative methods 
that failed to capture the way that livelihoods, economy and ecology interact.732 
Official GoL rhetoric on hydropower supports this position claiming that following the 
construction of a hydropower project, “other related sectors benefit with an increase 
in agriculture, irrigation, fisheries, industry, tourism and general services”733. This 
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 Ferrie, "Laos Turns to Hydropower to be 'Asia's Battery'." 
728
 "Managing the Mekong – No Longer a Wild, Natural River," Vientiane Times, July 31, 2014: 
http://www.vientianetimes.org.la/sub-new/Environment/Environment_Managing.htm. 
729
 Laplante, "Economic Analysis of NT2", 85. 
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 Laplante, "Economic Analysis of NT2", 49. 
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 McDowell, Scudder, and Talbot, "21A and 21B PoE Report", B8. 
732
 See: Laplante, "Economic Analysis of NT2"; ADB, "Summary EIA NT2"; "ADB Technical Assistance"; "Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic: Greater Mekong Subregion Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project – Social 
Safeguards Monitoring,"  (Manilla: Asian Development Bank, June 2008). 
733
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strongly contradicts the evidence presented by the example of the NT2 and a range 
of other dams. This rhetoric appears to stem from a highly optimistic point of view 
that fails to factor in worst-case-scenarios where hoped-for mitigations completely 
fail. As a consequence they also fail to capture the potential costs involved in 
rehabilitation, compensation, and losses to livelihoods if such worst case scenarios 
eventuate.  
By viewing the system in ecological rather than economic terms, SES is able to 
grasp not only that the river is a complex ecosystem, but that it also contributes in a 
variety of ways to the social and economic fabric of the Nakai Plateau and the XBF 
region. This systemic perspective suggests that the current national security 
perspective that views the nation’s water as a source of income for nation building, 
misses the importance of the many other benefits of the region’s hydro-resources. In 
failing to understand the importance of these resources, this simplistic economic 
approach fundamentally misunderstands that the costs of hydropower production are 
in fact much greater than the best-case modelling consistently portrays.734 Greater 
awareness of the complex and interactive nature of environmental resources within 
the region’s economy and communities would provide a very different framework in 
which to assess the relative merits of hydropower construction.  
The Construction of the NT2 and the Destruction of Human Security 
In the context of the rapid and widespread hydropower construction not only in the 
Mekong River Basin but across Asia more generally, the implementation of a 
livelihood adaptation program is both unusual and, from a human security 
perspective, desirable. What the case of the NT2 demonstrates, however, is that 
even with the best intentions of the IFIs, and a reasonably well established 
livelihoods program, the outcomes for those downstream of the dam are still poor. 
Chapter Five outlined the significant problems associated with both upstream and 
downstream impacts. 
Upstream, around 6,000 people were forced to relocate as a result of the flooding of 
the Nakai Plateau. The Nam Theun Power Company (NTPC) alongside the World 
                                                          
734
 A range of reports demonstrate this clearly in relation to the NT2. See: Blake, "Review of the NT2 EAMP"; 
Blake, "Adequacy of Compensation Measures XBF"; Theiss, "Reservoir Fisheries Predictions NT2"; Willing and 
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Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided compensation and mitigation 
measures for resettlers including new housing, sanitation, access to water, land for 
growing crops, irregular payments from the Village Forestry Association (VFA) and 
limited assistance for livelihood adaptation. These measures have proved useful in 
part, but there are still serious long-term concerns for ressettlers. Many of these 
problems revolve around food security. Although fisheries initially increased due to 
the “windfall catch”, they have steadily decreased as competition has continued for 
this important resource. The amount of allocated land is also a problem with 0.66 ha 
being allocated per family, without regard to the size of that family, the remoteness of 
the land, or the quality of the land for food production. Following the infilling of the 
dam, a mass culling of buffalo occurred decreasing the overall herd on the Plateau 
by fifty per cent. This had a double effect of impoverishing many resettlers who had 
previously invested their savings in buffalo. On top of this, the collapse of the VFA, 
due to unsustainable and illegal forestry practices, and the failure of the limited 
alternative livelihoods program has meant that the sustainability of livelihoods on the 
Nakai Plateau is tenuous at best.  
The more serious impacts in terms of ecological destruction and numbers affected 
have occurred downstream on the XBF. The change in flow of the XBF as a result of 
the diversion of almost the entire flow of the Nam Theun River has eroded 
riverbanks, destroyed riverbank gardens, decimated fisheries, and damaged 
irrigation pumps up and down the length of the XBF. The quality of the water has 
also significantly changed, impacting on potable water, the health of villagers and the 
quality of crops under irrigation. People’s relationship to the river has also drastically 
changed with many fearing to go in or near the river due to the risks of skin irritation 
and being swept away by the rapid flow even in the dry season. Although there has 
been limited compensation measures, these are clearly inadequate in comparison to 
the massive ecological changes wrought by the NT2. As a result livelihood options 
along the XBF have been greatly reduced. 
Systemic Environmental Security anticipates these problems. Clearly, it is neither 
reasonable nor sensible to divert almost the entire flow of one of the Mekong’s 
tributaries into another of the Mekong’s tributaries and expect anything other than an 
ecological and social disaster. Nor is it reasonable to expect anything other than the 
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same result when inundating an ecologically functioning plateau, turning it into a 
massive reservoir. A systemic perspective sees the many rivers of Laos as having 
value in a variety of ways. Residents of the Nakai Plateau and XBF have an intimate 
relationship with the Mekong’s tributaries that emanates from the systemic ecological 
services provided by these rivers. They eat fish caught in the rivers and sell the 
surplus to gain income; they drink and wash in the water; they use the water for 
irrigation; they plant crops in the banks during the dry season and sell the surplus at 
market; they use the rivers for transportation; and they have a unique culture and 
religion that is attuned to the seasonal ebb and flow of the rivers’ waters. For these 
people, the river is quite literally life.  
What clearly does not cross the minds of Laotian policy-makers is that the rivers 
within its borders are part of a large, interconnected, highly complex, transboundary 
ecosystem that, when vibrant and healthy, directly support the lives and livelihoods 
of hundreds of thousands of Laotians and millions of MRB residents with a social, 
cultural and economic value that is difficult to measure. Nor does it appear that 
Laotian policy-makers comprehend that, for those who rely on the waters of the 
Mekong and its tributaries for life and livelihoods, these waters are not an external 
environment to be tamed, controlled, subdued, and transformed into money. Instead 
they provide the basics of subsistence and life, underpin livelihoods, and provide the 
basis for the local economy. 
The GoL and Human Security: A Systemic Environmental Security 
perspective 
There are clear links between the national security mindset of the GoL and Laos’ 
environment. There are also clear links between human security and the ecological 
processes and services of Laos’ many rivers. It is painfully obvious, however, that 
Lao policymakers either do not understand the way that this links the state to human 
security –through the impacts of hydropower on the environment – or that they are 
deliberately ignoring these links. There is no obvious acceptance that what the state 
does to the environment undermines the official human development logic that 
justifies the construction of hydropower. Perceiving these issues from the 
perspective of Systemic Environmental Security, on the other hand, provides a clear 
and straightforward way of understanding the links between the state, the 
environment and human security. SES disputes the dominant logic in Laos that links 
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human security to economic development. Instead, it recognises the importance of 
local ecological processes and services to human security and, as a consequence, 
challenges the idea that the construction of hydropower increases the security of the 
state. Far from securing the state, an SES perspective suggests that both the 
security and the legitimacy of the state is undermined by the current rapid 
hydropower development in Laos. 
Understanding the way that the GoL views its relationship with human security is the 
key to understanding how it so significantly misses the links between the 
environment and the security of its citizens. Its main concerns revolve around 
poverty alleviation and attempting to move itself off the list of ‘least developed 
countries’ (LDCs). One of the key indicators that enable graduation from this list is to 
increase the average Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.735 GoL rhetoric 
therefore follows the logic that: a) national economic development is crucial for 
poverty alleviation; b) hydropower development is good for economic development; 
therefore c) hydropower development is good for poverty alleviation (see figure 
29).736 Official rhetoric clearly demonstrates this attitude. For example, national 
assembly member for Luang Prabang province, Mr Bountham Sengphansiri, said he 
supported the controversial Xayaburi dam “because he believed it would generate 
revenue for the country, helping to reduce poverty and fund development efforts”737. 
This is in line with statements within the GoL’s strategic plan to implement a national 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) regime which claims that 
hydropower is essential “for the GoL to meet its goal of reducing poverty and 
ensuring food security”738. Specifically related to the NT2 project, the Lao 
Department of Energy Policy and Planning states: “The Nam Theun 2 hydropower 
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 "Laos: Aiming to leave least developed country list." 
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 Jennifer Corinne Veilleux, "Is Dam Development a Mechanism for Human Security? Scale and Perception of 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia and the Xayaburi Dam on the Mekong 
River in Laos" (Oregon State University, 2014), 277. 
737
 "National Assembly Backs Xayaboury Dam," The National Assembly of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
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project in Lao PDR has improved living standards for families in the area, while 
providing a $2 billion revenue stream to fight poverty”739.  
 
Figure 29: GoL Human Security Improvement Logic 
This attitude is supported by development agencies and IFIs who, rather than 
framing the issue in terms of the negative consequences for human security, frame 
hydropower construction as contributing to poverty alleviation and development. 
Documents from IFIs consistently portray the dam as a large win for Laos and its 
ability to provide better national development and poverty alleviation outcomes.740 
For example, a 2005 World Bank Technical Brief described the project’s 
development objective: “to generate revenues that will be used to finance spending 
on priority poverty reduction and environmental programs in Lao PDR through 
environmentally and socially sustainable exploitation of NT2’s hydropower 
potential”741.  
The revenue from the NT2 is by no means insignificant for the GoL, estimated at 
US$2 billion over the twenty-five year concession period – worth around twenty per 
cent of Laos’s annual GDP at the time of construction.742 These figures are much 
more modest when considering that the annual contribution to government coffers is 
around US$80 million per year.743 Nevertheless, combined with the other seventy 
hydropower projects that are either operational, planned or under-construction, the 
hydropower sector is undoubtedly making a significant contribution to the economy 
of Laos. If we tentatively accept the GoL’s logic that economic development is linked 
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to poverty alleviation, then it indeed follows that hydropower development – which is 
good for economic development – is also good for poverty alleviation and human 
security.  
This logic can only be justified if the focus, rather than being on understanding the 
root causes of poverty and human insecurity, is instead on raising the economic 
bottom line. GDP per capita is increasing, from US$702 in 2007 to US$1,408 in 
2012, and for those that view development in econometric terms, this is a positive.744 
Unfortunately, GDP per capita – which is an average measure – tells us nothing of 
the way that national economic gains are either inequitably accumulated or evenly 
distributed. Although GDP per capita is on the increase, sixty-two per cent of 
Laotians were still living on less than US$2 a day in 2012, a drop of only six per cent 
since 2007.745 The average increase in GDP per person does not automatically 
translate into poverty reduction on the same scale. The increasing number of those 
involved in the agricultural sector – seventy-seven per cent of all Laotian households 
– and the steadily decreasing amount that agriculture is contributing to GDP is a 
clear indication that the benefits of economic growth are not being distributed 
evenly.746 
The argument that economic development is the precursor to poverty alleviation falls 
into a wider debate about whether human development is a prerequisite to human 
security.747 It has been argued that poverty increases the likelihood of conflict and 
also prevents the attainment of many human security goals associated with ‘freedom 
from want’ which can only be achieved through a certain level of human 
development.748 With regards to the NT2, Systemic Environmental Security provides 
a unique perspective in relation to this debate. SES recognises that the ecological 
services of the Nakai Plateau and XBF underpin the human security needs of those 
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who live in the region. It is an immense contradiction to suggest that the 
development of hydropower – which severely threatens and undermines the human 
security of locals – is needed in order to contribute to the poverty alleviation of those 
same people who are having their poverty increased as a result of hydropower 
construction.  The national development imperative that is, at least on paper, 
designed to improve the lives of Laotian citizens is in fact destroying their human 
security (see figure 30). 
 
Figure 30: Systemic Environmental Security Perspective of the Relationship between Hydropower 
Construction and Human Security in Lao PDR  
The assumption that poverty alleviation and development come from significant 
increases in revenue can only be accurate if: a) the activities that lead to revenue 
increases do not at the same time increase poverty and human insecurity and; b) 
that the revenue collected from those activities is distributed in an equitable and 
effective manner in which the majority of Laotians benefit and poverty is in fact 
alleviated. On the contrary, this rapid hydropower construction may be referred to as 
“hydro-industrialisation”749, but it is clear that it would be inaccurate to couch it in 
terms of poverty alleviation, human development or security. In regards to poverty 
alleviation, the long-term prospects on the Nakai Plateau for sustainable livelihoods 
is bleak and on the XBF, poverty has increased rather than decreased, with villagers 
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struggling to come to terms with the destruction of the ecological system that once 
provided them with their livelihoods.  
In regards to human development, hydro-developments – as opposed to other forms 
of industrialisation such as construction and manufacturing – bring with them few 
jobs. In the short term they provide some labour roles, but in the long term, very 
little.750 A recently released report from the World Bank found that although 
hydropower contributed around eighteen per cent of Laos’ GDP in 2013, it only 
provided 22,000 people with employment.751 As far as employment is concerned 
therefore, hydropower provides jobs for only 0.3 per cent of the Laotian 
population.752 Furthermore, the rapid hydropower construction is having a negative 
impact on other sectors such as manufacturing by putting upward pressure on both 
wages and the exchange rate.753 We must also consider that there is something 
perverse about using temporary local labour for the construction of hydropower 
projects. The same labourers are redundant after the project has been completed 
but have effectively participated in the construction of the source of their future 
insecurity. 
This is why the sustainable livelihoods question is so important – and the NT2 
Concession Agreement mentions it a total of thirty-seven times.754 If Laos is to 
alleviate poverty through so-called ‘development’ such as the NT2, it must at the 
very least ensure that the livelihoods of those impacted by these developments are 
not worse off or in jeopardy as a consequence. What is evident, however, is that 
between 120-150,000 Laotians are, on the whole, worse-off in terms of their 
livelihood prospects and human security outcomes as a result of the construction of 
the NT2. The extent of the problems downstream could easily be referred to as a 
crisis, given the chronic problems that are developing, and this should more 
accurately be referred to as “de-development”.755  
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Instead of poverty alleviation, development and increasing human security, what is 
actually occurring as a result of the NT2 is the accumulation of wealth by a relatively 
few elites within the GoL, leading to a form of resource capture as described by 
Homer-Dixon. The highly valuable resource of water transformed into hydropower is 
encouraging the state to capture and sell this resource with little or only token 
consideration of the problems that it creates for its own citizens. The growing 
disparity between rich and poor and the continued negative outcomes for rural 
households during a time of rapid national economic growth is concerning in that the 
economic growth and wealth production at the core is not making its way to the 
periphery. In regards to hydropower, this is of particular significance given that it is 
those in these rural areas who essentially bear the costs of the increasing national 
income.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, corruption is endemic throughout Laos and this 
is creating growing concerns in relation to the revenue created by the NT2 and other 
hydropower projects. The World Bank’s 2013 update on the progress of the NT2 
expressed concerns about how the revenues have been allocated, demonstrating 
the limitations in the accountability of this process.756 A 2014 investigation into 
corruption in Laos by Global Witness found a gap of US$150 million in the state 
coffers in just a two year period – equivalent to almost the entire revenue of the NT2 
over the same period.757 This is an extraordinary amount of money to be missing 
from a nation with a GDP of just over US$11 billion, with an average GDP per capita 
of US$1408 and sixty-two per cent of its citizens living on less than US$2 a day.  
Security and the NT2: A Systemic Perspective 
The above section demonstrates that the analytical framework of Systemic 
Environmental Security provides unique and key insights into the security situation in 
Lao PDR in relation to the construction of hydropower dams. The GoL claims that 
the construction of hydropower projects is primarily to raise revenue that can be 
used for poverty alleviation. Official rhetoric from the government and IFIs support 
this position. This attitude stems from a traditional understanding of security and 
economy that views the environment as a dormant external source of resources 
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waiting to be captured and transformed into revenue. The state has the ultimate 
control over the resources within its own borders and the sovereign right to exploit 
them as it sees fit.  
From this position, the state’s relationship with human security is one of economic 
paternalism. It is the role of the state to grow the economy as quickly as possible, 
gaining the maximum in foreign income from the resources at its disposal in order to 
distribute this money through poverty alleviation measures. Hydropower, which 
transforms the abundant water resources of Laos into foreign currency is the perfect 
candidate for gaining the much needed capital to distribute in this way. This attitude 
is summarised perfectly by the GoL’s Ministry of Energy and Mines, Department of 
Energy Business: “The Lao Government believes production and exports of 
hydropower will bring many benefits to the country. Primarily it will boost revenues, 
which can be used to alleviate poverty and improve the standard of living of the 
average Lao citizen”758. Inconveniences to a purported minority of citizens in this 
process is unfortunate, but necessary in order to meet the nation’s economic goals.  
In stark contrast, the perspective of Systemic Environment Security demonstrates 
that the state’s relationship to the environment has a direct impact on the relationship 
that its citizens have with the environment. In the case of the NT2, and across Laos 
more generally, a large proportion of Laotians rely on the nation’s environmental 
resources for their subsistence and livelihoods. Hydropower construction has serious 
negative impacts on the systems that provide these services. SES therefore 
fundamentally undermines the state’s rationale for hydropower construction by 
linking the activities of the state not with poverty alleviation, but poverty creation. 
Although hydropower construction may be increasing the revenues of the state, 
there is little evidence that this money is making its way back to the people affected 
by hydropower developments.  
SES brings to light the inherent contradiction that results from the GoL’s continued 
hydropower development. Using hydropower, which is creating and increasing 
poverty, as a tool for alleviating poverty is clearly logically unsound. For the GoL’s 
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poverty alleviation logic to be effective, it must both focus on the long-term 
replacement of the livelihoods of those who have lost them due to hydropower 
construction and provide financial support in perpetuity for those who have been 
impacted until such time as their livelihood prospects are equal to or greater than 
what they were before the construction of the dam. The compensation measures 
attached to the NT2 construction go some way to achieving this but fall far short of 
what is necessary to mitigate livelihood losses. 
A systemic perspective provides a clearer understanding of this situation because it 
provides greater temporal context to the current hydropower construction on the 
Mekong and its tributaries. The system itself was in existence millennia before the 
Westphalian concept of nation states was conceived and has functioned effectively 
over time to provide subsistence, livelihoods, transport and economy for those who 
live in the MRB. Previous to the modern adoption of the idea of nation states in 
continental Southeast Asia, the region was divided into kingdoms and tribes, divided 
by ethnicity and language groups.759 This culturally heterogeneous situation allowed 
for the flourishing of cultural and economic centres from Luang Prabang in the north 
to Siem Reap in the south. European settlement changed this to a degree but it was 
the arrival of Communism and the twentieth century Indochinese wars that solidified 
the idea of national borders, firmly separating one nation from the other. The most 
significant challenge in terms of a systemic approach has been the concentration of 
power over the state in the hands of a small elite. 
The case of the NT2 demonstrates that putting state security above the environment 
and human security, actually undermines the security of the state unless the state is 
described very narrowly. Only if the state is understood as the central government, 
and security is understood in terms of national economic growth and wealth creation 
for government elites, could hydropower construction in Laos be considered to 
increase security. If the citizens of the country are to be considered part of the state, 
then the continued narrow focus on transforming the water resources of the nation 
into hydropower is clearly undermining the security of the state through negative 
outcomes associated with human security. In regards to national security and human 
security in Laos, therefore, it is not either/or but both. SES affords this perspective by 
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providing the analytical and conceptual link between state security and human 
security through the bridge of the environment. By conceptualising the relationship 
between the state and the environment, and by understanding the relationship 
between human security and the environment, we are able to understand the 
relationship between the state and human security in ways that transcend traditional 
conceptualisations. This is the unique contribution of Systemic Environmental 
Security. 
It is evident that the social contract is broken in Laos. Government actions are 
harming its own citizens, and creating deep insecurity and vulnerabilities in the name 
of helping them. The GoL is counting on continued economic growth based on 
ongoing demand for the energy produced by its hydropower developments. 
Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that they are not restructuring the Laotian 
economy to provide jobs and transition the economy towards true sustainable 
growth.760 This makes hydropower development something of a zero-sum game 
where the costs for these developments are paid for by the loss of ecological 
services and livelihoods nationwide.  
Of greatest concern in relation to this is the over-reliance on the hydropower sector 
for the security of both the state and its citizens. As more and more hydropower 
dams are constructed, and more and more ecological destruction occurs, many more 
Laotians will lose the means of subsistence and their traditional livelihoods. This 
makes them more reliant on the government and its hydropower revenue. The 
problem is that if the price of energy drops due to a glut of supply, or economic 
perturbations occur such as the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 the demand for 
energy may decrease significantly. There is also the risk that Chinese hydropower 
production can undercut the price of Laotian energy by a significant margin.761 If 
issues such as demand side problems or competition that significantly reduces the 
profit margin to the GoL, then it will struggle to provide the financial support that is so 
crucial for its citizens who have lost their livelihoods and means of subsistence. In 
such an event, instead of being able to rely on the ecological services that have 
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been provided by the rivers of Laos for generations, many Laotians will be doubly 
vulnerable, from both the destruction of their local ecosystems and the economic 
losses being faced by their government. This being the case, it is evident that a 
much more precautionary approach is required when constructing hydropower dams. 
A great deal more thought must go into the potential negative consequences of 
hydropower and how this impacts upon the security of Laotian citizens.  
The Mekong as a System 
Before concluding the chapter it is important to return to the context of the MRB as a 
whole. As should be abundantly clear in such a study, the MRB is more than its main 
stem and a tributary. The idea of splitting the case study into a macro and micro view 
was to firstly facilitate an understanding of the wide ranging impacts of hydropower, 
and secondly, to understand what the impacts of hydropower construction look like 
at the level of the village and individual.  
These two examples of hydropower development are indicative of the overall 
situation in the MRB. It also helps us to look forward in time as this understanding 
gives some idea of what is at stake in regards to Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) 
mainstream dams. Currently eleven dams are planned for the LMB mainstream and, 
in combination with the Lancang Cascade, these will withhold a staggering seventy-
five per cent of total sediment from the Delta.762 Even more controversially, a second 
cascade is now under construction in the upper reaches of the Lancang River. This 
will add another 9,765 MW of capacity: close to the combined output of the massive 
Xiaowan and Nuozhadu Dams. Around 100,000 people will be displaced as a result 
of both of the Chinese cascades.763 The effect of the Lancang dams and the LMB 
mainstream dams will be to effectively turn the length of the Mekong into a holding 
pond for hydropower production. 
Then there are the tributaries. The NT2 impacts upon two of the Mekong’s 
tributaries, the Nam Theun and the Xe Bang Fai. As explained in the methodology, 
the choice to use the NT2 as the micro case was due to the (relatively) large amount 
of available data. The potential subject matter was abundant, however, with at least 
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forty-one dams already built or under construction on the tributaries, and an 
additional thirty-one dams planned over the next two decades.764  
 
Several dams have already been mentioned in previous chapters in regards to the 
severity of their impacts on the livelihoods of villagers, including the Pak Mun and 
Yali Falls and the dams. A report released by International Rivers in 2008 provided 
11 case studies of dams in Laos, detailing the negative impacts of hydropower 
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projects on at least 590,000 Laotians, nearly 10% of the Laotian population.765 Each 
case details a familiar litany of complaints including fisheries’ losses, water quality 
decreases, food security issues and little, if any, compensation. Since the release of 
this report, hydropower construction has continued at a rapid rate.  
The overall number of individuals and villages affected by hydropower construction 
in the Mekong is difficult to estimate. The trouble is that Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) are often so lacking in detail that it is virtually impossible to 
determine the downstream impacts. The Xayaburi Dam is a case-in-point. Although it 
is the first mainstream dam to be constructed, and threatens to block the vital 
mainstream fish passages, its EIA only assesses impacts of the dam one kilometre 
downstream and twenty-two kilometres upstream.766 This is a severe oversight given 
what is known about the importance of long distance fish migration on the 
mainstream and the impacts of withholding silt from the delta.  
What we do know is that around sixty million people live in the LMB. Of these, 
twenty-five million live in a fifteen kilometre corridor on either side of the mainstream 
and over three-quarters of these live within five kilometres of the river.767 This 
includes seventeen million living in the Delta and at least another 1.7 million on and 
around the Tonle Sap – the two areas that are known to be most vulnerable from 
mainstream dam construction.768 In regards to the Tonle Sap, forty per cent of 
Cambodians rely on the lake as a source of subsistence and income, and fish 
provides seventy-five per cent of protein for rural Cambodians.769 In the Delta, over 
half of all employment is water-resource related and in Laos, seventy per cent of all 
rural households rely on fishing for their livelihoods. Across the basin, sixty per cent 
of the population have water related occupations.770 In short, the river, its tributaries 
and the ecosystem services they provide are a vital source of food security and 
livelihoods for tens of millions. A plethora of reports have demonstrated the negative 
                                                          
765
 Lawrence, "Power Surge". 
766
 Eric Baran et al., "Review of the fish and fisheries aspects in the feasibility study and the environmental 
impact assessment of the proposed Xayaburi dam on the Mekong mainstream," in Report prepared for the 
WWF Greater Mekong (Hanoi: WWF, 2011), 13. 
767
 "MRC SOB 2010", 47. 
768
 Marko Keskinen et al., "Exploring Tonle Sap Futures: Baseline results from hydrological and livelihood 
analyses,"  (Amsterdam: VU University, 2011), 5. 
769
 "MRC SOB 2010", 49. 
770
 "MRC SOB 2010", 48-49. 
 
 
241 | P a g e  
 
impacts that have and will occur to the MRB’s ecosystem services as a result of the 
construction of dams, yet construction continues at a rapid pace.771 For example, if 
dam building continues unabated, the “reduced suspended load will have significant 
implications for the transport of nutrients which naturally fertilize the Tonle Sap 
system and 23,000 – 28,000 km2 of floodplain in Cambodian (sic) and Viet Nam, as 
well as de‐stabilising the river channels, floodplains and coastline of the Mekong 
Delta”.772 This has a direct impact on the productivity of fisheries and a knock on 
effect to the large number of Cambodians and Vietnamese reliant on these areas for 
their livelihoods and subsistence. 
The point here is that the case study chapters are, in effect, a snapshot of the whole 
system. It is not possible to go into the kind of detail required to list every dam 
currently in operation – and the individuals and communities that they impact, or 
every dam that is under construction and planned – and the people they are likely to 
affect, but it is important to keep in mind the overall context of the large system of the 
MRB and the large numbers of people that are being impacted in very serious ways 
by the unwavering construction of hydropower.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the value of the analytical framework of Systemic 
Environmental Security by exploring four key insights: the relationships between 
states and the environment; the relationships between states and other states; the 
relationship between human security and the environment and; the relationship 
between the state and human security. The Lancang Cascade provided useful data 
as to the relationship between states and the environment.  The case of the NT2 
also demonstrated that nations, specifically Laos, view the water resources within 
their own borders as economic commodities rather than ecological systems. SES 
challenged the dominant mindset in the MRB that divides shared resources along 
state boundaries and treats the environment as an external, dormant resource to be 
captured and transformed into energy. The Lancang Cascade also provided insights 
into the relationship between states and other states when the MRB is conceived of 
as a system rather than simply divided along state boundaries. An SES perspective 
provides a platform that allows states to re-envisage their relationships in regards to 
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the Mekong, suggesting that more cooperative approaches to the resources and 
ecological processes of the Mekong are crucial. 
The NT2 case allowed a deeper understanding of the relationship between the 
environment and human security. Understanding the XBF and Nakai Plateau as 
ecological systems that underpin the human security of locals helps to understand 
the magnitude of the negative impacts wrought by the construction of the NT2. In 
fact, an SES perspective anticipates these impacts. Finally, the relationship between 
the state and human security was explored. Although the Lancang Cascade 
provided some general insights regarding the long distance impacts that can occur 
when one state captures the resources within its own borders, the most significant 
insights are provided by the Laotian context. SES challenges the current logic being 
used by the GoL that links hydropower construction with human development and 
poverty reduction. Instead of increasing human security, the current aggressive 
hydropower construction occurring within Laos is in fact creating serious insecurities 
and vulnerabilities. Instead of strengthening the state, they are undermining it by 
ignoring the importance of ecological services to the subsistence, livelihoods and 
economy of large numbers of Laotian citizens.    
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Section 4: Conclusions Section 
Conclusion 
 
The government (of Laos) wants to build 60 dams over the next 20 or 30 years, and 
at the moment it doesn’t have the capacity to deal with environmental and social 
impacts for any single one of them. 
  
Dr. Thayer Scudder, Member of the NTPC ‘International Panel of Experts’  
New York Times, August 2014.773 
 
This conclusion aims to achieve four things. Firstly, it will review the 
accomplishments of the thesis, looking at what it set out to achieve, how it set out to 
do this and how successful it has been in doing so. Secondly, it will look at the 
implications of the thesis for: policy and practice; security studies in general; and 
environmental security in particular. Thirdly, it will reflect on some of the challenges 
to Systemic Environmental Security. Finally, it will make suggestions for further 
research that can contribute to a greater understanding of the value of Systemic 
Environmental Security.  
Achievements of the thesis 
In order to understand whether the thesis has been successful in achieving what it 
set out to accomplish, we must briefly review the research questions and main 
hypothesis as established in the introduction and methodology. The three guiding 
research questions were: 
1. Does environmental security have a central theoretical core that enables it to 
coherently analyse the linkages between security and the environment?   
2. Is there a common theme that can be discerned within the literature on 
environmental security? 
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3. Does Systemic Environmental Security provide any unique insights into the 
relationship between security and the environment? 
Accordingly, the hypothesis as outlined specifically in the introduction was that there 
is a discernible recurring theme to the environmental security discourse and that if 
operationalised to form a synthetic approach – known as Systemic Environmental 
Security – this more comprehensive analysis would provide unique security insights 
that would not otherwise be achieved.  
Chapters One and Three addressed the first two questions. In regards to the first 
question, Chapter One, the literature review, outlined the disparate nature of 
Environmental Security Studies (ESS). Chapter Three analysed how this has led to a 
splintered idea of environmental security that defies definition. ESS has no 
theoretical or methodological core and it was observed that there have been three 
main reasons for the lack of a central premise to ESS. Firstly, ESS evolved during 
the opening up period of security studies following the end of the Cold War. Security 
studies itself became a highly fractious field of inquiry throughout this period, 
splintering into a range of different siloes focusing on different security referents and 
meanings of security. ESS is therefore a reflection of the broader splintered nature of 
security studies. Secondly, both ‘environment’ and ‘security’ are contentious terms. 
The critical work of Dalby emphasized the controversial nature of environment, 
indicating that it is often understood as separate from human activities and 
something to be conquered and controlled, rather than the context of human 
activities and that which fundamentally underpins human society. In regards to 
security, the splintered nature of security studies highlights the different ways that 
security can be understood – and, accordingly, the various ideas of who or what is to 
be secured.  Finally, the cross disciplinary nature of ESS also contributes to the lack 
of a central premise to environmental security. A variety of epistemologies and 
methodologies compete in the same space to argue over the meaning and focus of 
ESS.  
Chapter Three described this lack of a central theoretical core to ESS as “the 
problem with environmental security”. This “problem” was once again highlighted in 
Chapter Six by considering the case study chapters from the perspective of the four 
best developed paradigms of ESS: state security, human security, environmental 
 
 
245 | P a g e  
 
scarcities and violent conflict, and critical ecology. What was found was that each 
made a contribution to our understanding of the way that hydropower development in 
the Mekong is impacting on security, but none were able to capture the systemic 
nature of the relationships between the state, the environment, and human security. 
Unsurprisingly, there were significant differences between the positions of state 
security and human security. The importance of question one, therefore, is not only 
that it established that there is no central theoretical core to ESS and the reasons 
behind this, but that the lack of a united approach hinders ESS from providing a 
coherent and somewhat united analysis of the relationship between security and the 
environment.  
The second question asked whether there is a central theme to ESS. Chapter Three 
outlined the ways in which a large proportion of the environmental security literature 
is seeking to understand the interactions between the state, the environment, and 
human security. Each epistemology approaches the problem from its own 
perspective, favouring a particular referent or unit of analysis. Each perspective is 
nevertheless attempting to come to terms with the complexity involved in 
understanding how these interact in a systemic way. While there is a recognition that 
there are links between the state, the environment and human security, analysing 
one in isolation from the others, limits the understanding of the whole. Based on this 
analysis of Chapter Three, the answer to the second question appears to be a 
qualified ‘yes’. Yes, there is a recurring theme, but this must be qualified because 
although the similarities are discernible, given the disparate nature of ESS, the links 
are nevertheless tenuous.  
In order to understand more clearly the relationship between the state, the 
environment and human security, the analytical framework of Systemic 
Environmental Security (SES) was outlined in Chapter Three. Instead of focusing on 
just one security referent, it was noted that an SES perspective instead investigates 
the relationship between the state, the environment and human security. Rather than 
seeking to understand how the state and the environment interact, or how human 
security and the environment interact, an SES perspective suggests that to 
understand the relationship between the environment and security we must not focus 
on either state security or human security but on both.  
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This brings us to the final and most important research question that sought to 
explore the unique perspective brought about by Systemic Environmental Security in 
regards to the relationship between the environment and security. Chapters Four 
and Five provided a rich source of data to analyse from an SES perspective, 
outlining the serious challenges that are arising in the Mekong River Basin (MRB) as 
a result of hydropower construction. Chapter Four examined the cascade of dams 
known as the Lancang Cascade that have been constructed in the Chinese section 
of the Mekong. Understanding the Lancang Cascade enabled a macro 
understanding of the MRB and the relationship between security and the 
environment. Chapter Five examined the Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos and provided 
greater specificity for a micro understanding. Chapter Six then analysed the findings 
of Chapters Four and Five from the perspective of SES.  
Specific contribution of the thesis 
The analysis of Chapter Six demonstrates that SES facilitates insights into four key 
relationships relevant to security and the environment: 1) the relationships between 
states and the environment; 2) the relationships between states and other states; 3) 
the relationship between human security and the environment and; 4) the 
relationship between the state and human security. In regards to insight one, 
evidence from both the Lancang Cascade and the Nam Theun 2 established that 
states in the MRB tend to view their renewable resources in purely economic terms, 
and as both sovereign and exploitable. By viewing resources from this perspective, 
the dominant mindset drives a development imperative that seeks to transform the 
waters of the MRB into energy and profit. This hinders states from perceiving and 
understanding the range of other important renewable resources that are provided 
by the Mekong and its tributaries, such as fisheries, irrigation, riverside gardens and 
silt. These resources are not easily quantifiable in their value, not easily transformed 
into state and private capital, and their destruction is usually considered an 
‘externality’ of hydropower construction.  
The second important insight provided by SES is that viewing resources in this way 
can have a negative impact on the relationships between states. This knowledge 
primarily stems from the example of the Lancang Cascade, but is also related to the 
Lower Mekong mainstream dams that have been briefly discussed. As a result of the 
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construction of the Lancang Cascade and the supposed inequitable exploitation of 
the Mekong’s resources, realism anticipates political tensions between states. 
Instead, the development imperative of the GMS, encouraged by a liberal 
institutionalist mindset, and reinforced by the ‘ASEAN Way’, facilitates a false 
understanding that encourages states to think of the MRB in a compartmentalised 
way, divided along state boundaries. On the contrary, SES indicates that states in 
the MRB are connected via a complex ecological system and not simply connected 
by borders.  
What China does in its section of the river has a direct – albeit difficult to quantify – 
impact on the health of the environment in distant parts of the system, particularly in 
Cambodia and Vietnam. These impacts are most significant in the Delta and the 
Tonle Sap and threaten to wreak havoc with local ecosystems and the communities 
who rely on them. The problem is that all states have subscribed to the development 
imperative and view the environment in primarily economic terms. Without a 
significant paradigm shift there is therefore little room for a discourse of discontent. 
The unique insight of SES in regards to the relationship between states in the MRB 
is that whether they understand and accept it or not, riparians have a unique physical 
connection. From a normative perspective, each has a responsibility to the rest to 
ensure that the system functions as a whole and to seek ways of co-managing the 
system. It is not a matter of ensuring the security and prosperity of one nation or the 
other, but ensuring the security of the whole in the context of their ecological 
linkages. This cannot be fully grasped without an understanding of the third and 
fourth insights of SES as summarised below.   
The third important insight illuminated by Systemic Environmental Security is in 
regards to the relationship between human security and the environment. In the 
MRB, this relationship is particularly strong given that many individuals and 
communities are heavily reliant on natural resources for their subsistence and 
livelihoods. The NT2 demonstrated clearly the strength of this relationship, showing 
that hundreds of thousands in central Laos are reliant on the resources of the rivers 
for their subsistence, livelihoods and economic prosperity. Fisheries, irrigation and 
agriculture, riverside gardens, and potable water are most important contributions to 
human security in the area. The link between human security and the environment is 
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perhaps the most expected and uncontroversial finding of the thesis given that it 
aligns with the environmental security literature that focuses on human security, such 
as that forwarded by Barnett, Dalby, Adger, Peluso and others.  
Finally, SES engages with the relationship between the state and human security. 
This insight is related to the first, which found that states in the MRB view the 
environment primarily in economic terms. The example of the NT2 demonstrates 
very clearly that the relationship between the state and human security is not simply 
based on economic transactions that rely on increasing the revenue of the central 
government in order to redistribute this to individuals and communities. When 
environmental resources are valued by states only as a source of economic revenue, 
without due consideration for their wider importance in the context of ecological and 
social systems, this has significant negative impacts on human security. From the 
perspective of SES, therefore, the way that states view and interact with the 
environment is directly related to the relationship between human security and the 
environment.  
This point is related to the second insight in that the negative security impacts of the 
Lancang Cascade and mainstream Mekong dams are and will primarily impact at the 
level of human security. Without this understanding, as well as an understanding of 
the complex ecological system of the MRB, states are unable to comprehend the 
security implications of their actions and how the activities within the borders of one 
state can severely impact on the security of another that they do not share a border 
with. Systemic Environmental Security provides a unique perspective and affords an 
opportunity for states who suffer from the negative impacts of hydropower – for 
example Vietnam and Cambodia – to create a security discourse that challenges the 
activities in another state – for example China – based on the principle of non-
interference. The construction of the Lancang Cascade is interfering with the lives 
and livelihoods of millions downstream, and will continue to do so increasingly. One 
of the biggest challenges in this regard is that the effects of the Lancang Cascade – 
because they are temporally and spatially distant from the causes – are difficult to 
quantify in the here and now. 
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Summary and reflections on the research questions 
It is clear that the thesis achieved what it set out to accomplish. It answered the first 
question as to why there is no theoretical core to ESS. It also answered the second 
question regarding the similarities across the ESS literature, developing the idea of 
Systemic Environmental Security. Finally it answered the third question by exploring 
the unique insights provided by a Systemic Environmental Security approach.  
The question could be asked as to whether the research questions were themselves 
the right ones. Given the insights that have been outlined above, arguably these 
questions have shed valuable light on the concept of environmental security. The 
hypothesis that the framework of Systemic Environmental Security would shed 
valuable light on the relationship between security and the environment has proven 
itself to be correct. However, environmental security itself remains an amorphous 
idea. A question could have been asked about the definition of environmental 
security. Given the lack of definitional integrity and cohesion, it is possible that an 
investigation surrounding the definition of environmental security and the possible 
value that this may have contributed to the security literature in general would have 
also been a very valuable exercise. This may be an area of interest for future 
researchers.  
 
Systemic Environmental Security: Implications for Theory and 
Practice 
Although it is important that the thesis achieved what it set out to accomplish, it is 
also valuable to understand the implications of the development of the idea of 
Systemic Environmental Security. After all the research and analysis, it is essential 
to ask the important, yet confronting question of: “So what?” There is a range of 
potential implications, and it is not possible to go into them all in detail, however, this 
section will outline those that appear to be most relevant to both theory and practice. 
Firstly, in relation to practice, some implications of the thesis’ findings for the Mekong 
riparian states, and the region more generally, will be outlined. Secondly, some 
suggestions of what the development of SES means for security theory will be made.  
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Policy and Practice: “So what?” for the Mekong 
Although it would be a positive for security in the MRB, it is difficult to see Mekong 
riparian states shifting their current national security mindset and traditional security 
paradigm as a result of the findings of SES. Nevertheless, an SES perspective 
demonstrates very clearly that a continuation of the current practice of rapid 
hydropower development in the MRB is unsustainable in terms of the regional 
economy, a disaster for the MRB’s complex ecological systems, and a growing 
tragedy for human security. The construction of the Lancang Cascade is a fait 
acompli, and there is no longer any amount of policy shifting or political wrangling 
that would change this. The same can be said of the NT2. Yet this thesis, and the 
large body of research that accompanies it, shows that the assumptions behind 
hydropower construction in regards to the damage it causes to social and ecological 
systems is consistently underplayed. This is of particular concern for the eleven 
planned Lower Mekong mainstream dams. In purely economic terms, the best-case 
scenario of these dams is a total financial gain of US$33 billion. As we have 
observed, however, these financial gains come about as a result of losses to 
livelihoods and severe environmental destruction. The worst-case scenario could 
mean basin-wide financial losses of over a US$250 billion, accompanying a collapse 
in the environmental resources of the MRB.774 Given that the research indicates that 
best-case scenarios are rarely – if ever – achieved, this should stand as a stark 
warning for states who continue to move forward with hydropower development. 
An SES framework enables states to understand the relationship between 
themselves, the environment, and human security. It demonstrates very clearly that 
in the MRB, the relationship between states and human security is not one of purely 
economic paternalism, but is highly contingent on the impact the state has on the 
environment. In order to ensure the well-being of their citizens, it is absolutely 
essential – given the links between human security and the environment – that 
states do not remove, destroy, or degrade the environmental resources that are so 
crucial to lives and livelihoods. To do so rescinds the social contract between the 
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state and its citizens. In Laos, in particular, the social contract appears to be very 
much broken.  
Although SES provides a perspective that can undoubtedly allow states to re-
envision their relationship with human security, the most significant challenge is 
gaining policy attention and prioritisation for both social and environmental issues. 
One of the biggest challenges for SES is that if it is to be relevant at the policy level it 
must tread a fine line between forwarding important ecological principles and 
appearing to be “deep green”. The conflation of ecological issues with leftist politics 
is a consequence of the growth of Green parties who advocate strongly for the 
environment. Additionally, in the MRB, social and environmental issues tend to be 
the domain of NGOs and as a result are also treated with suspicion by states, 
business and institutions. The difficulty for SES is that it challenges the dominance of 
state-based thinking even while it is attempting to appeal to those who have a vested 
interest in the states dominance. This must be achieved without appearing to be 
politically oriented to the right, toeing the national security line, or supporting regimes 
that may be causing significant harm to their own populations.   
There is no cogent reason, however, to place the environment on either side of 
politics. The concerns of SES and ESS in many ways transcend the political divide, 
but if environmental insecurity is to be decreased – whether it be through the 
reduction of violent conflict related to renewable resources, the development of 
humane and appropriate policies to shape migration flows, an increase in poverty 
alleviation measures, or indeed the refashioning of the role of states that have been 
dominant since at least the time of the Treaty of Westphalia – politics must play a 
role. Clearly, without the involvement and investment of states, little can be done 
about the interplay between states, the environment and human security. 
Unfortunately this has not helped to answer the question of how to gain the attention 
of policymakers. Policymakers are expected to be clever “social engineers”, 
designing policy that positively influences outcomes, decreasing the levels of social, 
economic, and environmental stress, while improving the lives of its citizens and 
increasing the economic and political prowess of the states. But the complexity of 
environmental challenges – and their systemic nature – may in fact hinder, rather 
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than encourage the ingenuity necessary to prevent further environmental 
degradation. As Homer-Dixon argues:   
Unfortunately…the syndrome of multiple, interacting, unpredictable, and 
rapidly changing environmental problems will increase the complexity and 
pressure of the policy-making setting. It will also generate increased ‘social 
friction’ as elites and interest groups struggle to protect their prerogatives. The 
ability of policy makers to be good social engineers is likely to go down, not 
up, as these stresses increase.775 
National policymaking in the MRB occurs in the context of a complex web of political, 
economic, social, cultural and environmental challenges. It is understandable that 
balancing all these factors presents many difficulties. We must be careful not to 
excuse poor policymaking on over-complexity, however. The main implication of 
SES for policy and practice in relation to hydropower development in the MRB is that 
there has not been nearly enough attention paid to this complexity. Instead, the MRB 
and its resources have been viewed in far-too simplistic terms, as economic 
resources to be captured and profited from. SES shows clearly that it is time that 
policymakers pay much greater attention to the complex ecological system that they 
govern, and to those who rely on the continuing health and productivity of the 
system. 
Thinking Systemically About Security: “So what?” for Security Studies 
Chapters Two and Three demonstrated clearly the disparate nature of both ESS and 
security studies more generally. Security studies is broken into a range of different 
‘silos’; schools of thought that approach the idea of security from different 
epistemological and methodological positions. A systemic approach to security is at 
odds with this standard siloed approach of security studies. Even critical security 
studies, which has successfully opened up the referent of security to units other than 
the state, is still focused primarily on these units.776 The idea that security comes 
from securing the whole rather than the parts is still not part of the security paradigm. 
Much of the debate between the various schools of thought within security studies 
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are, in many ways, in a competition about ‘what or who is to be secured?’ The idea 
that in some cases, all referents can be simultaneously secured under a single rubric 
does not appear to have been considered. Systemic Environmental Security is 
therefore a challenge to security studies because it suggests that the competition 
between who or what is to be secured is extremely problematic – at least in the 
context of the environment. Narrowly focusing on only the security of states, without 
doubt limits a holistic understanding of security. The same can be said for focusing 
only on the security of individuals and communities. As Chapter Three highlighted, 
the majority of those engaged with the environmental security literature are already 
attempting to come to grips with the complex interaction between states, the 
environment and human security. 
It is, however, vital that we do not overreach in regards to the importance of 
Systemic Environmental Security. There is no intention to usurp all knowledge and 
learning within security studies with a single systemic theory of everything. Clearly 
SES has links to, and has in some cases built on, a variety of different theoretical 
approaches. Without these important and insightful ideas, SES could not have been 
developed. SES, therefore, does not propose replacing states with humans as the 
referent object of security, nor does it suggest that states are the most important 
security referent. Both are obviously important but neither can be secure unless the 
underlying biophysical processes in which they reside are capable of providing life 
and supporting the fundamentals of human activity. Neither is it the ultimate end of 
individuals or states to secure the environment, but all must recognise that without a 
well-functioning biophysical environment, there can ultimately be no security.  
This is a valuable idea for security studies. It is hoped that the analytical framework 
of SES makes the important contribution of giving security theorists reason to 
reconsider siloed and exclusive approaches to security. There are clearly situations 
where such an approach hinders our understanding of security rather than helps it. 
In particular, those attempting to engage with the complex issue of how security 
relates to the environment must understand the importance of the system and not 
simply focus on its component parts. 
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A framework for understanding complex environmental/social/political 
interactions: “So what?” for Environmental Security Studies 
The ‘problem’ of the disparate nature of environmental security studies has not been 
ameliorated by the development of SES. SES does not change the fact that there 
are a variety of theoretical paradigms, epistemologies and ontologies that are 
engaged with the ambiguously named ‘environmental security’. It is not the intention 
of, nor would it be necessarily valuable for, SES to unite ESS into a homogenous 
and united whole. In fact, it must be acknowledged here that SES is essentially 
dependant on the richness of theory that results from the disparate nature of ESS, 
without which SES would have nothing to synthesise. The fact that the various 
theoretical approaches to ESS have different referents of security – from individuals 
to the state – forms the foundation for the analytical framework of SES.  
The disparate nature of ESS is a problem in that it hinders the idea of environmental 
security from practical application at a policy level. The value of SES for 
environmental security studies is in its links to policy and the real world. It takes 
important elements of the environmental security discourse and synthesises them 
into an analytical framework which has demonstrated itself to be important and 
relevant in understanding the challenges in the Mekong. More investigation is 
needed, but it is hoped that SES can have more widespread applications in practice 
in other empirical settings. This would mean that environmental security can be used 
more effectively to understand large and complex challenges at the nexus of politics, 
society and the environment.  
Reflections on Challenges 
There have been significant challenges in researching and writing this thesis, in 
particular, developing the idea of Systemic Environmental Security. Chapter Three 
pointed out the challenges of any study into environmental security, and the 
methodology chapter laid out the particular challenges for this thesis. This section 
takes an opportunity to reflect on these challenges and what they mean for future 
research of this type.  
The disparate, cross-disciplinary nature of ESS makes any research related to it both 
too expansive and overly specific at the same time. This thesis is a perfect example 
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of this awkward situation. Focusing on the Mekong River Basin has integrated five 
nation-states,777 a population of over 60 million, a basin with a catchment area of 
795,000 km2 and a river that is around 4,900 km long. Understanding such a large 
and complex eco-political-social system presents immense difficulties. Nevertheless, 
in order to understand the environmental security challenges associated with 
hydropower in the MRB, the system must be understood as a system without 
compartmentalising it into artificial units. If this thesis has achieved nothing else, it 
has at the very least clearly established that the propensity to divide complex 
ecological systems along national boundaries and according to the whims of a 
centralised state, constructing large infrastructure projects that fundamentally 
change the ecological system, is at the heart of the challenges to security in the 
MRB. It is difficult, if not impossible to approach these problems by examining only 
that which occurs within the boundary of a single state. It is impossible, for example, 
to understand the problems associated with the silt capture of the Lancang Dams by 
only studying the Chinese section of the river as it provides no understanding of the 
systemic way that silt impacts the Delta.   
This relates to the challenge of the overly expansive nature of such investigations. In 
the case of the MRB, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. Nevertheless, this 
thesis has attempted to counter this difficulty by restricting the investigation to 
hydropower and focusing in on a single dam to examine the more immediately 
observable impacts through the case of the NT2. Arguably, focusing on the NT2 has 
been successful in providing a clearer understanding of the interaction between 
hydropower and security. We must, of course, use inference if we are to suggest that 
this relates to the Lancang Cascade and to hydropower more generally – although 
this in itself is not unusual in case study research.  
The challenge is, therefore, not that there has been a focus on a single dam, but that 
the focus has only been on hydropower. This is because there are a range of other 
factors occurring in the Mekong that are contributing to the challenges facing states 
and communities. Climate change, growing populations and increasing urbanisation 
are just a few of the issues that are also interacting with the impacts of hydropower 
development. These are complex problems in and of themselves and adding them to 
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the already complex nature of hydropower development in the MRB would only 
compound the difficulties with the scope of this study. Nevertheless it is difficult to 
avoid the fact that their absence presents difficulties to the idea of Systemic 
Environmental Security which seeks to understand the system in its entirety. This is 
not a challenge that can be easily overcome – if indeed it can be overcome at all. As 
Muir once wrote: “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to 
everything else in the Universe”778.  
For SES in particular, and ESS in general, research that is to have any relevance will 
always face this challenge of being both overly expansive and narrow 
simultaneously. From a methodological perspective, this obviously lends itself to a 
pragmatic approach that is able to make judgements as to the best way to go about 
any given investigation. Dictating that a study should have any particular level of 
specificity is unhelpful. An investigation into the relationship between the state and a 
single village is valid if the environmental processes under investigation are site 
specific – for example a local aquifer or village managed forest. This is just as valid 
as an investigation into the relationship between state attitudes to CO2 pollution, its 
effect on ocean acidification and how this may impact upon the food security options 
of small island nations.779 From the perspective of SES, both are equally valid, given 
that each is investigating the relationship between the state, the environment and 
human security, but each will obviously have a different level of specificity and will 
require a different knowledge base and methodological approach.  
The second challenge is related to the first. Research is often valued for its 
specificity and depth. Research that burrows deeply into a specific topic, seeking to 
understand a single area of investigation in great detail is common in academic 
studies – both qualitative and quantitative. Such research is in fact the norm and is 
so because academic institutions are built around various knowledge siloes with their 
foundations in a particular ontology, splintered into a variety of epistemologies, and 
researching based on specific methodologies. Cross-disciplinary research – such as 
that required of any SES study – presents a challenge to this model, because it 
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either requires these different knowledge siloes to work together, attempting to find 
common methodological and epistemological ground – described in some detail in 
Chapter Three – or, as has occurred in this thesis, a single researcher must attempt 
to cross these divides within the confines of a single piece of research.  
This being the case, the challenge is for the research to contain enough specificity 
for it to be considered of suitable academic value. Reflecting on this thesis 
specifically, it has required a depth of insight into a variety of academic research 
from the natural and social sciences. Without a knowledge of hydrology, fisheries, 
ecology and agriculture, the empirical section of this chapter would be weak and 
shallow. The knowledge required of the natural sciences for such an investigation is 
well beyond that which is normally required for a social science thesis investigating 
security. The opposite is also true for a natural science thesis where an in-depth 
knowledge of social science concepts would not normally be required. Yet this thesis 
demonstrates a deep connection with the international relations and security 
literature.  
The question therefore is: Is the investigation specific enough? At its core this is a 
security thesis, yet the addition of that vexatious word ‘environmental’ adds much 
complication. The natural science literature in Chapters Four and Five is detailed and 
provides clear insights into the ecological challenges in the MRB. These have not 
been addressed in a superficial way nor from a simplistic policy perspective, yet 
there is no claim to scientific expertise here. It has to be acknowledged, however, 
that each of the issues – such as fisheries and hydrology – can be delved into in 
much greater depth. This undoubtedly provides ammunition for a strong critique of 
this and similar research. Yet if this large volume of information was to be included, 
the thesis would have become unmanageable.  
The security side of the equation presents a different picture. There is both width and 
depth from a security perspective. Any scholar of environmental security does not 
have the luxury of being able to consider only one primary referent of security, nor to 
ignore epistemologies outside of a single perspective. This is obviously because 
ESS has no single referent or central epistemology. Coming to terms with 
environmental security means understanding a wide variety of security perspectives, 
yet width is no excuse for a lack of in-depth knowledge. This thesis has focused on 
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both traditional and human security studies, but it has also demonstrated a strong 
depth of knowledge in regards to the environmental scarcities and violent conflict 
literature, political ecology and critical security studies. Just as with the natural 
sciences, however, each of these subjects has its own large body of literature, yet to 
espouse them in great detail would once again have led to an unmanageable thesis.  
The final challenge, therefore, arises when attempting to understand what or who 
constitutes an environmental security scholar. What skills, knowledge and 
perspectives are required from such an individual? Furthermore, are they welcome 
within the security or academic community? As to what skills are required, this thesis 
has outlined the need for a cross-disciplinary approach. Obviously an understanding 
of the natural and social sciences is required and, therefore, a strong interest in both, 
and the way that they interact is essential. In order to facilitate such interest and 
research, tertiary education must actively encourage a cross-disciplinary approach 
that nurtures those who seek to understand the links between the natural sciences 
and the social sciences, between the environment and security. But as has been 
observed already, academic institutions tend to focus on siloed research rather than 
cross-disciplinarity.  
Dupont and Pearman discuss this problem in relation to climate change, viewing it as 
a conceptual and structural problem: 
…our education system is not producing sufficient numbers of students and 
graduates with the requisite skills to effectively analyse the causes and 
consequences of climate change. The problem is both conceptual and structural. 
Conceptually, strategic and international security studies…is still overwhelmingly 
concerned with military conflict and this bias is reflected in our universities and 
teaching institutions. Structurally, the study of climate change is very stove-piped. 
Climate scientists see the issue primarily through the lens of physical science, 
economists focus on cost benefit calculations, environmentalists and business 
sceptics argue about desirable levels of greenhouse gas emissions and appropriate 
remedies, while strategists have largely ignored the subject altogether.780 
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This is obviously a much larger issue than can be – or needs to be – discussed in 
this thesis. Nevertheless, understanding this challenge gives greater context to the 
idea and development of Systemic Environmental Security.  
Suggestions for further research 
There is a range of potentially fruitful research areas that would provide rich and 
valuable data to explore, challenge, and strengthen the idea of Systemic 
Environmental Security. More research into hydropower development is the obvious 
place to start. As outlined in Chapter Six, there are many other hydropower projects 
on the Mekong and its tributaries that would make a valuable contribution. Lower 
Mekong mainstream dams most obviously need investigation given the large 
numbers of people who will be affected by their construction. A project that would 
provide clearer insight into the relationship between states, the environment, human 
security and other states would be the Yali Falls Dam given that it was built in 
Vietnam and sits just 80km upstream from Cambodia.781 This would provide greater 
specificity and a micro view that would shed light on the potential impact of Laos’ 
Don Sahong mainstream dam which is scheduled to be built just 1km from the 
Cambodian border.782  Hydropower construction is occurring all throughout Asia, so 
shifting the focus from the MRB towards other river basins would be valuable. In 
particular, the Salween River, which flows first through China and then Myanmar, 
currently has thirteen dams planned on the Chinese section of the river, and another 
six proposed downstream in Myanmar.783  
In South Asia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Bhutan are all 
engaging with various levels of hydropower construction. The obvious candidate is 
India, given that it too sits downstream from Chinese hydropower projects. Of 
particular interest, however, is Bhutan, which instead of focusing on Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) focuses on Gross National Happiness (GNH).784 Of significant 
interest to the idea of SES is whether the Bhutanese government is aware of the 
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connections between itself and human security through the bridge of the 
environment and how this plays out in the context of hydropower. Of course China, 
the global leader in hydropower generation, would also provide valuable cases. 
Looking further afield, there is also significant hydropower construction occurring in 
both South America and Africa that warrants investigation. 
If Systemic Environmental Security is to have more widespread appeal as a 
framework for understanding the relationship between the environment and security 
then it must also have relevance beyond hydropower. Aquifer systems and their links 
with economic productivity, human health and food security appear to be relevant to 
SES. Australia’s Great Artesian Basin, China’s North China Plain aquifer, and India’s 
Upper Ganges and Indus River aquifer systems would potentially provide valuable 
insights into the relationship between security and the environment.785 Forestry 
activities also appear particularly germane given forestry’s frequent links with both 
human security and state economic activities,786 and riverine and ocean fisheries 
may also prove relevant to SES. Global climate change would pose a significant 
challenge to the idea of SES given the immense scale of such an inquiry. Whether a 
case-study or case-studies could be established to support such an enquiry is an 
intriguing question.  
It may also prove useful from a historical perspective to revisit the cases studied in 
other projects such as Homer-Dixon’s Project on Environment, Population and 
Security (EPS), and the Environmental Change and Acute Conflict (ECAC) project. 
Bachler’s Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) and the Global Environmental 
Change and Human Security (GECHS) project. May also yield valuable new insights 
to the concept of SES.787 If SES provides new and unique insights into these cases 
then it helps to demonstrate its value to the environmental security literature more 
broadly.  
Of interest and relevance would be cases where there appears to be a healthy 
relationship between the state, the environment and human security. Knowing what 
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factors have contributed to such healthy relationships would enable this knowledge 
to be transferred to other arenas where insecurity prevails in order to explore positive 
ways of increasing security in a systemic way. This would potentially be of interest to 
Peace Studies research. Possibly relevant to this is the role of democracy, given that 
in the MRB, all riparians are essentially one party governments.788 An understanding 
of the role of democracy is therefore important when considering the relationship 
between the state, the environment and human security and requires further 
investigation.789 
Finally, the role of industry and business is missing in the majority of the 
environmental security literature: and SES is no exception in this respect. In the 
MRB, hydropower development is driven not only by states, but by international 
corporations and state-owned enterprises with a high profit motive. Although there 
has been acknowledgement within the thesis that corporations play a role in 
environmental harm, there has been no direct analysis of this – the focus being on 
states and human security. It is unusual to think of business as part of the security 
equation yet if corporations are taking actions that are driving insecurity, then 
obviously they need to be taken seriously in relation to security. Given Systemic 
Environmental Security’s focus on systems and holistic understanding, then the role 
of business needs to be considered when such an analysis is warranted and 
incorporated into the theoretical framework if necessary. 
Final reflections 
The challenges in relation to hydropower in the MRB have been around at least 
since the early 1990s, during which time plans for the NT2 were well advanced and 
the construction of the Manwan Dam, the first dam of the Lancang Cascade, was 
completed. Since this time, scholars have been attempting to understand the 
complexity of these challenges and come to terms with the security implications of 
hydropower construction in the MRB. One of the most insightful examination of these 
                                                          
788
 Although Cambodia is officially an exception, former Khmer Rouge cadre and now Prime Minister Hun Sen 
has ruled the country for over thirty years. See: "Hun Sen, Cambodia's Prime Minister, Marks 30 Years of 
Hardline Rule " The Guardian 14 January, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/22/bangkok-
big-brother-politics-ruling-party-democracy  
789
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issues was provided by Evelyn Goh in 2006, and her contribution is worth quoting at 
length:  
The Mekong region’s economic development is often pitted directly against 
ecological protection. Yet it should be clear that the connection between ecological 
and economic sustainability is human security; the question is not whether economic 
growth should be prioritised over conservation, but how the welfare and well-being of 
communities can be improved and ensured by distributing the benefits and costs of 
economic development in a way that does not undermine the ability of these 
communities to make a living and to enjoy an improving quality of life. Given that 
most of the information and data about such impacts are being collected on the 
ground by non-governmental organisations working within local communities, the 
acceptance that ensuring human security is one crucial responsibility of national 
governments is an important missing link that will connect these local movements to 
national, and eventually regional, agendas. This critical conceptual link will have to 
be forged if claims that national and regional development contributes to social, 
national and regional security are to be meaningful.790 
This insightful passage highlights the security challenges that have arisen as a result 
of hydropower construction in the MRB, confirming the importance of the research 
agenda of this thesis. It furthermore demonstrates the persistent lack of a systemic 
understanding of the links between the state, the environment and human security in 
the region – given that the above passage was written nearly a decade ago. This 
thesis, and the development of the idea of Systemic Environmental Security, makes 
an immensely valuable contribution in regards to the missing conceptual link 
between states and human security in the MRB.  
The analytical framework of Systemic Environmental Security conceptualises the 
links between the state, the environment and human security. It demonstrates very 
clearly that the economic activities of states that impact on the ecological systems 
within their own borders is having significant negative impacts on the human security 
of residents of the MRB. What is clear is that states neither understand nor respect 
the strong relationship that exists between themselves and human security. 
Systemic Environmental Security makes it clear that these links do exist, and – if 
states are to have any legitimacy – provides compelling reasons as to why these 
                                                          
790
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links must be taken very seriously. In order to avoid undermining their own 
legitimacy, states must fundamentally shift not only their relationship with the 
environment, but more importantly the relationship with their own citizens. However, 
as it currently stands in the MRB – most notably in Laos – states are the drivers of 
human insecurity rather than protectors and facilitators of it.  
Any appeal to states that they must take a more considered and precautionary 
approach to hydropower – and other environmentally destructive practices – is 
essentially futile without firstly, recognising the critical importance of human security, 
and secondly, appreciating the importance of the environment to human security. 
Consideration of the importance of the lives and livelihoods of the millions who live in 
the region will in turn facilitate a recognition of the importance of the environment to 
human security. 
Systemic Environmental Security provides this unique perspective, demonstrating 
that in the MRB, it is not just a matter of focusing on either state security or human 
security separately, but instead focusing on both in the context of the environment. 
Only from this perspective can a comprehensive understanding of the security 
situation in the Mekong River Basin be gained. It is hoped that the unique insights 
provided by Systemic Environmental Security can be applied in a range of contexts, 
providing clearer conceptualisations of the complex relationship between security 
and the environment.  
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Appendix 1 
Expert Interviews 
 
Interview Questions: 
Environment and Climate 
 What are the impacts of lower Mekong river dams on the ecosystem services 
of the Mekong river? 
 What are the costs of replacing these services if they are lost?  
 Have you witnessed or are you aware of regional changes due to global 
climate change. 
 If so, how do these impact the river and the population that rely on it? 
 In your opinion, are the biggest changes occurring on the Mekong due to 
climate change or anthropogenic impacts? 
 Are there ways to mitigate against these changes? 
 
Food and Water Security 
 In your opinion, what role do Mekong fisheries and agriculture play in local 
food security? 
 What role do Mekong fisheries and agriculture play in regional food security? 
 What are the current assessments of the potential losses to fisheries and 
agriculture due to main stream dams? 
 Are you aware of any studies that estimate losses to fisheries or rice 
production from mains stream dams? 
 Are you aware of any studies that estimate losses to fisheries or rice 
production from climate change? 
 Is there significant aquifer depletion in the region? 
 What is being done about salinity in the delta? 
 What is the role of GMO crops in the region? 
 Are there potential benefits to irrigation from mainstream dams?  
 What would be the likely impacts of proposed lower mainstream dams on 
regional and local food security? 
 Are there changes in population and appetites which may impact on food 
security? 
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Migration and Human Security 
 What has been the consequences to populations living in the Mekong River 
Basin from previously built dams on the Mekong’s tributaries or Upper Basin 
Dams? 
 In these circumstances, has there been initial forced relocation? 
 What have been the longer term impacts to populations in these areas in 
regards to health, nutrition and livelihoods? 
 As a result of climate change or anthropogenic impacts, has there been any 
migration occurring in the region? 
 In your opinion, if large scale migration were to occur, where would these 
migrants go and why? 
 Do you see any evidence of regional ethnic tensions?  
 
International Security and Conflict 
 In your opinion, what have been the causes of past regional conflicts? (leave 
the time scale open to the interviewee but perhaps press on recent or pre-20th 
century if they do not elaborate) 
 Do you believe there are currently any tensions that may result in wider 
spread regional conflict? 
 Is ASEAN an adequate forum to resolve regional issues?  
 Do you believe that the issues involving dams are significant enough to create 
armed conflict? Please elaborate.  
 Can you foresee a situation where Lower Mekong states form a bloc to put 
pressure on China for more information or dam building cessation?  
 What would be the consequences of a single lower basin mainstream dam? 
Get expert to elaborate around the themes of conflict, food security, tragedy of 
the commons.  
 What role do local and regional governance structures have that could 
mitigate or influence the likelihood or result of conflict should it occur? 
 
Governance issues 
 What role does the Mekong River Commission play in governance of the 
Mekong. 
 Is this role adequate? Should they have more/less power? Please elaborate. 
 What is your opinion of the interactions between nations 
 
 
266 | P a g e  
 
 
Economy and Development 
 Have you done, or are you aware of analyses that estimate the cost of 
replacing renewable resources in the Delta/Tonle Sap/Upper Mekong (or 
other basin section specific to expert)? 
 Is there a trade-off between development and environment in the Mekong 
River Basin.  
 What are the economic ramifications of not developing? 
 What are the economic ramifications of developing in this way? 
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Appendix 2 
Villager interviews 
 
Interview Questions 
 How has the NT2 dam affected your village? In general would you say that it 
has had a positive, neutral or negative impact? 
 Has there been any impact (positive or negative) on food production and 
availability as a result of the construction and running of the NT2 dam and/or 
reservoir? 
 Has there been any impact (positive or negative) on the availability of fish and 
your ability to catch it as a result of the construction and running of the NT2 
dam and/or reservoir? 
 Has there been any impact (positive or negative) on your ability to grow, 
harvest and store rice and/or other agricultural products as a result of the 
construction and running of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir?  
 Has there been any impact (positive or negative) on your livestock as a result 
of the construction and running of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir?  
 Has there been any impact (positive or negative) on water quality and/or 
availability as a result of the construction and running of the NT2 dam and/or 
reservoir?  
 Has there been any impact (positive or negative) on your health, or the health 
of those in the village (that you are aware of) as a result of the construction 
and operation of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir? 
 Have you received any compensation from the NTPC or the GoL for the 
changes that have occurred as a result of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir? 
 If you did receive compensation, do you think it was adequate? Why or why 
not? 
 Has there been any impact on the cost of living (such as the price of 
electricity, the price of fuel, or the price of food) since the construction and 
operation of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir? 
 Has there been any impact on the local environment or ecosystem services as 
a result of the construction and operation of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir? 
 Has there been any emigration from the village as a result of the construction 
and operation of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir? If so, why do you believe it is 
linked to the construction and operation of the NT2 dam and/or reservoir? 
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 Overall, would you say that the construction and operation of the NT2 dam 
and/or reservoir has been positive, neutral or negative to: yourself; your 
village; the nation; the government; the NTPC? 
 Is there anything else you would like to add or discuss? 
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